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ABSTRACT 
 
My research investigates the use and regulation of private military companies (PMCs) in international 
law. This legal research adopts a critical method of historical sociology to accommodate changing 
modes of governance. By exploring historical patterns of the use of private force I analyse the 
effectiveness and applicability of contemporary attempts to regulate PMCs. 
 
There are numerous overlapping forms of regulation that attempt to govern PMC conduct. The key 
gap, identified by analysing relevant bodies of international and domestic law, is the lack of a 
corporate liability mechanism strong enough to tackle grave international crimes committed by PMCs 
and the challenges posed by the corporate veil. 
By assessing the prevailing form of governance and the role that private security plays in state policy, 
it becomes clear that states are the main PMC clients who rely on companies for providing security 
services. Meanwhile the industry treats military activity just like any other commodity that can be 
self-regulated by the free market. In order to close the gap of PMC impunity, an international legal 
response is required that can target PMCs as companies and to invoke criminal corporate 
responsibility.  
This is why I develop a corporate criminal responsibility approach that has the potential of addressing 
the legal gap in PMC regulation. I argue that due to the military nature of their activity, PMCs are 
different to other companies as they took on a portion of state functions that requires a proportionate 
legal response in terms of responsibility.  
Transnational nature of PMC activity signals the need for these companies to be recognised as actors 
on the international level and acquire international legal personality. Finally, I explore the possibility 
of invoking criminal corporate responsibility through international criminal law as it offers the most 
tailored approach of regulating a changing governance. 
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Introduction 
From medieval to early modern history, private soldiers have dominated the security landscape. 
Their existence was fundamental to the waging of the wars between feudal lords, dynastic 
monarchies, and the condottieri of Italian city-republics. Then, as early as the fifteenth century, 
mercenaries were identified by Machiavelli as a threat to republican ideals and good 
governance.1 They were also more expensive than the emerging citizen conscripts, putting a 
financial strain on the large-scale belligerent demands of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
monarchies. However, only when a mercenary could be juxtaposed against a national citizen 
army was the use of private force gradually decreased as an element of state military power. 
Even then, this trend was prevalent only amongst the sovereign states of continental Europe, 
while their overseas empires enjoyed an exemption from legal and normative regulation, raising 
mass colonial armies on behalf of the empires.  
Modern mercenaries, or private military contractors, largely inherited their unenviable 
reputation from their counterparts in the latter half of the twentieth century, when mercenaries 
were criminalised by the Geneva Conventions in the context of decolonisation and attempts to 
overthrow emerging governments.2 Today, with the largest private security company, G4S, 
employing over 620,000 people globally,3 private providers dispose of vast resources and are 
being actively used to perform various security functions across the world. Private military 
companies (PMCs) can be hired by individual states to deliver a multitude of services and 
support functions in a foreign operation.4 PMCs have also been hired by the UN for 
                                                 
1 Machiavelli, N.: “The Discourses” in Machiavelli, N. (ed. Wootton, D.): Selected Political Writings, 
Hackett Publishing Company Inc., Cambridge, 1994, p. 140. 
2 The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Protocol I, Article 47 (2), June 1977. 
3 See www.g4s.com/en/Who%20we%20are/Our%20people/Our%20employees/. 
4 Scahill, J.: Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s most Powerful Mercenary Army, Serpent’s Tail, London, 
2007; Shearer, D.: “Private Armies and Military Intervention” 1998, Vol. 38 (316), The Adelphi Paper 316; 
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peacekeeping purposes;5 moreover, they can be contracted out by other companies to protect 
extraction facilities abroad.6 While the growth of the private military industry can be observed 
in the media and through general privatisation trends,7 it can be problematic to obtain 
comprehensive data about PMC activity. Unlike national armies and official governmental 
agencies, PMCs are more obscured because they are not subject to the Freedom Information 
Act or similar legislative tools that impose transparency. Government enquiry into the private 
military industry is also limited with little reporting or regulation of the industry.8  
The thesis does not focus on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) because the majority of 
private military activity would fall through the net proving IHL a weak regulatory mechanism. 
For instance, IHL extends over state military forces, mercenaries who meet all six Additional 
Protocol I (AP I)9 criteria, and those contractors who have been properly incorporated into 
national armies or government bodies. However, since the AP I definition is narrow and there 
have been very few instances of integrating PMCs into state military,10 most private military 
actors would fall outside of the remit of IHL.11 
                                                 
Howe, H. M.: “Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes” 1998, Vol. 
36 (2), The Journal of Modern African Studies, pp. 307-331. 
5 Ostensen, A. G.: “UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies”, The 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, SSR Paper 3, 2011, available at: 
http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/UN-Use-of-Private-Military-and-Security-Companies-Practices-and-
Policies; Colonel Russell, D. W.: Understanding the Application of Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1997. 
6 Paying for Protection. The Freeport Mine and the Indonesian Security Forces, A Report by Global 
Witness, July 2005; Arduino, A.: Security Privatisation with Chinese Characteristics: The Role of Chinese 
Private Security Corporations in Protecting Chinese Outbound Investments and Citizens, Policy Report, S. 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, June 2015. 
7 Cropley, E. and Lewis, D.: “Nigeria drafts in foreign mercenaries to take on Boko Haram” 12 March 
2015, Reuters, available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-nigeria-violence-mercenaries-
idUKKBN0M80VT20150312; Arduino, A.: Security Privatisation with Chinese Characteristics. The Role of 
Chinese Private Security Corporations in Protecting Chinese Outbound Investments and Citizens, Policy 
Report, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, June 2015. 
8 McFate, S.: The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and what they Mean for the World Order, OUP, 
Oxford, 2014, p. 9. 
9 AP I definition is analysed on p. 27. 
10 E.g.: Sandline International and Executive Outcomes whose personnel were enrolled as “Special 
Constables” on an assignment to Papua New Guinea in 1997. 
11 For private military conduct under IHL see: Cameron, L. and Chetail, V.: Privatizing War: Private 
Military and Security Companies under Public International Law, CUP, Cambridge, 2013. 
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Furthermore, IHL provides a framework of international armed conflict where PMCs are rarely 
seen to operate partially due to the nature of their activity and partially due to their civilian 
status. What this means is that in order for IHL to apply as a relevant regulating body of law, 
PMCs would have to be incorporated into state forces and act as part of national armies during 
an armed conflict. PMC contractors bear criminal responsibility as individuals, regardless of their 
status under IHL and its reach does not extend to corporations. 
In the current legal context, my enquiry aims to investigate whether PMCs could offer a viable 
solution to address existing international security issues and if their current regulation under 
international law (IL) is fitting to perform this function. The issue of PMC regulation has engaged 
considerable debate amongst legal and political scholars, policy makers, and the international 
community. Because of this focus, a wide range of possible responses have emerged, varying 
between industry attempts at self-management through voluntary norms and non-binding 
standards,12 to numerous approaches that critique private force, offering solutions grounded in 
ethics13 and human rights.14 PMC regulation, current and developing, can be broadly divided 
between the ‘responsibilisation’ and criminalisation approaches. Although the soft norms of 
‘responsibilisation’ are aimed at raising standards and PMC respect for human rights, they run 
the risk of creating a veneer of false legitimacy while lacking legal enforcement and any tangible 
mechanisms for delivering justice. The proposed criminalisation efforts, on the other hand, are 
state-centric and are likely to create a dissonance and polarisation between the states in the 
two opposing regulatory camps, namely those actively using PMCs and the ones condemning 
                                                 
12 Such as: International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers; The Montreux Document; 
American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) International; International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO/PAS 28007:2012); OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, etc. 
13 Percy, S.: Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007; Pattison, J.: “Deeper Objections to the Privatisation of Military Force”, 2010, Vol. 18 (4), 
The Journal of Political Philosophy, pp. 425-447; Tesón, F.: “Humanitarian Intervention: Loose Ends”, 
2011, Vol. 10 (3), Journal of Military Ethics, pp. 192-212; Alexandra, A., Baker D.-P. and Caparini, M. 
(eds): Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies, and Civil-Military Relations, Routledge 
Military Studies, New York, 2008. 
14 Such as the efforts of the UN Working Group on Mercenaries and the UN Intergovernmental Group on 
Business and Human Rights. 
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them as a modern form of mercenarism. The multitude of existing and emerging regulations 
concerning PMCs demonstrates the numerous unsuccessful attempts at tackling this issue. 
But why is there a need for regulation? And what are existing approaches to private military 
activity trying to achieve? On the one hand, PMCs are seen to endanger the state monopoly on 
force by offering a private route to the acquisition of an armed and militarily trained force. On 
the other hand, not only do governments permit the existence of PMCs, they have been eagerly 
incorporating privatised violence into state policy since the 1980s, through privatisation and 
outsourcing, a strategic framework inspired by neoliberal ideas. I argue that, if properly 
regulated, private military resources can be used to supplement state forces. The value of my 
research lies in the method that I develop to evaluate the relationship between the prevailing 
form of governance and the contemporary security landscape. It is not enough simply to focus 
on the solution without assessing the type of governance to which this regulation is being added, 
and the questions as to who will execute it and in what way. The latest UN efforts in the form of 
a Draft Convention,15 for example, go straight from the problem of PMC activity to a solution 
based on state-centric criminalisation, entirely disregarding the process of its implementation 
and the likelihood of its efficacy. 
Thinking critically about historical forms of state and military allows us to identify regulation in 
previously unsuspected places. There is very little historically informed literature in IL on PMCs, 
as most approaches treat this subject as an entirely new area of study. All these approaches 
produce temporary or incomplete regulatory frameworks as they fail to take into consideration 
the question of constantly changing governance structures. By reflecting on the relevance of 
contemporary developments in a historical context, I seek to understand why the use of private 
security is becoming important and how it can be governed.  
                                                 
15 Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and 
Security Companies, 13 July 2009. 
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The role of mercenaries in European state formations and subsequent conquests between 
fourteenth-century feudalism and the ‘long nineteenth century’, followed by the shift towards 
the privatisation of security introduced by neoliberalism and the new wars erupting at the end 
of the Cold War, will all be assessed in terms of military history. While a historical analysis 
provides the context for the use of private military forces by different types of states both in the 
past and today, the legal treatment of this relationship (between the state and military force) is 
the primary concern of my research. However, without the historical analysis, I would be lacking 
insight that allows me to draw broader conclusions about the suitability and efficacy of existing 
and future regulation. 
My project contributes to existing work in the field by exploring the relationship between form 
of governance and type of military force. The aim is to identify patterns that occur throughout 
the military history of private force and that could be used to assist in the analysis of future legal 
issues in the regulation of force. By drawing on historical sociology and the history of war, I 
develop a novel IL account of the question of PMC regulation. This will help to contextualise the 
private military sector as an inherent form of force used by states, rather than a new 
phenomenon, therefore raising questions about its legitimacy and regulation. The overall 
methodology used in this interdisciplinary research can be described as applied or integrated. 
By using IL and historical sociology I draw insights from these disciplines to answer the legal 
question of PMC regulation and to reveal how different institutional practices can illustrate 
patterns and repetitions across centuries.16  
Applying a socio-historical approach demonstrates that the policy of the use and regulation of 
violence is not legally neutral; instead it is shaped by the various expressions of power and is 
articulated through the language of legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy is expressed through 
norms and has the ability to drive policy. Drawing on a critical legal approach, I use the concepts 
                                                 
16 See Chapter 2 in Dorsett, S. and McVeigh, S.: Jurisdiction, Routledge, Abingdon, 2012, pp. 10-29. 
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of power and legitimacy to explain legal aspects of the regulation of private violence. I evaluate 
the relationship between form of government and military force in order to understand the 
normative ground for state choice of type of military power. This mechanism is set out to 
demonstrate patterns that occur throughout history, and that could be applied to address future 
legal issues in PMC regulation. By deconstructing the overlapping regulations in the realm of 
private security, I reveal the legal gap that arises from the lack of a strong norm of corporate 
responsibility. PMC impunity is fortified through the absence of any recognised international 
legal personality for corporations, while simultaneously creating a veneer of legitimacy of being 
a properly incorporated company.  
Numerous cases brought against corporations17 often demonstrate a negative outcome for the 
claimants, or, in the best-case scenario, the company is forced to pay damages and settle, 
avoiding criminal charges. Even the most infamous and notorious modern-day incident, 
involving the massacre of seventeen Iraqi civilians at Nisour Square by Blackwater employees, 
resulted in the imprisonment of four American contractors, while the company settled out of 
court and the PMC’s former director Erik Prince continues to work in the industry, providing his 
services in China and Libya.18 State responsibility also fell through the net, as the contract 
between Blackwater and the US Department of State was not sufficient to establish proof of 
direct control and attribute the private conduct of the PMC to the United States. In all the variety 
of international legal norms and regulations, only individual criminal responsibility was invoked 
for the crime committed within the parameters of a state operation outsourced to a company.  
In order for regulation to fulfil its purpose and deliver justice, it needs to be applied to the entire 
supply chain of private security, and implemented at a level that is less likely to generate 
impunity. An effective regulation of private military actors also needs to take account of the 
                                                 
17 Al Shemari et al. v. CACI et al., Arias v. DynCorp, Arias v. DynCorp, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. 
18 Cole, M. and Scahill, J.: “Erik Prince in the Hot Seat” 24 March 2016, The Intercept, available at:  
https://theintercept.com/2016/03/24/blackwater-founder-erik-prince-under-federal-investigation/. 
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historical context. By assessing the prevailing form of governance and the role that private 
security plays in state policy, it becomes clear that states are the main PMC clients and they rely 
on companies for the provision of security services. Subsequently, due to their bias and reliance 
on private security providers, states are arguably not the best placed actors to carry out the 
regulation of PMCs. Neither is the industry, as it tends to treat military activity just like any other 
commodity that can be self-regulated by the free market. In order to close the gap of PMC 
impunity, an international legal response is required that has the capacity to act beyond the 
state and invoke criminal corporate responsibility.  
By examining the questions of the use and regulation of PMCs, my thesis seeks to identify the 
main source of impunity, namely the lack of a strong norm of corporate responsibility and, 
particularly, international criminal liability for corporations. This is why I develop a corporate 
criminal responsibility approach that has the potential to address the legal gap in PMC 
regulation. I argue that, due to the military nature of their activity, PMCs are different to other 
companies. In past decades, they took on a portion of state functions that required a 
proportionate legal response in terms of responsibility. The transnational nature of PMC activity 
signals the need for these companies to be recognised as actors on the international level and 
to acquire international legal personality. Finally, I explore the possibility of invoking criminal 
corporate responsibility through international criminal law as it offers the most tailored 
approach to adapt to a changing governance. 
Chapter Outline 
Where does a norm against the use of private military force come from and what makes it a 
norm? Why were mercenaries used historically and why has their popularity fluctuated 
throughout the centuries? I start by exploring different forms of governance and by tracing the 
state’s choice of security resources, their allocation and distribution, as well as the formation of 
norms behind this choice. 
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My enquiry is focused on the ability of existing PMC regulation to adequately control private 
force and its capacity to deliver justice in the event of PMC misconduct. In other words, can 
existing IL effectively regulate PMCs and does it fit the current governance system? The 
contemporary legal analysis19 answers the first part of the question by examining regulatory 
bodies, ranging from voluntary industry-driven self-regulation, to IL and the human rights 
regime, to the framework provided by company, contract, and tort law. The latter part of this 
question, however, is addressed first, through a historical examination of private violence and 
its deployment in interstate belligerent conduct from the fourteenth century to the present day. 
By breaking through the customary notions of public and private I seek to attain a much wider 
scope for analysis, and to adopt a more meaningful and informed approach when analysing 
contemporary challenges in IL posed by the use of private force. 
The first chapter lays out the methodology, key definitions, and legal concepts used throughout 
the thesis. It also provides a brief literature review of the core accounts used to construct my 
approach. It introduces the concepts of state, power and legitimacy, mercenaries, private 
military contractors, and regulation, and explains the meaning of those terms in the context of 
this research. Chapter 1 asks the important question about the responsibility of individuals, 
corporations, and state entities in the event of gross offences committed by PMCs. Questions of 
responsibility are explored in further detail in Chapter 5 in order to identify legal gaps that can 
lead to PMC impunity.  
Chapter 2 provides a socio-historical analysis of the different forms of governance between the 
fourteenth and nineteenth centuries. This chapter focuses on tracing the changing relationship 
between forms of governance and the military power that they use. It analyses the shift from 
vassals serving multiple feudal lords and private armies to a move towards a professional 
standing army in the absolute monarchies of continental Europe, to mercenaries and the 
                                                 
19 Conducted in Chapter 5. 
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unconsolidated militaries of Italian city-states, as well as contrasting models of levée en masse 
of the early nation-state of Revolutionary France, to the outsourced colonial army of the English 
East India Company. Chapter 2 begins to crystallise the normative patterns of shifting conflict 
paradigms and military structures, a process that is further developed in the following two 
chapters.   
Chapter 3 continues the historical analysis into the twentieth century by drawing on the 
changing nature of war and tracing IL’s response to mercenaries in the context of decolonisation 
and proxy warfare. The re-emergence of private force is juxtaposed with the total centralisation 
of military resources at the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly during the period of 
the two World Wars. Chapter 3 uses the Nicaragua case to demonstrate that the IL of the 
twentieth century is largely politicised. Despite the codification of provisions relating to 
mercenaries under the Geneva Conventions and active anti-mercenary movements, it will be 
argued that relevant treaties and norms have failed to achieve universality in their relevance 
and applicability.  
Furthermore, the failure to criminalise the act of mercenarism, coupled with the spread of 
neoliberal ideas and the changing paradigm of new wars, has led to the rise of private military 
companies at the end of the twentieth century, which is the focus of Chapter 4. In this chapter I 
argue that the emerging form of governance from the 1980s onwards, so-called neoliberalism, 
completes the cycle of different models scrutinised in previous chapters. With its characteristic 
small government, privatisation, and outsourcing trends, the neoliberal state resembles a 
contemporary model of the fragmented sovereignty of feudalism, albeit within an entirely 
different historical context. The changes that the state undergoes in the process of pursuing 
neoliberal policy also affect the security landscape of this period and are carried through into 
the present day. Along with the normalisation of private security in terms of government policy 
comes the end of the Cold War and the change in conflict paradigm from large scale interstate 
14 
 
 
 
tensions to far more ambiguous internal ethnic struggles, powered by the growing private 
security market and the absence of the US-Soviet balance of power. Both strong and weak states 
have promoted privatisation and the outsourcing of security; in the former, this was a result of 
neoliberal policies, while the latter had little choice in the absence of strong existing military 
structures. Ethnic wars in Bosnia and Sierra Leone demonstrated the nature of the ‘new wars’ 
as well as the other side to the use of private military resources. 
I use the example of the Tadic case to highlight the extraordinary progress which the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has made in establishing 
individual criminal responsibility and joint criminal enterprise, while simultaneously leaving 
open questions about attribution of authority on a corporate and state level. I conclude Chapter 
4 with an analysis of PMC classification. By working through the taxonomy of PMCs I define the 
scope for analysis of contemporary PMC regulation under existing and emerging bodies of law. 
This chapter considers what makes PMCs problematic under IL and how their corporate and 
military nature challenges current regulation. Failure to criminalise the act of mercenarism 
allowed for the incorporation of PMCs as legitimate businesses. Meanwhile extensive 
privatisation and outsourcing made room for private providers in the security sector, and 
changed the perception of normality and legality in private security. 
Chapter 5 explores both the impunity of PMCs and the different types of liability that they are 
subject to. It focuses on the contemporary legal regulation of PMCs and the role of international 
legal institutions in shaping normative conditions in favour of and against their use. I explore 
contemporary problems posed by the overlapping regulation of PMCs and the limitations that 
derive from the existence of different bodies of law in their efforts to invoke individual, 
corporate, and state responsibility. Existing and emerging regulatory initiatives and their 
potential for efficacy are analysed, taking into consideration the public/private allocation of 
security resources, based on the mode of governance and the trends identified in chapters 2, 3, 
15 
 
 
 
and 4. The purpose of Chapter 5 is to navigate through the complex channels of existing 
regulation and to identify key legal gaps that lead to PMC impunity. 
After analysing individual liability for PMC contractors and existing provisions for state 
responsibility, I examine the limitations to corporate liability for PMCs. I identify the sources of 
corporate impunity in the procedural and territorial limitations of domestic criminal legal 
systems, as well as in the corporate status of PMCs. I then analyse the limitations of international 
regulation and the effects of polarisation between the criminalisation and ‘responsibilisation’ 
approaches. This chapter identifies key loopholes in PMC regulation created by limitations to 
corporate liability and lack of criminalisation of mercenarism. These cannot be addressed by 
existing mechanisms of individual criminal liability, or the loose norms around state 
responsibility. International criminal liability for corporations, on the other hand, can provide 
potential opportunities to effectively handle private military activity and associated corporate 
offences.  
The final chapter explores why we need corporate criminal liability for PMCs internationally and 
offers potential future legal responses for its implementation. This chapter builds upon the 
historical and legal arguments developed throughout the thesis in order to provide 
recommendations for a more effective and tailored regulation of the private military space, 
while consciously avoiding the drawbacks linked to the mode of governance and future security 
trends. 
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Chapter 1 
Legal Theory and Concepts 
This chapter sets the scene by presenting the key notions through which the ideas of this thesis 
are articulated. It outlines the scope of my research and equips the reader with the necessary 
theoretical framework to follow the historical narrative and engage with it from a critical legal 
angle. I start by asking historical and theoretical questions about the definitions of state, 
sovereignty, and the norms which govern the mode and regulation of violence, exposed by the 
two broader concepts of power and legitimacy.  
This chapter is organised in four parts. Parts 1 and 2 focus on the theory and concepts that 
govern the changing conflict paradigm, norms, and international legal responses to private 
military forces, analysed in chapters 2, 3, and 4. Part 1 establishes historical and theoretical 
definitions of a state, its structure and integrity, and the norms that govern the mode and 
regulation of violence. Drawing on the approach of historical sociology based on the work of 
Michael Mann and Charles Tilly, I introduce the concepts of power and legitimacy that are used 
throughout Chapter 2 to articulate the use of private violence in different forms of governance. 
Part 2 examines definitions of mercenaries and private military companies proposed by the 
leading regulatory bodies in international law (IL) and security, including the Geneva 
Conventions, the UN General Assembly, the UN Working Group on Mercenaries, the Montreux 
Document, and the International Code of Conduct. Parts 3 and 4 bring together the legal theory 
and concepts of regulation, and scrutinise the three facets of responsibility that arise from the 
use of private military forces, providing the framework for chapters 5 and 6. 
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Part 1: Methodology and Definitions 
State 
I base my approach on the methodological constructs that can be found in Mann,20 Weber,21 
Tilly,22 and Dorsett and McVeigh.23 These critical approaches highlight the evolving nature of 
states, authority, law, and economic power, and the way these shifts influence the relationships 
between the concepts from a socio-historical perspective. Through a critical lens, all four 
accounts demonstrate the inherent presence of notions such as state, sovereignty, jurisdiction, 
etc., going beyond accepted definitions. My socio-historical approach is built upon this critical 
debate, and seeks to establish normative patterns by examining the relationship between 
different types of governance and the type of military power it deployed. 
The starting point of my discussion is the concept of a state: not a modern state, or a nation-
state, not a democratic or an authoritarian one, but a state as an entity and an actor. Max Weber 
views the state as a “the agency that guarantees security” especially in times of external 
danger.24 According to Weber, “a society is organised as a state where there is a successful 
monopolisation of the exercise of legitimate violence. [...] ‘[T]he state’ is simply whatever 
agency it is that discharges that function.”25 This definition is a starting point as it extends 
beyond the fixed notion of a ‘nation-state’ and allows for a more critical approach in examining 
the exercise of legitimate violence.  
                                                 
20 Mann, M.: The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914, CUP, 
Cambridge, 1993; Mann, M.: The Sources of Social Power, Vol. III Global Empires and Revolutions, 1890-
1945, CUP, Cambridge, 2012; Mann, M.: The Sources of Social Power, Vol. IV Globalizations, 1945-2011, 
CUP, Cambridge, 2013. 
21 Weber, M.: The Vocation Lectures, Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2004; Gerth, H. H. and 
Wright Mills, C. (eds): From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Routledge, London, 1993. 
22 Tilly, C.: Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990; Tilly, C.: 
The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975. 
23 Dorsett, S. and McVeigh, S.: Jurisdiction, Routledge, Abingdon, 2012. 
24 Gerth and Wright Mills, supra, p. 177. 
25 Geuss, R.: History and Illusion in Politics, CUP, Cambridge, 2001, p. 15. 
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Michael Mann’s definition of the state is much influenced by Weber, whereby the state is 
understood as a set of institutions and personnel with a territorially demarcated area over which 
it exercises a degree of authority and legitimacy, backed by military power.26 For Mann, the 
concepts of territory and centrality are closely linked, representing political relations that 
radiate to and from a centre, to cover a particular territory. The state, therefore, “does not wield 
an analogous resource to ideological, economic, and military power. [...] It alone is inherently 
centralised over a delimited territory over which it has binding powers.”27 There can be various 
degrees to which a state is centralised. Although I agree with Mann’s assessment from a 
structural standpoint,28 I propose to envisage a state as an empty shell or, as Geuss puts it, 
“merely an agency operating and exercising powers in a certain way.”29 It is exactly this starting 
position of neutrality that I strive to adopt when analysing and defining the state – a form of 
authoritative governance that fluctuates throughout history. I echo Hegel’s philosophical 
argument, whereby “a sick or demented human being who may be incapable of leading a 
universal life is still a human being”,30 meaning that a state is still considered to be a state even 
if it is unsuccessful in pacifying its population or its institutions are weak. 
For Charles Tilly, states are “coercion-wielding organisations that are distinct from households 
and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organisations 
within substantial territories.”31 Tilly’s definition of a state, therefore, also operates outside of 
the narrow concept of a nation-state, and includes city-states, empires, theocracies, and many 
other forms of government. Along the same methodological lines, in their analysis of the 
plurality of jurisdictional forms of authority, Dorsett and McVeigh consider earlier forms of state 
and authority that predated the modern nation-state. The purpose of such an approach is to 
                                                 
26 Mann, 1993, supra, p. 55 
27 Ibid., p. 56. 
28 Structural, as opposed to functional; what a state is, rather than what it does or ought to do. 
29 Geuss, supra, p. 43. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Tilly, supra, p. 1. 
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shift focus away from the dogma of the Westphalian state in favour of a more intricate analysis 
of “jurisdiction as a practice of authority and the creation of lawful relations.”32 
Power and Legitimacy 
All the above-mentioned accounts make no distinction between public and private violence, 
leaving it open for states to establish the boundaries of legitimacy over the power they possess. 
The concepts of power and legitimacy are the two conditions through which Weber defines the 
state. In other words, first is the mandatory adherence to the rules by all members of a 
designated group of people, and second is the successful monopoly of the legitimate use of 
violence.33 Adherence to the rules can be labelled as the legitimacy of a state, and the monopoly 
of violence can be understood through the concept of power. Together power and legitimacy 
form the notion of sovereign authority, and are consistently applied throughout this thesis, 
serving as a theoretical background.  
I draw upon Geuss’s reflection on authority to frame the concepts of power and legitimacy. 
Although he differentiates between epistemic, natural, de jure, and de facto authority, the latter 
two are of particular interest to me. De facto political authority is concerned with factual control 
of certain people over a certain area; it is likely to contain “a strong element of compulsion of 
the threat of use of physical force.”34 Power can be understood in various ways. Geuss argues 
that it would be a mistake to think that because Hitler was not able to get what he wanted 
(lasting hegemony over Central Europe), he did not have much power.35 On the other hand, 
simply because the monarchs of absolute monarchies conquered the desired territories, it does 
not mean they had high administrative power. Power is a versatile notion that is omnipresent 
throughout history; it manifests itself at all times through one form or another. Mann 
                                                 
32 Dorsett and McVeigh, supra, p. 32. 
33 Geuss, supra, Chapter 3, “The Concept of the State”. 
34 Ibid, p. 40. 
35 Ibid., p. 23. 
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differentiates between despotic and infrastructural power, whereby despotic power refers to 
the distributive power of the ruling class over civil society, and infrastructural power describes 
the state’s institutional capacity to penetrate its territories and implement decisions.36 To 
contextualise infrastructural power, one can take the example of early medieval empires who 
had enormous military capacity but only limited administrative authority.37 Mann argues that 
effective infrastructural power increases collective state power and enables civil society to 
control the state through intelligent and efficient representation.38 Grounded in the relationship 
between despotic and infrastructural power, Mann’s two dimensions of state power reveal the 
functional, rather than structural aspect of the modern state, envisaging different types of 
governance. 
 
Infrastructural Power   
Despotic Power Low High 
Low Feudal Bureaucratic-democratic 
High Imperial/absolutist Authoritarian 
Figure 1: Two Dimensions of State Power 
 
In Coercion, Capital and European States, Charles Tilly is concerned with the relationship 
between war and states. He argues that, on the international level, wars created European 
networks of national states, while the internal state structures were significantly shaped by 
preparations for war.39 Exploring this relationship between coercion and economic power allows 
Tilly to go beyond the Westphalian concepts of states and sovereignty, and significantly 
enhances the scope of his analysis. Weber sets out, although not entirely explicitly, a 
relationship between political and military power, which thinkers like Tilly and Mann take up 
                                                 
36 Mann, 1993, supra, p. 59. 
37 Held, D., McGrew, A. et al. (eds): Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Polity, 
Cambridge, 1999, p. 33. 
38 Mann, 1993, supra, p. 59. 
39 Tilly, supra, p. 76. 
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more openly. “All political structures use force, but they differ in the manner in which and the 
extent to which they use or threaten to use it against other political organisations.”40  
Weber also considers the question of the ‘legitimacy’ of government and military power, which 
for him is linked to economic expansion, and to class and status relationships. Coined by Geuss 
as de jure authority, legitimacy derives from law and assumes “there is a law that prescribes that 
people should obey them.”41 De jure authority crystallises into legitimacy that should not be 
questioned and ought to be followed, while de facto political authority translates into raw power 
that simply cannot be questioned. The two concepts of power and legitimacy, articulated 
through the different faces of authority, serve as a methodological basis for my analysis. Both 
concepts are timeless and neutral in the sense that they are present in every single state 
formation to a certain extent; they are fundamental, almost atomic components to the 
formation of any form of governance. 
In the context of this research, legitimacy is best envisaged in terms of the acceptance and 
validation of power. First of all, according to Geuss’s criteria, a legitimate state has effective 
control over a given territory which it claims, and it monopolises the use of force within that 
area.42 The monopoly of violence creates a visibility of control that the state ought to uphold. 
Commonly associated with the state and a centralised governmental remit, ‘public’, in a military 
context, ought to represent the force that is controlled by the sovereign. However, would the 
monopoly of force diminish if a state (sovereign) chooses to use “a mostly foreign and private 
force for one purpose (CIA covert operations), a foreign and public force (colonial armies, foreign 
legions), and a domestic and private one for yet some other (US private contractors in Iraq)”?43 
                                                 
40 Gerth and Wright Mills, supra, Essays in Sociology, Chapter 6 “Structures of Power”, p. 159. 
41 Geuss, supra, p. 40. 
42 Ibid., p. 32. 
43 Barkawi, T.: “State and Armed Force in International Context” in Colas, A. and Mabee, B. (eds): 
Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires: Private Violence in Historical Context, Hurst & Company, 
London, 2010, pp. 50-51. 
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What separates private force from illegitimate or criminal acts is the (potential) recognition of 
the former as a legitimate tool chosen by the state, and the latter as a violation of its laws. 
Kontorovich argues that while piracy and privateering are effectively the same type of activity, 
piracy was considered a heinous crime, while privateering was legitimised state commission.44 
It is therefore crucial to understand the narrative of legitimacy when analysing the use and 
regulation of different types of military power. Legitimacy does not simply arise from a 
widespread behaviour; it derives from normative behaviour and a sense of obligation. The 
importance of legitimacy is not purely theoretical; it transpires into norms and has the ability to 
drive policy. To take the example of sixteenth-century Italian city-republics, Machiavelli 
dismisses wealth as the source of legitimacy of signorie in favour of a mixed governance, based 
on republican values and a citizen army.45 Or, more recently, the extent of 1980s neoliberal 
policies demonstrates the rationalisation of outsourcing the security sector, a change that was 
unimaginable even thirty years prior to that. 
Sovereignty 
It was not until the latter half of the seventeenth century, marked by the Peace of Westphalia, 
that the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’ acquired their modern meaning.46 Sovereignty is 
one of the most important elements in the framework of modern politics and IL: “today the 
most obvious form of legal ordering is that of sovereign territorial state.”47 Sovereignty serves 
as a definition of the modern international system, as it accordingly marks the “division of the 
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world into sovereign states.”48 Often assigned solely to the nation-state construct, sovereignty 
represents the nexus between power and legitimacy, covering a much wider array of 
governmental formations. I purposefully separate the notions of the modern state and 
sovereignty to distance myself from the widespread ‘Westphalian’ conception, as it solely 
epitomises one form of governance rooted in territoriality and autonomy.49 Sweeping 
reconfigurations of sovereign authority have restructured the international system in important 
ways.50 For Douzinas, sovereignty is the name given to the act of coming together or the self-
constitution of a community in and through jurisdiction, the speaking of law.51  
A fundamental concept, sovereignty cannot be defined in a legal and political vacuum. It has 
distinct properties and characteristics, but no definition. However, sovereignty does not start 
with the nation-state; it has a much longer history. State conduct was always concerned with 
the justification of authority. Whether deriving from the Church (in feudalism and the Holy 
Roman Empire), dynasty (in absolute monarchies), reason (Machiavellian republicanism), the 
state and the people (territorial and popular sovereignty of a nation-state), or law, these 
accounts demonstrate a variety of historical and normative justifications of resort to power.52 It 
is possible to locate sovereignty in all of these forms of authority. It manifests itself though the 
existence of a state, or any other form of governance, and through its supporting driving agents, 
power and legitimacy. Sovereignty is the content of the structural shell of a state.  
Contrary to the Westphalian belief,53 I suggest to circumvent the limitation by territory and 
approach the concept of sovereignty from a different angle. By associating sovereignty with 
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political authority, rather than exclusively with territory, I can identify its many institutional 
forms. For example, in the absolutist state “the ultimate instance of legitimacy was the dynasty, 
not the territory.”54 And, although feudal authority was often exercised on a territorial basis, the 
notion of ‘public’ and ‘national’ territory did not and could not apply until the establishment of 
the modern state.55 The importance of consolidation between power and legitimacy, thus, 
manifests itself in every epoch regardless of the extent of the sovereignty possessed by the 
state: “A ruler could be sovereign, as could a husband or the Church.”56 In the various forms of 
governance the actual power of the state as an institution (power), did not necessarily 
correspond to that of the ruler (legitimacy). It is, therefore, essential to identify this dynamic 
within each of the selected state types in conjunction with the type of force deployed at the 
time. Besides the literature on method,57 theoretical resources used in my research include 
extensive sources on military history and the changing nature of war;58 historical accounts of 
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differing forms of governance, such as feudalism,59 Italian city-republics,60 absolutism,61 
imperialism62, nation-states;63 and material on neoliberalism,64 privatisation, and the decline of 
the state.65 Examining historical examples of different forms of governance helps to outline 
structural commonalities in state management and shows the gradual formation of the modern 
state as an institution, as opposed to its medieval predecessor in the shape of the monarch. It 
also clearly demonstrates the changing extent of sovereignty and brings to light the reasons for 
its expansion and contraction. 
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To ensure consistency across the thesis, I adopt the following assessment mechanism that 
assumes the role of the analytical framework for my research, loosely based on a socio-historical 
approach to state and military found in the accounts of Weber, Tilly, Mann, and Dorsett and 
McVeigh. It demonstrates the relationship between the state and military force within different 
governmental configurations. It does so by scrutinising the structure of the state and locating 
the sources of its legitimacy, and by establishing the type of military force used by the state by 
articulating the concept of power. This methodology offers a systematic historical perspective 
while formulating a trend of state-military relationships. Building an intellectual bridge between 
the state and the military in different governmental formations historically allows us to evaluate 
the effectiveness of existing and emerging policies attempting to regulate contemporary PMCs. 
Part 2: Mercenaries, Contractors, Civilians 
In the absence of a universally accepted definition of mercenaries, the term has been stretched 
from hired individuals, to private security firms contracted by the state, to cross-border troops 
providing military services.66 Historically, as Chapter 2 demonstrates, mercenaries were ascribed 
a more colloquial meaning, exemplifying the nature of medieval privateering and the 
professional aspect of the absolutist standing armies. In the twentieth century the national 
liberation movements of the Cold War era urged for criminalisation of mercenaries through the 
ratification of the 1972 Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa by the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Combining the elements of nationality and motive, the first 
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regional definition of mercenaries was comprehensively drafted in order to address the 
challenges that mercenaries posed for the national liberation movements and the sovereign 
integrity of the newly established African states.67 While binding on the signatory states, the 
OAU definition of mercenaries was subsequently altered in 1980 by the addition of Appendix III, 
aligning it with the most widely accepted international definition of a mercenary, codified in the 
1977 Additional Protocol (AP) I to the Geneva Conventions.68 AP I articulates the parameters of 
motivation in order to define mercenaries under IL. Article 47 (2) of Protocol I states that a 
mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is especially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain 
and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation 
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and 
functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by 
a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a 
member of its armed forces. 
Later, the 1989 UN Mercenary Convention69 broadened the definition to include non-nationals 
recruited to overthrow a “government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a 
State; or undermine the territorial integrity of a State.” While this definition of mercenaries was 
largely based on AP I, it was expanded by being applied to “armed conflict”70 and to “any other 
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situation”.71 The latest UN General Assembly annual report from the Working Group on the use 
of mercenaries (WG) outlines the notion of foreign fighters. The report considers “motivation 
and recruitment practices, the linkages between foreign fighters and mercenaries and the 
human rights implications”.72 As part of the report, the WG compares and contrasts the concepts 
of mercenaries and foreign fighters. They conclude that while both may be recruited abroad or 
locally, “foreign fighter mobilisations may encompass nationals of a party to the conflict, such 
as from the diaspora, while mercenaries are necessarily non-nationals.”73 Although AP I did not 
produce a timeless and universally accepted definition, it formalised the legal status of a 
mercenary as a non-combatant under IL, marking an important change in the normative 
classification of private military actors. The status of PMC contractors does not have a separate 
definition under IL. According to the Montreux Document, the personnel of Private Military and 
Security Companies (PMSCs)  
are protected as civilians under international humanitarian law, unless they are 
incorporated into the regular armed forces of a State or are members of organised 
armed forces, groups or units under a command responsible to the State; or otherwise 
lose their protection as determined by international humanitarian law.74  
In 2013 the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights published a 
revised document on the topic of regulation of private security, “The international Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Providers” (ICoC). The ICoC does not define contractors or civilians; 
their definition refers to Private Security Companies and other Private Security Service Providers 
(PSCs) personnel as: 
persons working for a PSC, whether as employees or under a contract, including its staff, 
managers and directors. [...] Persons are considered to be personnel if they are 
connected to a PSC through an employment contract (fixed term, permanent or open-
ended) or a contract of assignment (whether renewable or not), or if they are 
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independent contractors, or temporary workers and/or interns (whether paid or 
unpaid), regardless of the specific designation used by the Company concerned.75  
It is particularly important to highlight that PMC contractors are non-combatants and, therefore, 
civilians, if they are not incorporated into the military forces of the state. However, the idea of 
civilians who provide military and security services on behalf of a private company, which in turn 
is contracted by a state, but not formally incorporated in its military structure, is a rather 
problematic one. Whether referred to as civilians, non-combatants, or PMC contractors, this 
particular segment of non-military personnel who have access to hostilities challenges 
contemporary international legal norms and is not appropriately regulated. 
Definition of Private Military Companies 
Although most defenders of the private military industry, and even some critics,76 insist on the 
separation between private military companies and mercenaries, the nature of their activities 
have substantial similarities, and their motives and methods often overlap. Putting aside the 
political context of the AP I definition of mercenaries, rooted in the rhetoric of decolonisation 
and national liberation movements, the aim of international community is to criminalise 
inappropriate participation in hostilities by groups and individuals who have no national or 
ideological relation to either party to the conflict.  
The WG defines a PMSC as “a corporate entity which provides on a compensatory basis military 
and/or security services by physical persons and/or legal entities”.77 By acknowledging that PMC 
activities fall outside of the UN Mercenary Convention’s definition, they become excluded from 
its regulatory scope.78 Meanwhile, the AP I mercenary definition disregards most PMC 
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personnel, many of whom are nationals of one of the parties to the conflict and are not 
contracted to fight in military operations.79 The WG has been following the development of the 
Policy and the Operations Manuals on the use of armed services from private security 
companies and engaging with the UN Department of Safety and Security in order to produce a 
comprehensive, human rights-compliant policy framework for the procurement and use of 
armed private security companies by United Nations organs and bodies.80 This initiative clearly 
indicates the WG’s intention to legitimise the deployment of armed private contractors by the 
UN.  
Another definition of PMCs was proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross. At 
the fourth meeting on the ‘Swiss Initiative’ in September 2008, the Montreux Document was 
finalised and adopted by consensus of participating governments.81 The Montreux Document is 
an intergovernmental document intended to promote respect for international humanitarian 
law (IHL) and human rights law whenever PMCs are present in armed conflicts.82 It states that:  
PMSCs are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, 
irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in 
particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, 
buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner 
detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.83  
The industry as well as academic literature provides a variety of terms: private security company 
(PSC), private military company (PMC), private security and military companies (PMSC), private 
security companies and other private security service providers (PSCs). Interestingly, the 
Montreux Document and the ICoC do not differentiate between PMSCs based on the nature of 
                                                 
79 The Montreux Document, p. 40. 
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the contribution they make (or do not make) to the conduct of hostilities.84 For the purpose of 
this research I use the term PMC, as it reflects a company engaged in the provision of armed 
contractors. 
While I critique the regulatory application and highlight limitations of the Montreux Document 
in the following chapters, its definition of PMCs closely supports the proposed scope of my 
analysis. In other words, all of the functions listed above, except for advisory services, apply to 
armed private contractors. While the ICoC builds upon the foundation of the Montreux 
Document, attempting to address some of its regulatory gaps, the proposed definition only 
covers Private Security Companies and Private Security Service Providers (PSCs). Similar to its 
predecessor, the ICoC describes a PSC as “any Company (as defined in this Code) whose business 
activities include the provision of Security Services either on its own behalf or on behalf of 
another, irrespective of how such a Company describes itself.”85 Although omitting ‘military’ 
companies or services from their terminology, the ICoC recognises the military aspect of PSC 
activity nonetheless. The ICoC Preamble states that “PSCs play an important role in protecting 
state and non-state clients engaged in relief, recovery, and reconstruction efforts, commercial 
business operations, diplomacy and military activity.”86 Such codification mechanisms adopted 
by the recognised international regulatory authorities inadvertently distance PMC from their 
contentious mercenary association, thereby further normalising and legitimising PMC activity.  
Challenges of the Definitions 
The key problem of defining the legitimacy of mercenaries, or their corporate successors, private 
military companies, is not a legal, but mainly a political one. Whether examined from a historical 
angle, or that of nationality or motive, there is always a degree of irregularity present in the field 
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of private military force. This needs to be recognised as a limitation. According to Kevin O’Brien 
the definition of a ‘mercenary’ contained in AP I is generally unworkable as a legal instrument 
for two reasons. First, it describes the actor and not the act of mercenarism. Second, all six 
parameters of the definition must apply to the actor in order to meet the criteria.87 
One broad criterion for defining a mercenary is grounded in nationality or citizenship, i.e. foreign 
recruits in a national army. However, countries like the US, the UK, and France have legal 
mechanisms that enable foreign citizens to serve in their militaries.88 Defining a mercenary 
based on a motivation of financial gain is too narrow because it excludes contractors who 
participate in a conflict for ideological reasons.89 It also omits a large number of ex-military 
personnel who continue their profession outside of the state army. Motives are hard to 
establish, as they may vary depending on the individual. Moreover, they are subjective and open 
to interpretation. Basing the entire set of regulations purely on motivation makes the law easy 
to manipulate, depending on political agendas. As noted in the Diplock Report, released in 1976 
following the involvement of British mercenaries in Angola, the “soldier of conscience may be 
found fighting side by side with the soldier of fortune.”90 A definition based on motivation 
questions the neutrality and impartiality of law and once again brings political rhetoric into play. 
However, if the element of motivation by profit is removed from the definition, its content 
degrades substantially. If mercenaries are not distinguished from other combatants by 
commercial gain, then the term would cover all non-nationals and non-residents who enlist to 
oppose or support any political movement in an armed conflict.91   
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The test of motivation offers another controversial facet in the more contemporary example of 
the Indonesian army. Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. is a prominent US mining company 
that controls one of the world’s largest gold and copper mines in Indonesia. The company 
collaborated with the Indonesian army who guarded the Grasberg mine. In 2003, two US 
pension funds that were shareholders in the company raised a concern about “human rights 
abuses against the indigenous population [of Papua] by the Indonesian military in connection 
with security operations conducted on behalf of Freeport-McMoRan.”92 As a result of this 
inquiry Freeport-McMoRan were found to have made substantial payments to the Indonesian 
army, often to a single general, to ensure military protection of the extraction business. 
According to the research conducted by Global Witness, Indonesian reformists considered these 
payments controversial, and saw them as evidence of the dependency of the Indonesian 
national army on a private company.93 This is a question of motivation and loyalty, and an 
example of a national army pursuing private, mercenary goals instead of serving the state and 
the nation.  
The military suggested that the activities conducted by Freeport-McMoRan were a lucrative 
business ameliorating the military facilities, equipment, and transport.94 If the security services 
provided by the military ultimately benefited the Indonesian economy and the state, they could 
potentially be regarded as catering to public state interests. This argument would stand, had 
Freeport-McMoRan not been found to be paying the military directly, rather than the 
Indonesian government. Between May 2001 and March 2003, Global Witness found that “a 
series of payments totalling US$247,705 appear to have been made by Freeport Indonesia to an 
Indonesian general named Mahidin Simbolon.”95 In this scenario, an army was a governmental 
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institution that pursued private goals outside of the public framework. Security services to the 
mining company were provided in exchange for monetary gain, therefore evoking a mercenary 
motive. 
A historical and at the same time universal example of piracy can be explored in contrast to 
mercenarism to better understand the definition. As a rule, mercenaries and PMCs always act 
upon instruction within the terms of a contract or in exchange for a payment, while pirates 
pursue their own interests. Although piracy fundamentally differs from mercenarism in this 
respect, there have been historical examples where pirates were used by a state to perpetrate 
an attack on their opponent. By the 1720s, thousands of pirates had sought to build 
autonomous, relatively equal, and democratic orders of their own, countering Atlantic capital. 
Captains were often elected and accountable to their crews, attitudes were liberal, and 
decisions were democratic.96 Despite these positive characteristics, for hundreds of years, IL has 
treated the pirate as a hostis humani generis – an enemy of all mankind.97 The rationale behind 
the universality of the pirate as an enemy was the indiscriminate threat that piracy posed to 
trade, other sailors, and even the established world order. However, before sailors-turned-
pirates could claim their own ship, they commonly “served the needs of the maritime state and 
the merchant community in England.”98 Some seamen were recruited to serve on Jamaican 
privateers during the War of Spanish Succession.99 A mercenary motive or a legitimating state 
action could draw distinctions between a pirate and a privateer. In 1817 William Hutchings was 
accused of piracy for sailing an American ship under a “Buenos Aires commission and colours as 
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a part of their independence struggle against Spain.”100 In United States v. Hutchings101 the court 
established that animo furandi, a necessary component of piracy, could be disproved if the 
accused was acting under a commission or acting on government service without a 
commission.102 In addition, Woodes Rogers was known for both recruiting pirates in his capacity 
as a captain of a large scale privateering trip, and denouncing them in the West Indies as royal 
governor of the Bahama Islands.103   
While nationality and motive have been prominently used to distinguish and define 
mercenaries, both tests can also be problematic in terms of context and universality. Unlike 
pirates, terrorists, freedom fighters, and militias, mercenaries and PMCs are typically hired to 
provide their services on behalf of another party, rather than waging a conflict to pursue their 
own political or ideological goals. Also, under current provisions of IL, only states can commit 
the acts of aggression, using mercenaries as their implements; mercenaries themselves cannot 
be the perpetrators.104 So, rather than focusing on the monetary gain, I propose to envisage a 
transactional relationship between supply and demand of private security that existed long 
before modern sovereign states, national armies, and arguments concerning the ethics and 
morality of private military resources.105 
For the purposes of socio-historical analysis, this thesis considers a broader spectrum of irregular 
military actors, foregoing the rigidity of the proposed definitions in order to evaluate all forms 
of private violence used by a state. The scope of my enquiry extends to various privately 
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organised military forces deployed by a state or a sovereign, regardless of the contemporary 
classification. Such an approach allows us to trace different facets of private security in the 
changing conflict paradigm. Narrowing down the definition may hinder the broader purpose of 
understanding the constitutive elements of contemporary issues posed by private military 
actors. Therefore, in Chapter 2, the terms ‘mercenary’ and ‘private military’ are used 
interchangeably. It does not, however, negate the nuanced differences that the two notions 
have in the abstract. 
According to Nikolas Rose, the value of narrow definitions lies in their ability to provide the 
grounds for critical thought in response to contemporary issues.106 However, a more historically 
informed classification of mercenaries enables us to consider patterns of state-military 
relationships, where a more rigid contemporary legal definition would draw a line. For example, 
Hampson argues that foreign units that were routinely hired and incorporated into states’ own 
forces before the nineteenth century cannot be considered mercenaries.107 While Hampson’s 
assessment is accurate if measured against the criteria set out by the AP I definition of 1977, it 
is crucial to bear in mind the political circumstances of decolonisation under which this definition 
was drafted. The context of national liberation struggles can hardly apply to the widespread 
professionally hired private soldiers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. However, the fact 
alone that mercenaries were not criminalised, but were actually a norm for centuries, insists on 
the significance of the ‘private’ element in feudal, absolutist, and imperial military cultures. 
When a conflict unfolded in sixteenth-century Europe, the king would summon his barons who 
appeared with their troops,108 leaving him dependent on the patronage and loyalty of feudal 
lords rather than his own ability to centralise military power. Similarly, nineteenth-century 
empires were not relying on their own ‘home’ armies to fight territorial wars. They were 
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leveraging colonial armies, whom they subjected and utilised in a manner that considerably 
differed from the treatment of national conscripts.  
The context in which the definitions of mercenaries were drafted implies that the law is not 
neutral; instead it is shaped by various expressions of power and articulated through the 
concept of legitimacy. This becomes of particular significance when analysing current and future 
legal responses to PMC regulation. Different aspects of violence, traditionally segregated into 
public and private, are not purely arbitrary. They bear political and normative meaning and are 
related to a state’s choice of security resources, their allocation and distribution, as well as the 
formation of norms supporting this choice.  
Part 3: Regulation: Theory and Concepts 
Since the end of the Cold War, an overwhelming number of PMCs have been operating as part 
of foreign military operations, with their services ranging from consulting and risk assessment 
to training and combat. As a result of numerous high-profile incidents involving PMCs, such as 
Blackwater in Iraq or DynCorp in Bosnia, there has been a growing international interest in 
regulating private military activity. Regulatory responses came from many directions. The UN 
strategy is divided between the Human Rights Council’s (HRC) voluntary initiatives,109 and the 
Working Group, who took a firm stance through the Draft International Convention on the 
Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies (Draft 
Convention), attempting to invoke state responsibility for all PMSCs registered on their territory. 
It also produced a number of comprehensive legally binding and voluntary guidelines aimed at 
enhancing the responsibility of transnational businesses to respect human rights, including 
prevention, mitigation, and remediation. In the meantime, the industry introduced a number of 
                                                 
109 “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’ Framework, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner”, New York and 
Geneva, 2011. 
38 
 
 
 
self-regulatory bodies that certify PMCs and provide guidelines in order drive the standards of 
their services internationally. Amongst such industry bodies are the American Society for 
Industrial Security (ASIS) International,110 the International Organisation for Standardisation 
(ISO/PAS 28007:2012)111 providing guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies 
supplying privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,112 
and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, which is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5. The outcome of such active regulatory responses to private military conduct 
is a complex network of binding and voluntary provisions that all claim to regulate private 
military space. What complicates this picture further is the domestic jurisdiction invoked by the 
corporate nature of PMCs, therefore introducing company law, contract law, and tort law into 
the mix. 
It is important to identify what exactly is meant by ‘regulation’, as this term can mean a variety 
of controls with different degrees of enforcement and state intervention. A common 
understanding of regulation is tied up with the concept of ‘command and control’, whereby the 
state uses legal rules that are often backed by criminal sanctions.113 According to Andrees, Nasri, 
and Swiniarski, regulation can be statutory, i.e. legally binding, in which case it is ordained and 
enforced by a judicial body or government authority. It can also be voluntary, whereby the 
measures adopted by the industry actors serve as guiding principles and behavioural 
standards.114 The OECD, for example, defines regulation as the “imposition of rules by 
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government, backed by the use of penalties that are intended specifically to modify the 
economic behaviour of individuals and firms in the private sector.”115 Prices, output, rate of 
return, disclosure of information, standards, and ownership ceilings, or in other words, all 
mechanisms of social control affecting all aspects of behaviour, can all be considered as 
regulatory instruments.116  
Regulation can be broadly differentiated by the level of state involvement, with the conservative 
approach rooted in free market principles, the liberal approach seeking a balance between 
regulatory and criminal sanctions, and, finally, the radical approach relying predominantly on 
the punitive nature of criminal justice.117 As a critique of a centred prosecutorial theory, David 
Garland develops a more comprehensive approach to regulation. To address and mitigate 
criminal activity holistically, the ‘responsibilisation’ approach seeks to incorporate a wide range 
of civil society instruments and institutions, including the private sector.118  
A purely state-centred definition of regulation119 does not reflect current industry influences, 
which are prominent in the PMC field. By embracing a wider range of regulatory techniques, a 
decentred approach emphasises social responsibility rather than the punitive nature of 
criminalisation.120 It can help raise and maintain industry standards and drive ethical behaviour 
amongst PMCs and their employees. The decentred approach is characterised by five key 
notions: complexity, fragmentation, interdependencies, ungovernability, and the rejection of a 
clear distinction between public and private.121 Together all these notions more accurately 
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describe current regulatory needs, whereby the state no longer holds a monopoly of force, and 
there are a number of new complex and interconnected actors that understand and drive 
industries, and the processes that govern them. These five notions create a rationalisation for a 
new decentred regulator who, in theory, would be much closer to the industry, and therefore 
more likely to understand the needs and the risks related to the regulatees.   
While the contemporary security sector is no different in some ways to the proliferation of 
privatisation and outsourcing of numerous military functions, the lethal nature of the industry 
coupled with the international context of PMC presence makes the military unique. Under the 
current norms of IL, it is not permissible to wage a private war. Government involvement, 
therefore, becomes inevitable in one shape or another. Although, as contemporary PMCs can 
be involved in a range of non-military activities, such as the extraction business on behalf of a 
multinational corporation, there are scenarios to which the state is not party to. However, my 
enquiry is concerned with the PMC engagement in international state or multilateral122 projects, 
whereby contractors operate in conflict or post-conflict environments of high sensitivity and are 
exposed to direct participation in hostilities.  
A criminal justice approach, therefore, could contribute to punishing and also preventing gross 
violations in the realm of private security. Meanwhile, all controls that are currently in place for 
mercenaries and PMCs are not criminalised, with the exception of the narrow definition of 
mercenaries, contextualised in decolonisation. Nonetheless, the merging of the lines between 
public and private can be identified in ‘hybrid’ regulatory bodies that combine governmental 
and non-state actors.123 For the private military industry such decentred regulation can be 
observed in the Montreux Process and the International Code of Conduct.124 
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The Purpose of Regulation 
Julia Black defines regulation as “the intentional activity of attempting to control, order or 
influence the behaviour of others.”125 This definition sets regulation apart from both the 
government operating domestic state laws, and market and social forces, by invoking the 
element of intentionality. As such, regulation can have multiple goals. Most generally it aims to 
provide some sort of organisation, but it can also manage risk,126 provide access to justice,127 or 
strive to achieve justice.128 My enquiry is concerned with the application and the effective 
exercising of the regulation, therefore focusing on a functional aspect of the definition. To unfold 
the key issues of this research, regulation is conceptualised as a broader mode of administering 
PMC activity, with ‘responsibilisation’ representing a more decentred approach that entails both 
legally binding and voluntary norms, and criminalisation, invoking criminal justice exercised 
through judicial systems and government authorities. As a discipline, regulation can operate 
across sovereign borders; it reaches both international and industry realms, forming a variety of 
relationships between state, law, and society.129 Regulation can be analysed from an 
effectiveness perspective, whereby the gap between what a regulation sets out to do and what 
it does in practice is at the core of the critique. It can also be critiqued in terms of value, or 
whether it is aimed at the appropriate goals, and if it delivers the appropriate value of legitimacy 
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or justice.130 This thesis adapts a critical approach of legal and policy reform131 in order to analyse 
the gap between existing and future regulation of the private military space, and the justice that 
this regulation can provide in the event of gross violations by private military actors. 
Building on the value-based approach, an important goal of regulation specifically concerning 
private security providers is to enable an appropriate use of PMCs. According to Nigel White, 
“the idea of PMSCs using force may be distasteful, but if it is used in a regulated manner to 
protect the human rights of vulnerable people, then arguably it should not be prohibited.”132 In 
other words, regulation should ensure an environment whereby private security resources could 
address the needs of the international security landscape without the risk of their acting with 
impunity. Effective and value-based regulation could also help PMCs to finally overcome their 
legally dubious and unethical reputation in the eyes of the public.  
Part 4: Individual, Corporate, and State Responsibility 
Law and regulation fulfils its goals through enforcement, or in other words by invoking 
responsibility. When a PMC is involved in committing a gross violation, such as killing a number 
of civilians as part of its contracted activities, who should be responsible and in what way? Is it 
the contractor who fired the gun? Or perhaps the company he was recruited by, who may not 
have provided the appropriate training? Or should it be the state that outsourced the support 
of military activities to a private entity? Both military conduct and human rights are viewed as 
primary concerns of states, rather than corporations or individuals.133 Equally, if the context of 
the PMC as a professional occupation is removed, it then reduces the situation to an instance of 
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one civilian killing another. This means that all three components, the contractor, the company, 
and the state are crucial to establishing responsibility in PMC conduct.134 
Hannah Tonkin discusses the theory and practice of state responsibility and, most importantly, 
relevant international regulation and how it applies.135 She argues that the fundamental 
principle of state responsibility is that a state is only responsible for its own acts rather than all 
acts.136 The rationale for this construct prevents the state from performing as the guarantor of 
all acts in its territory, or acts of its nationals abroad.137 What differentiates the relationship 
between the state and PMCs from using the services of any other corporation is the potential 
resort to power on the international level, and human rights violations in the context of post-
conflict reconstruction, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, etc.  
There are very strict norms in IHL and Customary IL concerning intervention and the use of force 
by states.138 Due to the governmental nature of PMC activity, a number of regulatory 
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mechanisms have been developed to establish state responsibility, whereby the conduct of the 
private party is assignable to the state. Amongst such mechanisms are the Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles) adopted by the 
International Law Commission in 2001. Together with the Commentaries, the ILC Articles outline 
the conditions for attribution of private conduct to the state. There are also industry-specific 
regulatory bodies, such as the Montreux Document and the Draft Convention on the Regulation, 
Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies that outline the obligation 
of states who hire, host, and domicile PMCs. Additionally, the United Nations “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” Framework sets out the guiding principles for states, as well as businesses, to 
ensure human rights values are promoted and followed.  
Finally, the relationship between the state, as client, and the PMC, as provider of services, is 
administered by contractual terms that both parties agree to. Contract law adds an extra layer 
of surveillance and legal enforcement, as its jurisdiction applies when one of the parties is found 
to be in breach of contractual terms. While only states and international organisations are 
recognised as subjects of IL, individuals possess international legal personality under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which outlines their responsibility for the 
commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.139 In order for a PMC 
employee or director to be held liable for aiding or abetting a crime under the Rome Statute, 
prosecution must demonstrate that the assistance was provided “for the purpose of facilitating 
the commission of the crime”.140 In other words, it is necessary to prove the knowledge and the 
intent of the accused. 
Furthermore, Article 21 of the Draft Convention establishes the rules on individual criminal 
responsibility by exercising its jurisdiction over individuals through the domestic laws of state 
                                                 
139 Art. 25 Statute of the International Criminal Court UN Doc./A.CONF.183.9*, 2187 UNTS 1998, p. 90. 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parties.141 On a national level, contractors are also subject to domestic criminal laws just like any 
civilians. However, domestic criminal law is often limited by territoriality, whereby its 
jurisdiction does not extend beyond the national borders of the state. Also, it has been observed 
in past practice that hiring states would grant PMC contractors legal immunity from local 
criminal legal systems of the state where they performed their services. Such was the case 
during the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administration in Iraq. To overcome these 
issues, in 2000 the United States Congress passed the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
(MEJA), that gave federal courts jurisdiction over felonies committed by persons “employed by 
or accompanying the armed forces” overseas. Similarly, according to the UK 2006 Armed Forces 
Act, PMC contractors working for the UK Armed Forces are subject to Service discipline. The 
limitations and practical applicability of regulations invoking individual responsibility for private 
military contractors are analysed in Chapter 5.  
Finally, there are numerous regulatory bodies that make provisions for corporate responsibility; 
some are international, some domestic, some binding, others self-regulating and voluntary. 
Corporate liability can be of a criminal (domestic criminal justice system) or social nature (in tort 
law). Historically, corporate liability developed in a different way to that of states or individuals. 
Unlike individuals and states, who can be tried at the ICC (and the ad hoc Tribunals) and the 
International Court of Justice respectively, currently the mainstream view is that legal persons 
cannot be held criminally liable on an international level. While there is no strong norm of 
international criminal responsibility for the corporation, the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights is an emerging precedent to that end. As of May 2014, it became the first international 
court to recognise and criminalise corporate liability for international crimes.142  
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To conclude, the choice of this critical approach enables this research to consider a wide range 
of different configurations of state, military, policy, and law. The following three chapters 
demonstrate that private security is a long-existent phenomenon that is deeply entrenched in 
governmental, political, and economic structures, all of which should be considered when 
formulating current and future regulatory mechanism. Having established the theoretical 
framework of this thesis and explored the key themes and definitions, I now proceed to examine 
governmental and military developments that contributed to the establishment of this norm. 
  
                                                 
Assembly/AU/Dec.517-545(XXIII), available at: http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/decisions/9661-
assembly_au_dec_517_-_545_xxiii_e.pdf. 
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Chapter 2 
Historical Typology of States and Military Forces 
While contemporary definitions of mercenaries derive from experiences of the Cold War and 
the wars of national liberation, a large body of historical evidence defends and even welcomes 
private military service. For centuries, more often than not states relied heavily on external 
military support to sustain power, expand territories, and extend their rule. Typically linked to 
the concept of modern nation-states,143 sovereignty and the subject of its decline are often 
explored in international relations (IR) and IL literature from the standpoint of modernity.144 By 
decoupling the notion of sovereignty from the modern nation-state, I consider different 
expressions of private and irregular force in contrasting forms of governance and examine state 
practice in regulating these forces.  
While not considered states in the modern sense, different forms of governance from the 
fourteenth century onwards each had characteristic military power and distinct sources of 
legitimacy. Analysed through the concepts of power and legitimacy, these typologies help us to 
track lineages of state/military relations up to the present day. This chapter offers a reading of 
historical military developments in order to draw attention to the differing ways in which 
violence was normatively organised. It develops an account of the changing nature of war and 
military power in modernity, providing the necessary context to critique contemporary attempts 
                                                 
143 The Peace of Westphalia, 1648. 
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by IL to regulate mercenaries and PMCs. The typologies are offered as examples only and are 
not intended as authoritative historical accounts.  
Having highlighted the structural and functional elements of a state in Chapter 1, I here build 
upon the accounts of Machiavelli, Anderson, Mann, Tilly, Wallerstein, and Marshall to consider 
the process of state formation through the lens of military history and the changing nature of 
war. I explore the questions of public and private violence by conducting a study of the role of 
mercenaries and private armies in different forms of governance between the fourteenth and 
late nineteenth centuries, such as feudalism, absolutism, Italian city-republics, the early nation-
state of Revolutionary France, and the outsourced government of the British Empire, run by the 
East India Company (EIC). To approach this task with consistency, I analyse the relationship 
between the state and the military through the concepts of power and legitimacy. I scrutinise 
the structure and organisation of these forms of governance and locate the type of military force 
that prevailed in every scenario.  
Part 1 outlines the core ideas that summarise the feudal form of governance and considers 
military power in medieval states. It also examines the key features of absolutist states and 
demonstrates how the legitimacy of a monarch was diversified and strengthened through 
various institutions. It focuses on the development of professional armies and the role of 
mercenaries in their creation. Part 2 offers an account of republicanism and the anti-mercenary 
norms through the neo-Roman political thought of Machiavelli and his contemporaries. It 
analyses the sources of legitimacy prevailing in Renaissance republics, and explores the concept 
and practical application of the civilian militia as a type of military force developed and 
promoted in the sixteenth century.   
Part 3 focuses on the establishment of the nation-state and military nationalism, analysed 
through the lens of the French Revolution. Contrary to the position of a vassal in a feudal 
organisation who paid for his war equipment and provisioning, as well as the administrative and 
49 
 
 
 
legal costs of the fief entrusted to him out of his own pocket,145 the nation-state developed a 
mechanism to streamline administrative processes, and assumed responsibility and control over 
the organised violence that only its citizens (according to this view) ought to take part in. Hence 
I examine the role of citizenship and popular sovereignty in the formation of the nation-state 
and national army, and how they influenced the anti-mercenary norms. Part 4 analyses the 
outsourcing of governmental and military functions to the British East India Company and the 
role of colonial armies in imperial expansionism. While the institutionalisation of the national 
army created a strong rationale against the use of mercenaries and foreign legions, colonial 
encounters introduced European powers to a brand-new pool of unclassified military resources. 
Neither mercenary, nor national, these forces formed an integral part of colonial armies, raising 
questions about their legitimacy and highlighting the differentiation between public and private 
in the military context. In both France and Britain, we observe a limited use of mercenary forces 
at home while raising colonial armies to pursue their colonial ambitions abroad. The two models 
are chosen to demonstrate the first modern attempt at constructing a nation-state with a mass-
raised army, levée en masse, and the contrasting outsourced governance of the EIC. 
The final part of this chapter offers normative conclusions that each attempt to explain, within 
their own historical circumstances, states’ decision to deploy certain type of military force. It 
illuminates the norms that link governmental structures to specific types of armies. While 
considering some of the normative approaches grounded in these relationships, it sets the scene 
and introduces different forms of military force, revealing varying interpretations of its 
classification into public and private through changing conflict paradigms. This critical typology 
of different forms of governance and prevailing military actors allows me to take a more 
                                                 
145 Weber, M.: “Politics as a Vocation” in The Vocation Lectures, Hackett Publishing Company, 
Cambridge, 2004, p. 36. 
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meaningful and informed approach when analysing contemporary challenges in IL posed by the 
use of private force.  
Part 1: Feudalism and Absolutism 
Feudalism in Europe emerged from the disintegration of an empire, forming a ‘civilisation’ but 
not a world-system.146 Described by Tilly as patrimonialism,147 this historical stage stretched up 
to the fifteenth century in Europe and, arguably, some of its elements merged into successive 
forms of governance. The Christian Church and feudalism were the two pillars of medieval 
society that extended through to the era of absolutism. I do not intend to provide a full historical 
account of feudalism; instead I suggest some ideas that characterise the feudal order and 
contextualise early modern use of mercenaries.  
In the feudal form of governance, fourteenth-century knights and princes prioritised continuous 
conquests over the stability of the territories they possessed and the population within these 
territories. These rulers sought legitimacy for their authority from the Church,148 while their 
lords supplied the military power, leaving them with little sway over governmental processes. 
From an economic standpoint, the governmental construct of Western feudalism, according to 
Wallenstein, was a nodal system of increasing population and productivity, whereby landowners 
controlled the surplus and the legal system.149 In the absence of a money-based economy, 
centralised defence, or administration mechanisms, political fragmentation was undoubtedly a 
prominent feature of feudal society.150 The feudal military system was based predominantly on 
                                                 
146 Wallerstein, I.: The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European 
World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Academic Press, London, 1974, pp. 17-18. Background reading 
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147 Tilly, C.: Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p. 29. 
148 Held, McGrew et al., supra, p. 35. 
149 Wallerstein, supra, p. 18. 
150 Fischer, M.: “Feudal Europe, 800-1300: communal discourse and conflictual practices”, 1992, Vol. 46 
(2), International organization, p. 444. Fischer outlines three orders in the feudal society: the oratores, 
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private agreements,151 while the only ‘legitimate’ wars could be fought to defend and expand 
Christendom against the pagans, or to remedy injustice.152 The main actors of feudal warfare 
were tribes, feudal levies, urban militias, and similar customary forces.153 The prohibition of 
arbitrary war drastically reduced the authority of the rulers, leaving them dependent on local 
private military forces. Ultimately, the idea of Christian unity did not coincide with the reality of 
territorial fragmentation and the continuous conflicts between those striving for control of tiny 
strips of territory.  
Power and legitimacy derived from the lord/vassal nexus. According to Montesquieu, the 
essence of feudalism lay in the custom of vassalage, to which the fief was entirely subordinate, 
used as a form of pay for loyal service.154 While a vassal’s primary duty was military service,155 
the feudal lord provided his vassals with material maintenance and protection both on the field 
of arms and in court.156 The lord and the vassal who were “by definition, on different social 
levels”, were bound together by a contract.157 Feudal lords relied on a financially driven 
relationship with their vassals that carried a mercenary nature. What distinguishes this 
relationship from the twenty-first century freedom of contracts witnessed between states and 
PMCs is the framework of oaths that characterised feudal society.158 The same respect for oaths 
was observed by knights. By accepting knighthood, all knights (even those who had not 
pronounced it) were bound by an oath.159 However, the common practice of “multiple 
                                                 
or clergy, providing the community with divine grace; the bellatores, or knights; and the laboratores, or 
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151 Brown, E. A. R.: “The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe”, 1974, 
Vol. 79 (4), The American Historical Review, pp. 1073. 
152 The just war doctrine, Fischer, supra, p. 436. 
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154 According to Montesquieu, quoted in Stephenson, C.: “The Origin and Significance of Feudalism”, 
1941, Vol. 46 (4), The American Historical Review, pp. 789. 
155 Bloch, M.: Feudal Society, 2nd edition, Routledge, Abingdon, 1962, p. 220. 
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vassalage”160 provided a certain level of choice and autonomy for the vassal to pick sides in the 
event of a conflict between two of his lords. Such risk inevitably weakened the military power 
paradigm that feudal nobility relied on. 
Furthermore, military power, the judicial system, and land revenue were all concentrated in the 
hands of lords, making them more powerful than any other feudal institution.161 At the same 
time, feudal lords had virtually no governmental instruments at their disposal to provide control 
over the claimed territories162 and the legitimacy of courts was often “restricted by private 
vengeance”.163 Distinct mercenary features can be observed in certain aspects of the feudal 
judiciary system, such as trial by battle, for instance. A practice favoured by the physically strong 
and also by the rich, it allowed women and clerics to offer a substitution, extending it to “any 
man who could afford to pay a warrior to fight in his stead, spawning a regular profession of 
judicial champions for hire.”164 
Power and Legitimacy in Absolute Monarchies 
The next historical typology that I explore in order to understand state practice in relation to 
mercenaries is the example of absolute monarchies. Rising from its feudal roots and 
characterised by the rising scale of war, absolutism resonated with an increase in state authority, 
leaving its footprint on sixteenth-century Europe. However, due to continuing limitation by 
divine and natural law, ‘absolute’ meant ‘unsupervised’ rather than ‘unlimited’.165 Although 
many features of the feudal mode of governance remained, finding their niche in the 
construction of the absolutist state, the changing nature of war set in motion further 
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development and concentration of systems that under feudalism had been fragmented and 
unconsolidated.  
Sixteenth century absolutism introduced an ideology whereby monarchs claimed the divine 
right of kings as a new means of legitimising their authority.166 To fortify their position, monarchs 
used the mechanisms of bureaucratisation, the monopolisation of force, the creation of 
legitimacy, and the homogenisation of their population.167 As absolutist states evolved, the 
source of their legitimacy was diversified beyond divine law. While firmly entrenched in one 
prince or a dynasty, a sovereign’s power now extended to a number of new institutions within 
their immediate interests, allowing for a shift away from feudal political fragmentation and 
towards state centralisation.168 Centralisation progressed by way of integrating smaller political 
units under a unified territorial area, with a consolidated legislative system and political 
authority to administer the new territory.169 The concentration of power initiated numerous key 
processes that bridged the medieval forms of governance with a modern sovereign state. Over 
the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries European monarchs170 cultivated a 
politically mature system of set territorial borders, slow yet steady monopolisation of military 
power, and its reorganisation into state armies.171 The bureaucratic state arose from 
administrative enhancements in the civil and military realm, introducing tax and credit systems, 
ample enough to sustain and nurture the belligerent ambitions of early modern states.  
Obtaining the monopoly of force in a modern sense may have been a conscious strategy to 
further monarchical authority or a reaction to the growing warfare demands of rising 
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absolutism. Demilitarisation of the noble class, restrictions on the civilian right to bear arms, and 
a conscious reinforcement of distinct state frontiers, all played a crucial role in increasing state 
capacity to pacify its own population.172 Administrative and military functions were performed 
by those dependent directly on the monarch, as opposed to unsubordinated, disobliging feudal 
lords. Suppression of the private armies in Tudor England173 and Richelieu’s efforts in France to 
tear down the fortresses within the state only to fortify its borders,174 are just a few examples 
that supported the trend.  
Having reached significant heights in warfare, this period merited the title of ‘military 
revolution’.175 The magnitude of this revolution was tied up in the reforms of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. As part of the strategic innovation in the military and social realms, 
Maurice of Orange and Gustavus Adolphus introduced the officer as the vital element of the 
European army.176 The officer assumed managerial responsibilities in the conduct of a battle. 
Not only did this change influence the conduct of war, it also sought to shape the social 
construction of the state, introducing a new and increasingly important professional class in 
European society.177 Bureaucratic structures were developed to administer states’ heavy 
monetary demands to further their military growth, recruit, and pay the troops, and to fund 
wars, immense in scale and resources.178 A typical army of 60,000 men, with its 40,000 horses, 
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consumed almost a million pounds of food per day.179 By strengthening and developing the 
administrative apparatus, the state could afford more flexible access to funding in the event of 
having to urgently raise an army, lowering the risk of financial crises and mutiny caused by 
unpaid military forces.180  
Professional Armies  
So what was the role of mercenaries in the process of developing professional standing armies? 
Usually assembled at the start of a war and disbanded at the end or even in the process of the 
conflict, due to a lack of resources or subsequent mutiny, the armed forces of the sixteenth 
century were unable to realise their full potential in the absence of effective control by the state 
and the structure of a permanent army. Distrust amongst the lower classes over the obligation 
to bear arms prevented monarchs from successfully building national armies.181 This led to the 
inevitable use of foreign mercenaries to conduct wars and pacify local uprisings, when the 
sovereigns lacked authority over their people. The absolutist state pioneered the professional 
army, which was largely mercenary in the sense of recruitment and pay.182 At the same time, 
the military revolution inflated in scale and facilitated the rapid proliferation of warfare by 
introducing gunpowder, portable firearms, siege artillery, anti-siege fortifications, and other 
significant innovations.183 
 Using mercenaries had numerous advantages. Professional disposable military resources were 
commonly used to conduct wars and expand the territories of the monarchy. The army of the 
Dutch Republic,184 for instance, was keen to finance mercenaries since their ruling elite was a 
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commercial class with no military aspirations.185 In addition, it gave the rulers the means to 
control the lords as the new source for supplying military force emerged, “creating an 
employment vacuum for the lesser nobility.”186 It also mitigated the risk of uprisings, fuelled by 
the population growth in Western Europe and the ‘vagabondage’ phenomenon. By 
incorporating a part of the population into their armies, rulers provided employment, 
simultaneously using this group to pacify the others.187 The new armies had significant influence 
on the integral state structure by inverting the feudal order from one where social position 
determined rank, to one where rank determined social position.188 This inversion resulted in 
dynastic monarchs rediscovering and adapting the core military principles of antiquity: the 
effectiveness in combat of trained infantry.189  
This shift in military layout was most successfully demonstrated by the example of Swiss 
pikemen, free peasants from the poor forest regions in central Switzerland. Their efficiency was 
rooted in an ordered discipline in battle rather than in the advances of innovative weaponry. 
They widely exported their superior military skills, and were known as one of the most popular 
mercenary forces in history. While these flexible, highly skilled military resources were always 
available to princes to fulfil their belligerent needs at home and abroad, the disadvantages of 
using foreign mercenaries included drastically impeding the consolidation of state sovereignty. 
The main challenge was to contain and fund foreign armies without the fatal consequence of 
bankruptcy for the monarchy. The ever-increasing cost of war, more expensive armaments, 
longer periods of training, and bigger administrative staffs shook the finances of every state in 
Europe.190 Therefore, incorporation of mercenary units into standing professional armies could 
be interpreted as a cost-saving alternative to waging wars with predominantly private military 
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resources. Such an approach can be considered a form of regulation of mercenaries through 
state practice. To demonstrate an opposing normative approach to mercenaries, I now examine 
a form of governance that, while sharing the same historical period, differed greatly to the 
governmental paradigm of absolute monarchies. 
Part 2: Italian City-Republics and Civilian Militia 
Renaissance Italy contrasted in governance and military structure to the comparatively 
centralised absolute monarchies of Western Europe. While the dynastic monarchies north of 
the Alps were growing in size and capacity, Italian city-republics found it challenging to develop 
beyond a ‘segregated mass’ into a consolidated entity. I will provide an account of the 
development of republicanism and the anti-mercenary norms through the neo-Roman political 
thought of Machiavelli and his contemporaries, analysing the sources of legitimacy that 
prevailed in Renaissance republics, and exploring the concept and practical application of civilian 
militia as a type of military power, developed and promoted throughout the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. Amongst the differing interpretations of Machiavelli and his thought,191 I 
seek to build upon the work of John Greville Agard Pocock and other historians who advocate 
Machiavelli’s republican nature.192 Understanding Machiavelli’s republican vision is important in 
the context of tracing the regulation of mercenaries in different historical typologies. Unlike 
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observing regulation and normative approaches to mercenaries in the state practice of absolute 
monarchies, Machiavelli’s republican account offers regulation at a moral (rather than purely 
practical) level. 
In the absence of any overarching unity,193 multiple governing authorities, otherwise known as 
signorie,194 emerged in Northern and Central Italy. Formally independent from the German Holy 
Roman Empire, they formed small independent governmental structures of city-states that 
prevailed in the region between the ninth and fifteenth centuries. Run by landed aristocrats, 
known as signori, this mode of governance was rooted in wealth rather than any other unifying 
authority, such as dynasty or the Church. Resting on force and personal fraud, the legitimacy of 
signori lacked communal support and aristocratic order or duty.195 Despite constitutional checks 
and balances, wealth played an important part in Italian city-republics, serving as a key source 
of legitimacy and power.196 Machiavelli condemned wealth as a source of legitimacy,197 as he 
deemed it deceitful, leading to corruption and the limitation of republican popular freedom.198 
Furthermore, it encouraged the aristocracy to build their own private armies, inevitably putting 
the integrity of a republic at danger.199  
Unlike the relatively consolidated monarchies north of the Alps, most Italian republics suffered 
from internal division within the cities, while the frequency of external warfare brought 
incessant crises of both military and fiscal nature.200 Although by the end of the fourteenth 
century most of Italy was governed by signori, the cities of Florence and Venice, retaining the 
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status of independent city-republics, maintained their power throughout the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries.201 While Venice was designed as a mixed government, in practice it was run 
by a large yet finite body of ancient families, therefore limiting the political participation of 
citizens.202 Florentine republican structure was also deformed under an authoritarian 
reorganisation, with the “political participation now increasingly determined from above.”203 
With no viable bureaucracy to administer the Papal States,204 the fragmented structure of Italian 
cities was neither truly republican nor monarchical in practice. In the absence of coherent 
sovereign authority, “temporary coalitions and consultative institutions played significant parts 
in war and extraction, but little durable state apparatus emerged on a national scale.”205 
Beginning in 1434, a sixty-year long Medici rule206 marked the decline of signoria political 
authority, as the Florentine electoral system was replaced with that of unilateral 
appointment.207 By the 1490s, the major powers of Italy – Venice, Milan, Florence, Naples, and 
the Papal States – had been warring with each other intermittently for decades;208 by the 1520s, 
the Habsburgs and Valois were fighting their dynastic wars on Italian territory.209 As of 1540, 
Milan and Lombardy had fallen under Spanish rule, France occupied much of Savoy and 
Piedmont, Florence had become a Medici-ruled duchy, and Naples was an appendage of the 
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Spanish crown. Even Venice and Genoa, although maintaining their oligarchic institutions, lost 
their authority in the Mediterranean,210 forcing Italian republicanism to surrender in the face of 
proficient centralised absolutist states.  
Expressions of military power by Italian city-states also differed to those seen in the absolutist 
mode of governance. Dependent on commerce and manufacture,211 cities served predominantly 
as market centres for local commodities, with limited warfare capacity on land and at sea.212 
Military engagements were pursued out of necessity rather than strategy and were avoided 
where possible in order to protect the free flow of trade.213 In the absence of a standing army 
or any necessary political infrastructure to facilitate a permanent military force, the condottieri 
in Italy owned their mercenary troops, “auctioning them and switching them from side to side 
in local wars.”214 The military disadvantages of Italian city-states became evident in the late 
sixteenth century, when Spain, England, and Holland all started to send large armed vessels into 
the Mediterranean for trade and piracy. Unable to compete with the military capacity and scale 
of absolute monarchies, city-states such as Ragusa, Genoa, and Venice found their previous 
reliance on speed, connections, and craftiness insufficient to protect them from great 
commercial losses.215 Italian leaders and troops played only a marginal part in the developments 
fostered by the military revolution, with the army of Venice being by far the most distinct 
exception.216  
There could be various explanations as to why mercenaries did not achieve the same results in 
Italy as in the European absolutist states. The above research suggests that different forms of 
governance support different military structures. Italy was divided into multiple city-states, 
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severely lacking the political consolidation and infrastructural capacity required to produce a 
permanent army, or to effectively incorporate mercenary forces. Furthermore, both the 
composition and organisation of the mercenary forces were different. Unlike in absolute 
monarchies, Italian mercenaries, auxiliary forces, and their commanding officers were 
predominantly foreign, paid, and trained by their country of origin.217 Resembling the 
commercial structure of modern-day private military companies, the authority over these troops 
lay in their homeland with the ruler who had ultimate control over them.218 Unlike their 
fourteenth-century predecessors, the mercenary soldiers of fifteenth-century Italian cities were 
mainly formed of Italians.219 The condottieri in Italy contracted out troops under their command 
to city-states for use in local wars. Meanwhile the other European monarchs created mercenary 
corps directly under their own control, forming professional standing armies.220 While some 
Italian states provided an increasingly disciplined and effective military, they did not produce a 
universal strengthening of the morale and collective virtue of the citizenry.221 It is at the heart 
of this republican rationale that Machiavelli's perception of mercenaries was formed, placing a 
citizen’s financial independence and genuine desire to protect the republic on the other side of 
the spectrum, serving as a guarantee against corruption.222 
Civilian Militia as a Norm Against Mercenaries 
Critical of the political and military practices of city-states, Niccolo Machiavelli’s republican 
views were opposed to the fragmented Italian governance that relied on mercenaries for 
provision of power and whose legitimacy was rooted in wealth. In his capacity as a senior official 
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in Florence (1498-1512), Machiavelli modelled the governance of Renaissance Italy in the period 
of constitutional switch between monarchies and republics upon the ideal of the Roman 
republic. Based on a good constitution,223 the republican ideal of civic glory,224 and, finally, the 
concept of the citizen militia, Machiavelli envisaged a republican alternative to the widespread 
idea of dynasty and private armies dominating the European landscape. Leonardo Bruni was the 
first humanist to attempt an analysis of the Florentine republican constitution.225 Like 
Machiavelli, he saw great value in the liberty and loyalty of every citizen to help promote a 
legitimate government, and therefore reinforce the liberty of a republic.226 
Fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Florentine republicanism emphasised the importance of 
“good arms and good orders”227 or, in other words, the relationship between military resources, 
available to the state, and an established system of administrative power. In line with his 
interpretation of Roman civic traditions,228 Bruni considered military functions “an essential 
attribute of citizenship itself.”229 He deemed mercenaries dishonourable, arguing that they 
fought poorly as they were not part of what they fought for.230 To Machiavelli, there was nothing 
more commendable than citizens defending their own state through the formation of an 
accountable military and active participation in the governmental system. To that end, 
Machiavelli advocated a military force comprised of citizens, and called for the establishment of 
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civilian militia, which materialised in 1509.231 Through the logic of civic glory and the urge of men 
to defend their own, the militia was viewed as a mechanism that transformed men into 
citizens.232 Subsequent republican visions also promoted a contemporary appeal for a distinct 
form of public security, namely a civilian responsibility to protect.233  
While in the rest of Europe mercenaries were a precondition of the new royal armies, 
Machiavelli’s neo-communal militia was formed of regular troops.234 Promoting an ethical 
argument against the use of foreign mercenaries, Machiavelli failed to see them as a valid 
military option for the absolutist states. However, the power of dynastic authority kept 
mercenary troops in check and used them successfully to their military advantage.235 Militias, 
on the other hand, were lacking in training and skill; their failure in Germany236 proved that only 
mercenary armies could compete in the new military landscape.237 The nature of absolutist 
warfare was highly territorial, requiring a military force to travel and fight beyond the homeland 
borders. This was not something a civilian militia had the capacity to deliver. And, although 
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italian militias found their niche in fortifying camps, digging 
defensive ditches,238 patrolling streets, and intervening in public conflicts,239 they could not 
compete with the professional range, experience and capacity of mercenary forces. Their 
fragmented governance made it problematic for city-republics to match the ever-growing 
armies of absolute monarchies; they simply crumbled under the weight of the sixteenth 
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century’s military requirements.240 Although the recourse to civilian militias in the context of the 
vast absolutist armies of the period was unsuccessful, the deliberate intention to restrict the use 
of private force was clearly defined, even if the concept was not fulfilled at the time.  
Part 3: The French Revolution and the Nation-State  
Alongside the professional army, the end of the seventeenth century also saw the principles of 
sovereignty and territoriality assume a new form.241 In Western Europe, absolutism ignited the 
process of state consolidation, reducing the differences within a state and increasing the 
differences amongst them, forming distinct political communities with a growing sense of 
national identity.242 Sovereignty became the entitlement to rule over a distinct territory. The 
emerging nation-states of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries started 
developing structures “to claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a 
particular territory.”243 The territory, associated with appropriation and legitimacy,244 became 
an essential defining feature for the concentration and control of power.  
In this section I trace the changing form of governance in the context of the French Revolution, 
and the changes it instilled in military organisation. The value of examining the governmental 
and military structures of Revolutionary France lies in attaining another distinct typology of the 
state-military relationship. Through the liaison between the army and the emerging nation-state 
I examine the original nature of levée en masse, a new form of conscription that pioneered the 
mass citizen army. The example of the French Revolution highlights the model of an early nation-
state, with its legitimacy rooted in a more centralised popular government, and its power drawn 
from the people, who gradually acquired the status of citizen-soldiers. The normative value of 
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this type of governance lies in the regulatory attempt to outlaw foreign soldiers, juxtaposing 
them against French citizens, bound together by territorial borders and national ideology. 
According to Bukovansky, the French Revolution “accelerated the shift in the European states 
system from the dynastic territorial state to the nation-state as the dominant model of political 
legitimacy.”245 Change of authority and governmental structure was inevitable when the Third 
Estate’s deputies transformed themselves on 17 June 1789 into a ‘National Assembly’ against 
the rule of the two senior orders. Giving the Assembly the power to devise a constitution, “they 
thereby announced their intention of redefining royal authority in terms of ‘national 
consent’.”246 The idea of public opinion as a source of legitimacy challenged monarchical rule.247 
It also symbolised a loss of power for the ancien régime, allowing the revolutionary coalitions to 
fill the vacuum.248 Centralisation emerged from within the nation as the bourgeois class united 
and led the people under the idea of popular sovereignty.249 These transformations in state 
organisation enabled changes to military structure on a national scale. Following the Seven Years 
War (1754-1763) an increasing warrior sentiment convinced the bourgeoisie and the nobility of 
the need for a standing army which, according to Bertaud, ought to become national to prevent 
it becoming an instrument of despotism.250 In practical terms this meant that the legitimacy of 
dynastic monarchy was (at least in theory) replaced with national institutions of wider popular 
representation. Previously dictated by wealth and class, professional military careers conflicted 
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with the concept of equality and inclusion, promoted by the Revolution. As control of the army 
was transferred from the king to the Assembly, a three-year project of military reorganisation 
had begun.251 By taking control of the funds and the terms of enlistment, defining the budget 
and duration of service, and having admission based on merit rather than class, the Assembly 
claimed and established its legitimacy. 
The Revolutionary state apparatus used literacy and ideology to drive military conscription and 
promote the idea of nationalism within the army. Increased literacy improved the technological 
capacity and therefore the effectiveness of the army, and was conducive to the organisation of 
a large-scale military through training and education.252 Literacy also made soldiers more 
susceptible to propaganda, which, inevitably, facilitated the spread of nationalist ideology.253 
Numerous pamphlets exhorted soldiers to protect citizens and to disobey their officers when 
ordered to oppose the people.254 The revolts soon became frequent and eventually led to the 
disintegration of the Royal Army in 1790-1791. 
A turning point was reached in March 1791 when the contract of enlistment was no longer 
between two individuals, but between the conscript and the state. This change was especially 
momentous as it implied stepping away from the notion of the private soldier carried through 
military history by feudalism. This contract of enlistment asserted the separation between 
private and public military force, assigning the former an air of mistrust and archaism, and the 
latter political relevance and strong national principles. Foreigners were disqualified, and the 
principle of homogeneous national armies, without foreign units or foreign private soldiers, was 
retained until Napoleon’s rule.255  
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The strength of nationalist ideology and its relevance to the army derived from acceptance 
based on citizenship. All members of the state were considered members of a status-group, as 
citizens, sharing all the requirements of collective solidarity that implies.256 Besides 
strengthening the revolutionaries with ideological power, nationalism gave the state an 
administrative dimension.257 The recognition of territorial sovereignty amplified the 
reorganisation of the military. Nation-states were now in possession of a defined territory and 
population which gave natural advantage to populous states such as France and Britain by 
allowing them to form mass armies from their own citizens.258 Perhaps the citizen armies did 
not directly arise from nationalism. However, as classes and other actors attained civil and 
political citizenship, the state became “their” nation-state, an “imagined community” to which 
they developed loyalties.259   
Although the army of Louis XIV included a substantial segment of French citizens, professional 
armies were predominantly foreign.260 Later, the transformation of the key governmental bodies 
produced strong national militarism,261 leaving little room for private and foreign military 
recruits. This symbiosis between raising a citizen army in exchange for the promise of equality 
was critical to the processes of wartime mobilisation.262 The war of 1792 served a unifying 
purpose, initiating the distinction and separation between national and foreign, which was 
perceived as a threat to the Republic. When the military was later reorganised, foreign recruits 
of all ranks faced radical changes. Under the admissions principles of the Legislative Assembly, 
foreigners were disqualified from joining the army. To ensure reliability, separate legions that 
also contained foreign recruits were created.263 Because legions were mistrusted on the basis of 
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nationality, an added level of military authority was present between the soldiers of the legions 
and the army general.  
This air of autonomy and the uncertainty surrounding their allegiances made the legions 
resemble private troops more than a unified national army. Although faced with nationalist 
controversy, these were used as an instrument of war and to propagate revolutionary ideas 
amongst foreign populations, where mercenaries were often recruited.264 Foreign military 
forces, therefore, played an important role in the French Revolution. Formed by the emigrated 
nobility, these served as a catalyst to popular mobilisation, forming the separation between 
‘native’ and ‘alien’ while fuelling the nation’s drive for self-determination.265 This crystallisation 
of the notion of a national state and citizenship influenced the norm against the use of foreign 
mercenaries in France at end of the eighteenth century. The relationship between an early 
model of a nation-state and a national army, therefore, illustrates another historical typology 
with a unique normative approach to private force.  
La Levée en Masse  
With a military policy aimed at transforming a professional army into a national army,266 1793 
saw the introduction of a new ideological military concept of ‘levée en masse’, which 
dramatically altered the scale of land warfare.267 Inspired by the Minister of War, Lazare Carnot, 
and orchestrated by sans-culottes between 1793 and 1794, the brigade formation process was 
essential to republicanise the army and make its chiefs respect civil power.268 On 23 August 1793 
the Committee of Public Safety ratified the Mobilisation Decree that imposed responsibility on 
all citizens to protect the French state. The Decree stated: 
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all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the services of the armies. The young 
men shall fight; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women 
shall make tents and clothes and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old 
lint into linen; the old men shall betake themselves to the public squares in order to 
arouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the 
Republic.269 
Popular sovereignty was henceforth articulated through equality of military recruitment and 
was reflected in the command system of a diversified national army. “The combination of the 
first waves of volunteers and the first conscripts produced an army that was by 1794 
representative of the society as a whole.”270 All single men aged between 18 and 25 were 
required to join military forces, therefore expanding the French army to over one and a half 
million soldiers by 1794. Used as a measure of internal security, the levée en masse united the 
nation and afforded the French supremacy in combat.271 While many scholars associate national 
conscription with democratic governance and republican values,272 the army was born out of 
necessity and desperation, as much as ideology.273 It is important to note that French republican 
rhetoric about the spiritual bond between nation and army was more conceptual than practical. 
Philip Bobbit makes a distinction between the “state-nation” of Revolutionary France, where 
the people of all classes are put at the service of the idea of the nation, and the much later 
“nation-state”, where the state is put at the service of the people.274 However, the example of 
Revolutionary France carries normative value. This type of military conscription was 
unprecedented in modern history; it also contributed to the formation of a national identity. At 
the same time, the concept of citizenship and the three pillars of liberty, equality, and fraternity 
fostered and shaped the new mass army. A modern state with its defined territory and 
population provided the necessary political infrastructure to implement such numerically 
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immense armies that it was neither necessary nor economically viable to hire mercenaries. The 
unifying ideology of nationalism introduced republican practices to the European political 
landscape. It also reinforced the importance of citizen military duty, opposing it to the 
immorality of mercenary forces. This particular version of modernity, with national militarism at 
its core, was imitated by other European powers, turning the idea of national mass army into a 
norm desired by many states. 
Part 4: The British Empire and the East India Company 
Contrary to the military struggles between the European dynasties or nation-states, the conflict 
paradigm of colonial expansion was an asymmetric encounter between a sovereign European 
state and what was perceived as an amorphous, ‘uncivilized’ entity. Given the lack of military 
organisation on the part of the non-European states, and in the absence of any legal limitations 
for states to wage war, seventeenth-century European empires expanded by conquering large 
parts of Asia and Africa.275 European empires were better equipped to obtain collective wealth 
and security than others because they possessed greater “capacity and legitimacy”.276 While 
military and administrative power was real, imperialist legitimacy was built upon Eurocentric, 
orientalist projections of European sovereignty.277 Rather than rooted in dynasty, divine laws, 
or republican values, the legitimacy of an empire was based on an assumed cultural superiority 
and military strength. 
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Born out of the industrialisation of war, the second British Empire was a classic example of 
Western imperialism with a huge and well organised armed force at its disposal.278 Exercising an 
‘informal empire’ on the Indian subcontinent until 1858, it allowed its peripheral rulers to retain 
formal sovereignty while significantly constraining their autonomy by intimidation through 
military and economic power.279 Enforcement posed no real difficulties as European military 
strength and organisation prevailed.280 In the case of imperial Britain, both coercion and military 
superiority were combined to create ostensibly legal instruments.281  
This example highlights a model of an outsourced governance which is diametrically opposed to 
the previously explored example of a nation-state. In order to explore the governmental 
construct of the British Empire in India, I analyse the state administration, financial, and legal 
paradigms that were deeply immersed in military practices. Then, through the lens of power 
and legitimacy, I examine the army of the East India Company (EIC). By considering its 
composition, role within the Empire, and its relationship with the sovereign, I consider if such a 
colonial army should be deemed a public or a private force. The historical example of the British 
EIC and its colonial army illustrates the legal gaps in the classification and organisation of military 
power. It highlights the importance of PMC and mercenary regulation, and mirrors some of the 
contemporary state behaviours in their attempts to bypass the law through outsourcing military 
functions to a private company. 
The East India Company and its Accession to Power  
Founded in 1600, the EIC was run by a court of twenty-four directors. With its key focus on 
competitive trade, by the first half of the eighteenth century the Company had achieved the 
status of a respectable commercial body, connected with London City banking and the Stock 
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Exchange.282 While originally the EIC had a pacifist outlook and was mainly preoccupied with 
commerce,283 the Anglo-French struggles of the early to mid-eighteenth century were an 
important factor in the Company’s territorial expansion and assertion of governing power in 
India.284  
With the power of the Mughal dynasty285 dominating throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the Indian Empire was the second greatest power in the East, after China.286 Whether 
Britain’s accession to power in India was made possible by fractions in the Mughal rule,287 Hindu-
Muslim tensions,288 or due to the emergence of a new political order in eighteenth-century 
India,289 the British seized the opportunity to insert a much stronger authority, built on trade, a 
strong industrial, financial, military basis, and an effective organisation of local resources. The 
needs of Indian rulers for cash and troops met British ambitions to play a political role as bankers 
and military commanders.290  
When in 1757 Robert Clive291 brought Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa under the protectorate of the 
Company, its servants were granted possession of vast territories, authority over about twenty 
million people, as well as access to three million pound sterling in revenues.292 In the south, the 
British occupation created a new state; whereas in Bengal, the Company operated within an 
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existing state, dealing directly with the local power.293 Local customs were respected as the EIC 
focused on economic rather than cultural imperialism. Just like the Indian states, the British 
Empire in India was built on the taxation levied on the cultivators of the land.294 A dynamic 
private sector bound the Indians and the British through active trade and the voluntary 
subordination of wealthy Indian merchants to the Europeans in exchange for security and stable 
commerce. The Company achieved its sovereign status by penetrating beneath the surface and 
building up its strength not on commerce alone. It used the local resources – popular, 
administrative, and military – to establish its rule and, thereafter, to expand it while retaining 
formal control of the territory.295 Legitimacy had to be established in order for the EIC to claim 
power over the new territories; it materialised following the India Act of 1784296 introducing the 
rule of the law in the English Presidencies. After becoming administrators of Indian law, the 
British presided over courts in which issues of rights to land and distribution of revenue were 
decided.297 
The EIC also held control over military resources, although these were not under the direct rule 
of the British Empire. They were privately managed, locally sourced, and funded by the profits 
of the Company: taxes raised through Indian administrative systems or bribes received directly 
from Indian aristocrats.298 However, in military and administrative practice, just like in trade, 
local traditions had to be respected if the Company was to stand a chance of establishing its 
authority. The common denominator amongst administrative, financial, and legal functions was 
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the ever-growing role and presence of the military apparatus, rooted at the core of the state 
and the society.299  
The Army of the East India Company 
The eighteenth century marked a shift in the Great Power struggles, from European issues to 
markets and territories that ranged across the globe.300 Administration of vast overseas 
territories was highly expensive and deeply impractical, unless “use was made, wherever 
possible, of existing political structures and resources.”301 In order to save costs and minimise 
the use of British soldiers, the EIC chose to obtain its military manpower from local sources.302 
The indigenous population, although lacking the training and unity of a professional army, came 
at a much lower cost than British soldiers. Following the French, who piloted sepoy303 
conscription, the British raised their own local forces, grouping them into battalions in Bengal 
and Madras by the late 1750s.304 Unlike the French, who used coercion as a method of 
enlistment, the British offered voluntary service, which was an accepted norm by this time for 
free-born Britons.305 For the sepoys, paid voluntary service was a more attractive alternative to 
the French compulsory conscription. To make the enlistment contract between the soldier and 
the Company more lasting, as well as to attract recruits and to purchase their quiescence during 
service, British policymakers deployed material incentives.306  
Until the European invasions, Indian military culture was predominantly feudal in nature, with 
private mercenaries serving a different warlord based on pay and opportunity. French and 
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British imperialists introduced a very effective mechanism that gave the sepoys a military 
framework and a sense of job security, while simultaneously ensuring a constant supply of 
military manpower. This European pseudo-standing army created a real sentiment of fraternity 
by offering the sepoys discipline, uniforms, and a regular pay that also guaranteed their loyalty 
to the Company. Furthermore, the use of more advanced firearms made the sepoys stronger 
and more effective than any local opposition.307 Equality ended there, as no sepoy, however 
long his service tenure, could ever rise above the rank of ‘native officer’.308 In addition to the 
Royal Navy, which had long been an inherent source of power, the Company’s forces in India 
added a significant new element to Britain’s military capacity, a major land-based army,309 
making it a source of British imperial expansion.310 The size of the sepoy infantry force, and the 
Company’s ability to mobilize a flow of resources, were key to its subsequent military success.311  
While gradually becoming the central infrastructure of the British Indian state, and an 
unparalleled regional military force, the army of the EIC had a complex constitution, full of 
contradiction and inequality. The British Army in India predominantly consisted of volunteers 
who were not citizens.312 While expected to fight and die for the Empire, they did not qualify as 
citizens in the French revolutionary or modern sense of that term.313 The army was composed 
of at least three different elements: the centralised monarchical army, the national army, and 
the mercenary army.314 Although controlled by a national command, John Company’s European 
forces consisted largely of non-nationals. Even those sepoys recruited locally were not 
necessarily subjects of the British Empire. For example, starting from 1820s, the region of 
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Oudh315 was an important source for the recruitment of Indian sepoys; however, it did not 
become part of British India until 1856.316  
At this time, while most armies and some navies still contained elements of international 
‘service’ and mercenary nobility,317 standing armies were beginning to prevail across European 
nation-states and empires. However, there was one more, little known, yet extraordinary 
element to the EIC army which puts in question its status as a public military force. In 1781 the 
EIC hired two Hanoverian regiments.318 These German auxiliary troops were hired out by a 
prince to the British, amongst other imperial powers, under a subsidy treaty stipulating the 
number of troops, the term of service, the geographical area in which they were to be deployed, 
and the missions they could be used for, in return for financial and political benefits.319 The 
presence of auxiliary troops, although regulated, brings another mercenary dimension to the 
composition of the Company’s army.320 After the official transfer of India’s political authority to 
Queen Victoria on 2 August 1858321 and the dissolution of the Company in 1874 by an Act of 
Parliament,322 the Company’s European regiments, including the battalions raised during the 
Great Mutiny,323 were transferred to the British Army. The local units, with all ranks 
predominantly taken by Indians, were consolidated into an Indian Army under the power of the 
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Queen.324 The main change, driven by the transfer of authority, was a separation between 
government and the military, subordinating the latter to the former.325 While this change had 
gradually taken place, the army remained a dominant consideration of future imperial policy. 
Was the Army of the EIC Private or Public?  
Though at home the British military had moved away from the use of foreign, private, or 
irregular forces, the EIC army was often referred to as mercenary. Formed of colonial subjects 
and two German auxiliary regiments, the enlisted soldiers fought for pay, and not to selflessly 
defend the Raj.326 The concepts of mercenaries and a colonial army were purposefully separated 
by the layers of imperial and orientalist logic to manage British public opinion at home whilst 
successfully pursuing colonial goals abroad. A similar approach is often deployed today by states 
using PMCs as part of their foreign policy. In addition to the existing types of military, 
mercenaries, and citizen armies, the logic of imperialism included a new, legally undefined 
military force: imperial troops.327 Whether perceived as a public force, controlled by the 
sovereign, or a private force outsourced by the Empire, either choice opens up a debate on 
accountability and the ownership of colonial military power. Quasi-state-owned, the colonial 
troops existed under imperial rule and the extended sovereign capacity of the hegemon. The 
empire had broadened the scope of its power to incorporate new territories and the resources 
that came with it. The British Empire could, therefore, be perceived to have retained the formal 
control of the use of force within the territory.328  
However, accountability and effective control would lie with the Company for two key reasons. 
Firstly, India was ruled directly by a small number of the Company’s servants, who were heavily 
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reliant on the local political and administrative structures and a locally raised Indian army. 
Secondly, it was controlled indirectly, through Indian princes, treaties, troops, and resident 
advisers (the source of de facto authority). In effect, until sovereign power was officially 
transferred to the Crown in 1858 after the Great Mutiny, the British Indian army, alongside the 
administration of British India itself, was fully governed by a private company. It was a classic 
case of ‘sub-imperialism’, whereby local interests dominated over metropolitan ones.329 The 
source of authority was determined by men actually in India, as opposed to Company directors 
in London or, even less so, in Parliament. And while Parliament repeatedly insisted that the state 
had a right “to interpose its authority” on the Company,330 it could not achieve the same level of 
influence. Furthermore, the legal status of the Company’s possessions had not been clarified, 
and while numerous assertions of the state’s right to Indian revenues had been made by 
ministers, these had not been supported in law or statute.331 In the absence of clear regulation 
concerning the use of colonial troops, the line between public and private tends to be blurred. 
The example of the EIC army is a testament to this ongoing issue. The areas where charter 
companies took on military functions fell outside the established order of the European state 
system.332 Therefore, while the Western hemisphere was consciously building national armies 
and moving away from mercenaries, colonial troops could easily be deployed due to an existent 
legal loophole.  
Part 5: Normative Approaches to Mercenaries 
Throughout modern history, foreign forces of one kind or another have been deployed by the 
great ruling powers.333 Tracing various forms of private military forces through the lens of 
shifting conflict paradigms demonstrates a political predisposition towards regulation. By 
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exploring historical patterns of the use of private force, I have illustrated different normative 
stances in favour and against mercenaries, depending on a particular form of governance. Such 
a method of historical typology is crucial for analysing the effectiveness and applicability of 
contemporary attempts to regulate PMCs. Having distinguished several forms of governance in 
the period between the fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries, we observe considerable 
differences in sovereign and organisational structures, highlighting the importance of 
understanding historical variability. Bringing together these patterns of governance allows us to 
trace normative approaches to public and private military power. 
The shifts in the use and regulation of mercenaries can be observed in the changing modes of 
governance, from Machiavellian republicanism, to growing centralisation and the professional 
armies of absolute monarchies. Similar republican and later national visions are endorsed in 
Revolutionary and republican France where foreign soldiers were gradually ruled out as the 
antithesis of the republic and the national army. While a norm in Western nation-states, this 
was contrasted with the imperial practice of the East India Company and its use of foreign 
colonial troops overseas. Selected examples were chosen to demonstrate contrasting 
approaches to mercenaries that existed in the same historical period but that were distinct in 
terms of types of governance. Machiavelli’s perception of mercenaries was defined by the 
questions of ethics, morality, and republicanism. Juxtaposing an army fighting for their own 
country and a mercenary who is hired to further someone else’s political interests, Machiavelli 
deemed soldiers for hire useless, lacking commitment and a motive strong enough to make 
them faithful and devoted.334 It is important to draw a distinction in Machiavelli’s perception of 
mercenaries, as he seems to reject the use of foreign mercenaries on one hand, and applaud 
the structural integrity of sixteenth-century English armed forces on the other. It is understood 
that the ‘foreign’ aspect of mercenaries is not concerned with the composition of the troops, as 
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at the time it would be irrelevant in the absence of national borders and the contemporary 
notion of citizenship. Instead, it relates to the origin of the troops supplied to a king, whether 
they were locally sourced or sent from abroad. What Machiavelli seems to object to is the cross-
border trading of military force as commodity, which demoralises the value of the state and 
endangers citizen security. ‘Good laws’ needed to lay ground for ‘good armies’,335 and so 
Machiavelli’s response to military corruption came in the shape of civilian militia, based on the 
citizen’s right and responsibility to protect their own state, and the privilege they have of doing 
so.336 Contrasting the widely deployed military strategies of Western Europe, Machiavelli’s 
militia was an ideological attempt not fit for its time and, most importantly, for the international 
state system at the time. Only the horizontal growth of the government could foster an 
environment favourable to conceive and propel the establishment of a permanent standing 
army. The difference with the military development of progressive absolutist states, such as 
Holland or Sweden, was their capacity to train and sustain their own officers, rendering the 
commanding layer of the army if not ‘national’, at least domestic. 
By the end of the sixteenth century the majority of armies and navies of Western Europe had 
become royal. This was effectively the first step to them becoming national. Keeping an army 
embodied all year round, as opposed to disbanding for the winter, laid the foundations for the 
modern standing army. However, the roots of this trend were military and financial, rather than 
political or constitutional; the shift towards standing armies was a tactical choice.337 
Nonetheless, this change brought states and their rulers one step closer to realising the 
importance of a permanent state army. Although Ralston implies there were elements of 
abnegation and even selflessness in the way an organised infantry force operated,338 there 
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appears to be little evidence to suggest that absolutist states eschewed the use of mercenaries 
for ethical reasons. Monarchs were quite reluctant to arm civilians due to fear of uprisings, 
intentionally demilitarising the nobility in the effort to subordinate rivals and achieve a greater 
degree of centralisation. 
In seventeenth-century Europe the shifting conflict paradigm was described in the context of 
the rapid expansion in the scale of war, while the rise of the modern state was marked by a 
change in military organisation. Instead of using ad hoc mercenaries, the majority of European 
states gradually integrated them into their own professional armies. Military expansion began 
to overshadow the forces and the weaponry available to any private local competitors.339 
Practicing military skill as a mass discipline eradicated the need for narrow specialisation, such 
as English longbow-men, Swiss pikemen, or Spanish men-at-arms.340 The increasing amplitude 
of war, powered by the absolutist state, directed the armed forces towards mass production by 
increasing the military productivity of a state. It reshaped the state structure by establishing an 
administrative system within a more centralised state apparatus. While in the context of 
absolutism, foreign and mercenary soldiers were more positively associated with the 
professional army, the foreign soldiers of Revolutionary France and later the French republican 
army were perceived as a threat to the republic and an unwelcome trespasser on the preserves 
of the national army. The new legitimating principle was the “people” or the “nation”.341 
Revolutionary mobilisation introduced the trend of the mass citizen army and accelerated the 
decline of foreign and mercenary troops. Revolutionary France retained some existing 
normative angles, previously observed in republican thought; it also introduced new ones, 
making a comprehensive statement against the use of mercenaries. The common ground that 
prevails both in Machiavellian thought and in revolutionary pamphlets, also featuring in the 
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American Revolution,342 was the element of the citizen-soldier that was borrowed from antiquity 
in an attempt to revive the power of the ancient Roman army. The idea of soldiers who are first 
and foremost citizens, participating in projects of national significance, contributing to the 
development of the infrastructure, and raising the moral value of military status, was actively 
promoted in Servan’s Le Soldat-Citoyen.343 At the same time, Rousseau praised citizen armies 
while consistently denouncing professional and mercenary armies.344 According to Rousseau’s 
Social Contract,345 every citizen should be a soldier by duty, and not by trade. Other professional 
officers, such as Compte de Guibert, shared the idea of a national army, condemning the armies 
composed of mercenaries, foreigners, and vagabonds.346  
Another norm, previously seen in Machiavelli’s republican aspirations, was the idea of a citizen 
militia as a measure against mercenarism. Unlike in fifteenth-century Italian cities which 
predominantly relied on foreign mercenaries, the militia was an established concept in France. 
Some officers, like the Chevalier de Pommelles, studied ways to develop the militia into a system 
of conscription, while the bourgeoisie considered the transformation of the militia into a 
national army as “the best guarantee for the community as a whole against the ‘mercenary’ 
menace.”347 The rising nation-state with its “revitalised concept of citizen warfare”348 created a 
new set of anti-mercenary norms. Key changes to military organisation, such as relative 
democratisation in terms of pay and admission by merit, were born out of the struggle for 
control of the army by the changing revolutionary leaders.349 It must be said that these changes, 
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although significant for their time, were not universal, and the army was far from democratised. 
Although born from popular, street level agitation, the French Revolution was essentially a 
bourgeois revolution. Despite the ideology of popular sovereignty, the citizen army was still 
officered by the middle classes. Nevertheless, with the crystallisation of territorial sovereignty, 
the national citizen army started to become the new norm. In the meantime, legions that 
contained foreign recruits and were more autonomous in their structure were seen as the 
antithesis of the Republic.  
The rise of new forms of governance created a new set of anti-mercenary norms. The normative 
approach to mercenaries and foreign troops following the French Revolution was different to 
the economic limitations posed by absolutism, and not fully in line with the purely republican 
ideology promoted by Machiavelli. Not only were mercenaries imposing on already stretched 
state budgets and undermining the moral value of citizen-soldiers, they were now opposing a 
notion of territorial sovereignty that did not exist in Italian city-republics or any other previous 
form of government. With the crystallisation of the concept of the nation-state, standing armies 
flourished and grew in strength and size. The new political relationship between citizens and the 
state meant that citizens were perceived as representatives of their home country. As citizen 
armies became the new norm, states also began to pass neutrality laws, which prohibited their 
citizens’ enlistment in foreign armies. The overseas empires followed a different normative logic 
to Westphalian Europe. In the latter half of the nineteenth century the great powers preferred 
to reserve the national population for domestic use, as the main military focus on the continent 
turned to building mass national armies.350 For Barkawi this combination of the institution of 
neutrality and the essentials of nation-state building meant that mercenarism declined as an 
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institution.351 At the same time, colonial armies fostered the spread of the empires and made 
their existence possible, providing a lucrative, effective, and accessible substitute for foreign 
mercenaries. According to Owens, the incorporation of imperial soldiers into armies and private 
trading companies is explained by the normative shift away from mercenaries and private 
armies.352 A similar argument is promoted by Percy,353 although the example of the East India 
Company’s army illustrates a different side to this trend, rooted in a specific mode of 
governance.  
In a time when “war and the military were central to state leadership and foreign policy”,354 the 
British Empire was outsourcing administrative and military authority to a trading organisation. 
One possible explanation lies in the limited knowledge the British Parliament had of India and 
its population. Meanwhile, EIC servants understood and did not interfere in the local culture, 
granting the Company its prevalent authority. To a great extent, the EIC had a firm hold on local 
infrastructure, building connections that were fruitful for themselves as well as the Empire. 
Hence, at first, there was no advantage in disturbing the successful management of affairs. 
Another explanation can be found in the negative perception of colonialism and the 
government’s desire to further distance imperial expansion from domestic affairs.355 The 
belligerent and subjugating image of the Second British Empire went against the norms of liberty 
and law, established in the Metropole. The structure of imperial governance was handled at 
arm’s length. By creating a buffer of supposed legitimacy between ‘virtuous’ Britain and the 
‘backward’ colonial regime, it removed direct responsibility from the Crown.  
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To compare the two modes of governance further, power in imperial Britain was not centralised 
and rationalised in the manner of the post-Revolutionary France; instead it was diffused and 
conflicted. Even at the height of imperialism, England was liberal in its approach to conscription, 
unlike the French monarchy. The constant conflict between Parliament and the Indian 
administrators, who were often censured for despotism, highlights the lack of true centralisation 
of power and legitimacy across the British Empire. It was a combination of competing 
authorities, unresolved conflict, and innovation. In India, there was no central police force, no 
central administration of the military, no constitution, nor obedient judiciary.  
As demonstrated in the EIC example, power, right up until the mid-nineteenth century, was 
scattered across the Empire rather than concentrated in any central state. Eighteenth-century 
imperialism presented an element of ‘extra-territorial’ sovereignty, which significantly increased 
the EIC’s military and economic power on the Indian sub-continent as well as in Europe. The 
sepoy army was at the core of British imperial expansion as it helped to establish and secure 
Britain’s dominance of the rich and lucrative Indian subcontinent. Later, under the direct rule of 
the Crown, it featured prominently in both World Wars, successfully fighting for the Empire. A 
legal and normative paradox, this is simply one historical example that demonstrates states’ 
methods of removing responsibility in the pursuit of their sovereign needs through alternative 
means. 
Conclusion 
Different governmental formations resorted to different types of military forces, forming broad 
historical patterns. The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the typologies discussed in 
this chapter is that more centralised states that consolidate their administrative and legal 
apparatuses are more likely to also be in greater control of the army, and where possible 
incorporate or eliminate any private or irregular soldiers. In Western absolute monarchies, 
mercenaries were a means to an end; their military skills were used to fortify the army, 
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incorporating professional soldiers into the core regiments. Nation-states also shared the anti-
mercenary stance, often invoking the republican ideals of antiquity, as voiced by Machiavelli. On 
the other hand, the context of colonial history alludes to a broader geo-political conditionality 
that played a significant role in the new military configuration. This conditionality arises from 
the availability of disposable cost-effective colonial resources. In addition, the brutal and legally 
dubious nature of colonialism makes it problematic to consider the move away from 
mercenaries to be a norm, driven by ethics and republican values in the case of overseas 
empires.  
Some historical accounts356 view the use of colonial armies as the sovereign’s choice of military 
power. While Britain may have ceased hiring private mercenary companies for its own national 
army after the Crimean War (1853-1856),357 it fielded hundreds of thousands of foreign soldiers 
before and after 1858 in the form of colonial armies and auxiliary troops.358 In reality, there may 
not have been a conscious shift away from the use of mercenary or private forces; the lack of 
regulation and the novelty of colonial armies was a lucrative ground for raising a cost-effective 
mass army through the legitimate use of non-national forces. British colonialism in India 
provided the context for a new, unclassified type of military force. Thompson calls it 
‘extraterritorial violence’,359 referring to foreign military manpower, as well as the existence of 
private military forces of various kinds, such as those employed by the great trading companies 
of the early period of European expansion. The question of codification is both relevant and 
important and I examine it more fundamentally in chapters 4 and 5, where I focus on 
contemporary regulation of private military companies.  
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While the institutionalisation of the national army created a strong rationale against the use of 
mercenaries and foreign legions, colonial encounters introduced European powers to a brand-
new pool of unclassified military resources. Neither mercenary, nor national, these forces 
formed an integral part of colonial armies, raising questions about their legitimacy and 
highlighting the disparity between public and private in the military context. Moreover, the 
outsourcing of military functions to a private body is a tactic states continue to use to this day 
in order to economise, or to evade responsibility, thus transforming the East India Company 
“from an historical curiosity into a highly relevant case study.”360 
 
  
                                                 
360 The Economist, 17 December 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21541753. 
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Chapter 3 
World Wars, Cold War, and Decolonisation 
Having considered a historical account of normative approaches to private and foreign armies 
in different forms of governance, I now commence my legal analysis of the use and regulation 
of mercenaries in the twentieth century. Following a brief analysis of the forms of military power 
prevailing in the first half of twentieth century, this chapter focuses on the role of mercenaries 
in the new type of conflicts that arose after the end of the Second World War. It identifies the 
laws that effectuate the control of mercenary activities in the context of decolonisation and the 
Cold War. Finally, the chapter examines the ability of IL to formulate norms relating to the use 
of mercenaries, and explores some of the challenges that state practice has posed to this 
process.  
The twentieth century saw a wide array of norms and stances on the use of mercenary forces. 
At the start of the century mercenaries were considered a taboo. In the 1990s there were fifty 
military personnel for every one contractor; now the ratio is ten to one.361 In less than a hundred 
years the military landscape has transformed from national citizen armies into an unregulated 
market for force, with private contractors filling a variety of security and military roles across 
borders. IL responded to this change with a number of treaties and conventions aimed at 
defining and regulating mercenary activity. This chapter evaluates the legal norms by 
scrutinising customary IL and state practice, along with the key international legal documents 
that include The Hague Convention V (1907), 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP) to Article 47 of the 
Geneva Convention (1949), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention for the 
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89 
 
 
 
Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa (1972), and the International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989), as well as various General 
Assembly (GA) Resolutions.  
These international legal treaties are examined in the context of the changing nature of war in 
the twentieth century. Through the imperial practices of decolonisation and proxy warfare I 
trace the attempts of IL to address the issues of mercenarism and private warfare. It is important 
to understand the changing nature of war across different times, as it has direct influence on 
the legal approach to the problem. During the Cold War, most academic and legal contributions 
were based on the paradigm of internationalised internal armed conflict by proxy.362 After 1990, 
ethnic and secessionist conflicts prevailed, marking a shift in international regulation, which I 
discuss in Chapter 4. The correlation between conflict paradigm and regulatory approach can 
also be observed in the legal documentation whereby the former ordains the latter.363  
This chapter provides a socio-historical explanation of how private forces re-emerged in the 
international arena following the noticeable normative shift away from the use of mercenaries 
in the preceding centuries, and particularly in the first half of twentieth century. The chapter 
offers normative conclusions that explain the juxtaposition between the anti-mercenary norms, 
codified in various international legal provisions following the post-colonial activism of African 
states, and what can be viewed as US enthusiasm to place military contractors at the centre of 
their recent and current foreign policy, coupled with the ambiguity of IL. Most importantly, it 
considers the position of IL in relation to mercenaries in the twentieth century and analyses 
attempts to regulate private forces. 
                                                 
362 Nolte, G.: “Intervention by Invitation”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2010, 
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I approach this question in three sections. First, I introduce the political and regulatory principle 
of non-intervention. Arising from the end of the nineteenth century and reinforced as a result 
of two World Wars, this norm prevailed until the 1960s. The military context of the Cold War 
shifted conflicts to the Global South,364 and introduced mercenary troops into the military 
conduct of these tensions. I consider the processes of decolonisation and the wars of national 
liberation that shaped the issue in two ways. First, national tensions meant the wars were 
internal rather than between states. Second, the lack of strong national armies created demand 
for military force, which often meant welcoming foreign involvement. Between 1945 and 1990 
the overwhelming majority of wars were fought by proxy rather than directly between the US 
and the Soviet Union, marking another change in conflict paradigm. While proxy warfare poses 
multiple challenges to IL, I focus on two most relevant to the overall argument, namely state 
intervention by invitation, and the use of mercenaries in the process. Through empirical 
examples of proxy wars in the Congo and Angola I provide the ground for the legal analysis in 
the final part of the chapter.  
By considering relevant treaty law, state practice and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case 
of Nicaragua, I analyse the international regulation of mercenaries during the period of the Cold 
War. I examine the efforts of Central African states that were directly manifested in the creation 
of the OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa and, indirectly, in the AP I to 
the Geneva Conventions, also considering other legal attempts to codify and regulate private 
military activity in the context of decolonisation and proxy warfare. From the state practice 
perspective, I examine in what way twentieth century international legal provisions allowed for 
pro-mercenary norms to arise, introducing the war in Vietnam as a contributing factor. Finally, I 
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analyse the position of IL on the Nicaragua case in the context of the use of mercenaries and 
state responsibility.  
Part 1: The Rise of International Legal Norms 
The first half of the twentieth century saw the pinnacle of the centralisation of military power 
and economic resources within the state, and a significant drop in mercenary activity. Enabled 
by developments in infrastructure and logistics, the two World Wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) 
introduced the notion of ‘total war’, a term describing extreme mobilisation and targeting of 
national economies and populations.365 While World War I was orchestrated by the elite, it was 
executed by the masses:366 first drawing the numbers from volunteers and, by 1916, through 
conscription to compensate for a decline in volunteering.367 The science and technology behind 
total warfare were key, and states were happy to invest in these new progressive and lethal 
developments.368 Submarines, fighter planes, artillery shells, and tanks all contributed to the 
totality of the Great War. A mature level of industrialisation meant that around 60 million men 
were mobilised into the armed forces, and kept in the field all year round,369 leaving little 
opportunity or need for mercenary forces.370  
In a similar way, the total nature of World War II, with peoples, technology, and all imaginable 
resources centralised in the hands of the state, left almost no room for mercenary units. 
Citizenship and national allegiance played an important role, further emphasising the norm 
against the use of private military forces, while existing colonial troops served to close any 
military gaps across empires. The scope and scale of these wars eliminated any opening for 
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mercenaries, with the exception of small groups of dispersed private soldiers,371 as states 
obtained a monopoly on violence and refused to share it with the private sector. According to 
Tilly, “the [build-up] of big navies and expensive, nationally-recruited standing armies, 
furthermore, entailed the disarmament of civilian populations, which reduced the prevalence 
of small-scale private warfare.”372 The Gurkhas were the most significant example of and the 
closest thing to a mercenary force experienced during the WW2 period.373 In contemporary 
international legal terms, Gurkhas would not fall under the mercenary category, as they were 
always recruited as members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict.374 Nonetheless, a 
quarter of a million professional Gurkha soldiers served in World War II in almost all theatres.375 
The American Volunteer Group, more widely known as the ‘Flying Tigers’, were a three-unit 
force of fighter pilots who were contracted to fight with the Chinese against the Japanese during 
World War II.376 This private military force had a short lifespan of only two years, before being 
officially disbanded in July 1942. Some soldiers later returned to serve in the military for the 
remainder of the war.377 
Besides the drastic changes in the global political layout and major military advances brought 
about by the World Wars and imperial expansion, the end of the ‘long nineteenth century’ 
marked the start of the universalisation of IL.378 The international legal system that emerged in 
its current form at the beginning of twentieth century built its foundation upon the rules of 
sovereign equality of states and against imperialist violations. From the late nineteenth century 
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and until 1945, international regulation of mercenaries was conducted largely through the 
development of the law of neutrality.379 In 1907 the European colonial powers rejected a 
German proposal for a total ban on the service of foreigners in national militaries. Instead they 
opted merely to require neutral states to prevent commercial recruiting on their territory.380 
The International Committee of the Red Cross emphasises that neutral states have the right “to 
stand apart from and not be adversely affected by the conflict” and duties of “non-participation 
and impartiality.”381 If a state allowed the recruitment or enlistment of mercenaries on its 
national territory, it was considered to be in support of the belligerent.382  
Although no definition of mercenaries was formulated at the time, two provisions relating to 
the recruitment and procurement of mercenaries were included in the 1907 Hague Convention. 
Article 4 states that “Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on 
the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.”383 The provisions are very clear in 
drawing the line on state responsibility. A state was not required to regulate their nationals if 
they wished to offer their military services to a third party state during a conflict and was, 
therefore, not accountable for individual outsourcing of mercenaries.384 As a consequence of 
the two World Wars, the laws of neutrality lost much of their former importance, and were 
superseded by the League of Nations and the United Nations, prohibiting the resort to war.385 
In addition, lessons were learned that urged the international community to outlaw extreme 
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use of force in favour of the growing interdependence and cooperation of states, rather than 
reliance on the raw balance of power.386 
Non-Intervention as an International Legal Norm 
Based on the Westphalian tradition, non-intervention and the sovereign equality of states have 
been at the core of accepted international conduct.387 The principles of non-intervention are 
largely focused on diplomacy, as opposed to coercion, as an acceptable method of state 
influence in international relations. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 fortified the definition 
of a state as an actor of IL with a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and 
the capacity to enter into relations with other states.388 Furthermore, Article 8 of the Convention 
affirmed that “no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”389 
The UN GA Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention (1965)390 advocated by Latin 
American countries and the Soviet bloc, and the Friendly Relations Declaration (1970),391 
reinforced the principle of non-intervention and the inadmissibility of foreign troops by 
invitation of a government.  
The following years saw a number of significant regulatory endeavours in the realm of non-
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intervention. It was declared as one of the principles guiding relations between states in the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.392 The 1976 
Declaration on Non-interference393 was wider than the Friendly Relations Declaration, as it 
denounced any form of interference, overt or covert, including the use of mercenary forces.394 
The Declaration also laid out a clearer exception for acts committed in pursuance of the right of 
self-determination.395 Supported by the non-aligned states and the Soviet bloc, the 1981 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of 
States was adopted by 102 votes to 22. The Declaration attempted to define the scope of 
intervention in more detail than previous resolutions, representing a very broad concept of non-
interference that is not in line with the accepted understanding of reality of customary IL.396  
Since 1957 about thirty-five UN Resolutions have been adopted by the GA with a particular focus 
on intervention and interference.397 This increased legal activity, deriving from different sources 
of law, is a clear indication of the efforts by the international community to reinforce and solidify 
the norm of non-intervention, covering a variety of scopes and avenues. State practice, 
however, indicates that the principle of non-intervention does not prohibit certain limited 
operations of foreign troops at the invitation of a government. In other cases, state practice 
demonstrated, although covertly, a different kind of intervention, an illegitimate intervention 
by invitation of the opposition.  
Part 2: Decolonisation and Proxy Warfare 
Historically, the concept of sovereignty has been closely associated not only with the state, but 
with the practice of imperial expansion, and little changed immediately after the end of the 
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Second World War.398 According to Michael Mann: “Nation-states, many of them embodying 
greater citizen rights, were established almost everywhere around Europe, but the overseas 
empires remained.”399  
This chapter does not intend to retell the history of decolonisation, nor is it possible or 
appropriate to identify all of its causes and effects. Instead, it provides the historical and political 
context of state behaviour that either directly encouraged the immediate use, or created a 
plausible environment for the long-term spread of private military forces. One such example 
derives from the struggle between the newly decolonised states, their former empires, and the 
two superpowers. The end of the Second World War brought significant demilitarisation 
which, in theory, ought to signify a post-war pacifist outlook. The US Army land and air forces 
began partial demobilisation of its approximately 8,290,000 soldiers on 12 May 1945400 and by 
the end of 1948 had trimmed the army to about one-sixteenth of its original size.401 Since 1945 
the ‘Long Peace’ resulted in a significant reduction of war between the Western states. It did, 
however, also see a significant rise of military activity throughout the rest of the world.402  
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibited states from resorting to threat or use of force in their 
international relations. The change in conflict paradigm that we observe post-1945 is that most 
conflicts were either internal or carried out by proxy, such as civil wars and wars of national 
liberation. This marked a shift from large scale international wars to ‘border actions’,403 though 
these were no less vicious or brutal. After 1945 civil wars became more frequent, as two or more 
parties within the same state acquired military capacity in order to pursue state power.404 
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Aggressive nationalism, seen throughout the WW2, lived on as a consequence of the war, even 
more so than its cause.405 
Some other factors contributed to placing the armed conflict at the core of decolonisation. 
Regardless of the extent of authority allowed for local governing groups, colonies were run by 
European imperialists. Force, rather than consent, was at the root of colonial administration.406 
The main transfers of power from colonial to indigenous rule took place during the first two 
decades of the Cold War, varying from simple and quick withdrawals in some cases, to prolonged 
bloody wars of liberation, as a general rule. Nationalism in the new emerging states was 
ideological, strong, and dynamic, unrestrained by any local administrative or industrial 
mechanisms. Often deriving from poverty and intensified by the colonial past, radicalisation was 
an inherent part of the post-colonial Third World. Since empires regularly attempted to retain 
some of their key investments even after decolonisation, especially in the exploitation of raw 
materials, the new nations understood the importance of state building and prioritised its 
implementation.407  
Institutions and procedures, inherited from the colonial era, prevailed in the new states after 
independence, often with a functioning indigenous administrative system that predated the 
empire, such as in India or in Nigeria.408 Despite these governmental legacies, the former 
colonies found themselves in a hollow, often corrupt shell of a state, striving to recuperate 
decades of political and economic development. Having fought their way out from empire, they 
were left to be constantly looking over their shoulder in the fear of colonial return or internal 
disintegration due to corruption and ethnic tensions. The extension of a Western-dominated 
state system with its European-style armies and constitutions to the Third World encouraged 
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and fuelled the spread of violence, authoritarian regimes, and military autonomy.409 
Decolonisation, in the broader rhetoric of the Cold War, therefore, contributed to the 
militarisation of the Third World not only strategically, by treating the newly emerging territories 
as the battlefield of the two superpowers, but also tactically, by establishing the supply of 
weapons and manpower from the West to the rest of the world. Military enablement was 
especially prominent in those countries that supplied valuable commodities such as oil.410  
Former colonies transitioned from imperial rule into a world ideologically partitioned by two 
new dominating superpowers. Both the US and the Soviets were actively pursuing newly 
liberated states through a different kind of imperialism. While not claiming the territories, they 
managed to dictate all other aspects of state governance with a very limited, and often forced, 
choice of either communism or capitalism. On the receiving end, there were the Third World 
states, often fighting wars of national liberation. Embedded in the wider context of the Cold 
War, these were tactically executed through proxies. Prevalent for over half a century, this mode 
of warfare played a crucial role in the militarisation of the Third World, and, ultimately, the re-
emergence of private military forces in the international arena. In 1964 the political scientist 
Karl Deutsch termed proxy wars as: 
an international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third 
country; disguised as a conflict over an internal issue of that country; and using some of 
that country’s manpower, resources and territory as a means for achieving 
preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies.411  
Deeming Deutsch’s definition too state-centric, Mumford defines proxy wars as “conflicts in 
which a third party intervenes indirectly in order to influence the strategic outcome in favour of 
its preferred faction.”412 Mumford’s definition does not exclude the role of non-state actors, 
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such as insurgent groups, and broadens the term beyond ideological motivation.413 He claims 
that the definition here of ‘proxy warfare’ rests on an underlying principle of indirect 
engagement, whereby State A uses proxies in State B to conduct ‘subversive operations’ on its 
behalf.414 During the Cold War indirect belligerency was important in the context of the nuclear 
arms race to ensure that a ‘hot war’ between the two superpowers could be avoided.415 
Although proxy warfare did not rely solely on private military groups, it followed the same 
transactional model of demand and supply of military power, characteristic of mercenarism. The 
difference being, in this scenario, the financial incentive was replaced or supplemented with 
political alliance and a very loose concept of protection. This increases the risks associated with 
managing the relationship between the benefactor and the proxy, a relationship that once again 
resembles that of a hiring state and a contracting party. The aid to Third World countries was 
provided with strings attached, often creating an environment where the recipient had little 
authority.416  
While political reasons for frequent intervention were rooted in assumed responsibility for 
global world order,417 the legal arguments only went as far as ‘self-defence’ and ‘intervention by 
invitation’, since ideology had not been ratified as a valid motive for intervention. For the 
duration of the Cold War, American foreign policy was based on pre-emptive interventions in 
the Third World on ideological grounds, against Soviet Union-influenced left-wing movements, 
and vice-versa. On one hand, the provision of armaments and military advisers made it easier 
for the superpowers to distance themselves from some types of limited war. On the other hand, 
the development of permanent military alliances and of military bases in affiliated territories 
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made it much more likely for states to get involved if their allies came under attack.418 All of 
these aspects fuelled global belligerency, unfolding extreme militarism across Latin America, the 
Middle East, Africa, and Asia. 
Mercenary Forces in the Congo and Angola  
In order to comprehend the scale of the Cold War and the mercenary activity that supplied the 
means of proxy warfare, I consider some examples of CIA-organised operations that included 
the financing, training, and provision of mercenary troops. The purpose of these empirical 
examples is to raise questions of legitimacy in outsourced nation-building419 and to demonstrate 
the increasing mercenary presence in the military landscape of the Cold War. These questions 
contribute to an understanding of how and in what way IL attempted to address the use of 
mercenaries in the second half of twentieth century.  
Starting from the early 1960s, mercenaries were a prominent tool of Congolese internal 
policy.420 One of the first and most notorious instances of mercenary deployment was by Moïse 
Tshombe’s secessionist government in the province of Katanga.421 During the Congolese Civil 
War the CIA established an army in the Congo to back pro-Western leaders Cyrille Adoula and 
Joseph-Desiré Mobutu. On 24 November 1964 five hundred Belgian paratroopers were airlifted 
into the city, diverting from a much more extensive US-backed military operation against the 
rebels, executed by European mercenaries and Cuban pilots who were funded and organised by 
the CIA.422 George Godley, the US ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
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later ambassador to Laos, spoke openly about US involvement in the ‘nation-building’ of Congo, 
which included dependency on Western mercenaries to pacify the population.423 The Mobutu 
dictatorship was reinstated under the pretext of modernisation and elimination of future 
insurgency.424 The Mobutu government had also been known to hire mercenaries to suppress 
further revolts in Katanga.425 When the Congo was renamed Zaire between 1971 and 1997, 
about three hundred Chinese instructors served with the National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola and were joined by fifty contracted military personnel from Romania and North Korea.426 
The purpose and use of mercenaries in the Congo stretched from supporting secessionist 
movements, to being hired by the government to combat extremist groups, to opposing the 
government itself.427 The short few decades of Congolese independence were mutilated by 
various mercenary groups, hired by conflicting political factions, intervening and shaping state 
politics. 
In 1975, after years of bloody fighting and civil unrest in Angola, Portugal finally let go of its last 
African colony. The transition to a new government was to take place on 11 November 1976 
with three political factions competing for control of the country. These were the pro-
communist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and two pro-Western 
organisations, Holden Roberto’s National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and Jonas 
Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Beyond the ideological 
rivalry with the Soviet Union, Angola had little importance to questions of US national security, 
and its economic significance did not exceed the small amounts of petroleum extracted from 
the Cabindan fields and the coffee export to the American markets.428 However, not only did the 
Soviet and US governments operate on Angolan territory through mercenary troops, UNITA 
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troops were trained and led by South African and Portuguese military teams, as well as various 
mercenary groups.429  
In September 1976 the first South African training camp was operational inside Angola.430 Over 
three months the CIA was allocated almost $50 million in total to be used to train, equip, and 
transport anti-MPLA troops.431 The bulk of the money was spent on arms and on paying French 
and South African mercenaries to help organise the Angolan troops, especially those of the 
FNLA.432 While ten thousand organised Cuban regular army troops were fighting on the MPLA 
side, mercenaries were instrumental in the military performance of the FNLA and UNITA. The 
CIA decided to recruit twenty Frenchmen to work directly with Bob Denard,433 famous for his 
mercenary activity in the Congo, and three hundred Portuguese mercenaries. While the 
Portuguese were already being recruited in small numbers by the FNLA, Colonel Castro, and 
Captain Bento,434 the latter had never materialised for Operation Savannah. The third mercenary 
force, involving around 160 British and American venturers, was organised and financed by 
Holden Roberto, allegedly also from CIA funds.435 The lack of sponsors and of cooperation from 
Congress ironically turned out to be a winning combination that limited the scope of escalation 
in Angola, therefore preventing another Vietnam.436 It did, however, introduce an unregulated 
market for force, exacerbating the security problems in the region.  
These are only a few examples. Both sides had relentlessly raised, trained, and sponsored third 
party military troops, which were often radical and contentious, to pursue their political goals, 
disregarding the sovereign borders and political integrity of the Third World states they 
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operated in. Other examples include: Nationalist Chinese troops in Burma,437 Sumatran Rebels 
in Indonesia,438 Khamba horsemen,439 the Cuban Bay of Pigs Invasion Force,440 Meo tribesmen 
of L’Armee Clandestine,441 the Ukrainian Insurgent Army,442 the Afghan Mujaheedin,443 El 
Salvador death squads,444 and the Haitian National Intelligence Service.445  
Decline of Non-Interventionism  
While decolonisation marked the liberation of new sovereign states from imperial rule, 
relentless interventions during the Cold War put the relevance of international rules on the use 
of force into question. I now examine to what extent intervention on political grounds 
contributed to the decline of sovereignty and, most importantly, the response of IL to these 
interventions. 
The formation of NATO in 1950 ensured continued joint defence preparation, while the 
presence of foreign troops on the ground reduced each country’s military freedom, something 
that would have been considered an intolerable infringement of state sovereignty a decade 
earlier.446 To those states whose road to independence passed through a ‘battlefield’, both the 
US and the Soviet Union were providing vitally important military aid. It was partially through 
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economic and political dominance and partially by invitation that the framework of the Cold War 
led to the decline of the concepts of non-interventionism and territorial sovereignty.  
At the 1962 UN Committee on Colonial Peoples, the representative for Mali raised a serious 
concern about the connection between military activities and colonialism, considering the 
presence of military bases “an impediment to the process of decolonisation” and noting that 
the “use of force was an inevitable consequence of a military presence.”447 While the legal norms 
of non-intervention were reinforced in numerous UN Resolutions and multilateral treaties, state 
practice was demonstrating a different trend. Until World War II, the legality of supplying certain 
types of armaments to belligerents was still sometimes questioned, and it was frequently argued 
that such sales would almost automatically involve the supplier in the conflict.448 However, 
during the Cold War and afterwards, the Americans and the Soviets supplied the Third World 
with military training, weapons, and often auxiliary forces, changing the normative approach to 
military assistance and intervention.449  
Most commonly, interventions were provoked when the two competing policies were pursued 
in the same state, triggering indirect US and USSR involvement through proxies. Such foreign 
policy frameworks, albeit almost always covert, set a precedent for the use of private forces. 
Moreover, this gradually reintroduced mercenary and private military groups into the security 
landscape. Intervention by invitation or consent is a significant limitation to the principle of state 
sovereignty, introduced during the Cold War. Chapter V of the International Law Commission 
describes eight different circumstances that can be considered as precluding the wrongfulness 
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of state intervention.450 Consent, covered in Article 20, is arguably the most relevant condition 
for post-1945 interventions, as it reflects the conflict paradigm of proxy warfare. According to 
Article 20, valid state consent precludes the wrongfulness of an act by another state.451 While 
such codification does not allow for unlimited state intervention, it marks the weakening of the 
norm of non-intervention, opening it up to political interpretation.452 The weakening notion of 
territorial sovereignty laid the premise for indirect state intervention and ‘arms-length’ politics, 
allowing the superpowers to establish an interventionist policy with a global reach.453 
Mercenaries became the most widely used tool for covert operations in proxy warfare. Their 
return had a particularly negative impact in the wars of national liberation, signalling the need 
for an international legal response to regulate these forces that were often perceived as a sign 
of neo-colonialism by the newly liberated nations.  
Part 3: International Legal Response to the Use of Irregular Forces 
1. Anti-Mercenary Norms 
While anti-mercenary norms prevailed amongst states of the Western hemisphere during the 
World Wars, the same rules rarely applied to the Third World and the wars of decolonisation. 
Soldiers of fortune played a prominent, controversial, and often disreputable role in the wars in 
Africa during the first few decades of the Cold War.454 This is why it is not surprising that anti-
mercenary norms were particularly prominent amongst the African countries: “this is based 
partly on the experience of the 60s and 70s when, starting with the Congo, mercenaries were 
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associated with instability and secessionist movements.”455 The rise of new, independent Third 
World states began to change the role of the United Nations. The five-year conflict over the 
decolonisation of the Congo was a testament to the changing role of the UN from a tool of US 
foreign interventions into a more diverse forum, bringing together the non-aligned countries, 
less susceptible to American influence than before.456  
The newly decolonised states urgently turned to the UN, the OAU, and other multilateral treaty-
negotiating fora, with the goal of developing and implementing norms to limit the use of 
mercenaries.457 Commercial military activity was deemed to violate the right to self-
determination, and, therefore, ought to be prohibited. According to Christine Gray, in the 
making of international regulations concerning the use of force, consensus between states can 
only be reached “at the price of ambiguity”.458 This explains some of the generalisation, or on 
the contrary, the need to meet all of the specific criteria, leaving room for political interpretation 
and avoidance. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples of 1960459 
was the first significant GA resolution to mark the legitimacy of decolonisation. However, it 
made no mention of regulation of force by national liberation movements.460 In 1965 the UN 
passed a Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention,461 whereby it explicitly implemented 
a wording appropriate for the context of the Cold War. The Declaration prohibited direct or 
indirect intervention, legally covering the threat of proxies.462 Although it does not reference 
mercenarism, it instructs states to refrain from organising, assisting, or financing terrorist or 
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armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state.463 The 
1968 UN GA Resolution 2465 Article 8 condemned the use of mercenaries against movements 
for national liberation and independence, and called upon “the Governments of all countries to 
enact legislation declaring the recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries in their 
territory to be a punishable offence and prohibiting their nationals from serving as 
mercenaries.”464 
The 1970 resolution on the Legal Status of the Combatants fighting against colonialism465 was a 
step towards a more formal codification of mercenaries. In the context of wars of national 
liberation, the resolution considered the use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes to be 
a criminal act, and mercenaries themselves to be criminals.466 The resolution did not provide any 
further guidelines for regulation, and left this matter to the legal and political interpretation of 
national courts. The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration followed the same approach, 
condemning intervention and emphasising state duty to refrain from organising irregular forces, 
including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another state.467 All efforts were drawn 
towards regulating and outlawing mercenary activity in Africa and the rest of the Third World. 
In 1972 the first definition of mercenaries was formulated in the OAU Convention, while the 
Diplock Report was published in 1976 following British involvement in Angola, signalling 
governments’ awareness of the issue and the need for new legislation. 
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The non-aligned countries repeatedly denounced foreign mercenary activities in the Third World 
during this period. Their criticism was heard at the Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, 
held in Geneva from 1974 to 1977. Arguing to deprive mercenaries of any legal protection, they 
were able to force regulatory change, despite the objections raised by other states.468 As a result, 
in 1977 AP I was established, defining mercenaries in Article 47 and, in theory, excluding them 
from combatant and prisoner of war status upon capture.469 Furthermore, since 1987 the 
Commission approved a special rapporteur to monitor the alleged use of mercenaries in 
contemporary conflicts on the African continent.470 This was a direct result of the concerns 
raised by the African states based on their detrimental experiences of mercenary involvement 
since the 1960s.  
Codification of the Law Relating to Mercenaries 
While there have been several attempts to define the essence of mercenarism,471 international 
legal codification of this matter faces significant criticism. What poses a problem is the lack of a 
universally accepted definition of mercenaries, as the term was stretched from hired individuals, 
to private security firms contracted by the state, to cross-border troops providing military 
services.472 Nonetheless, the legal status of a mercenary as a non-combatant was formalised 
under IL, marking an important departure in the norms concerning their use. 
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In 1972 the OAU ratified the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, containing 
a definition of mercenaries based on nationality and motive. It was formulated based on the 
challenges that mercenaries posed for national liberation movements and the sovereign 
integrity of the newly established African states. Instead of focusing on monetary gain, it 
identified the aims of a mercenary as being to overthrow a government, undermine 
independence, and interfere with the liberation movements.473 Despite a clear aversion to 
mercenaries and the innovative nature of the definition, the OAU Convention did not explicitly 
forbid the employment of mercenaries.474 This formulation aimed to regulate foreign private 
recruits from Europe and South Africa, leaving non-nationals, employed by a government to 
defend itself from dissident groups within its own borders, outside of the legislation. This was 
the case of the Cuban troops that fought for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) during the Angolan civil war.475   
Nevertheless, the OAU Convention is binding amongst member states,476 and its key purpose 
was to outlaw and eliminate mercenaries who, in the context of national liberation movements 
in post-colonial Africa, were considered a threat to sovereignty, independence, and 
development.477 In contrast to the 1907 Hague Convention, the OAU Convention called for 
states to introduce laws forbidding their nationals from engaging in mercenary activities.478 This 
provision invoked state responsibility to both prevent mercenary activity on their territory and 
to take extraterritorial measures to prevent their citizens from committing any of the offences 
defined in Article 2. It classified mercenarism and all auxiliary activities, such as training, 
financing, and recruitment, crimes against peace and security in Africa.479 Unlike any previous 
                                                 
473 OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, O.A.U. Doc. CM/433/Rev. L. Annex 1, 
1972, Article 1. 
474 Taulbee, supra, p. 347. 
475 Kinsey, supra, p. 4. 
476 OAU Convention, supra, Article 3. 
477 Ibid., Preamble. 
478 Ibid., Article 3 (a). 
479 Ibid., Article 2. 
110 
 
 
 
treaties, it explicitly declared the duty of contracting states to impose sanctions for any offences 
that fell under Article 2 of the Convention.480 
In 1976, triggered by significant mercenary activity in Angola, Appendix II was added to the OAU 
Convention. It reinforced the need for codification, and expanded the definition to not only 
include the actors (mercenaries) but also to extend international legal regulation over the act of 
mercenarism.481 The definition was no longer limited to foreign nationals; the crime of 
mercenarism could now apply to “the individual, group or association, representatives of state 
and the State itself” acting for personal gain, amongst other reasons listed in the original 
Convention.482 Furthermore, Article 5 of the Appendix highlights the fact that not only are 
offences committed by mercenaries considered a crime; being classified as a mercenary is a 
crime in itself.483  
The trajectory of international regulation of mercenaries was defined by the relentless 
interventions into the state affairs of African countries from the 1960s onwards. The OAU 
proved an effective mechanism in protecting the national interests of newly decolonised states. 
It heard the concerns of states posed by mercenarism, and articulated them into norms and 
regulations, calling for state responsibility and cooperation to eliminate this issue. The 
expansion of the definition of mercenaries was an attempt to outlaw all types of mercenary 
activity, regardless of the nationality, or the level of the involvement of the offenders. This is 
why the addition of Appendix III in the form of the International Convention against the Activities 
of Mercenaries in 1980484 seems rather contradictory. It took a different direction and adapted 
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the narrow definition of mercenaries found in AP I,485 focusing on monetary gain, direct 
participation in combat, and nationality.486 
British Mercenaries in Angola and the Diplock Report 
Significant international attention turned to mercenary activity following the trial of thirteen 
foreigners in Angola in 1976.487 All were convicted of the crime of “being a mercenary”, with 
four offenders sentenced to death, and the others to long prison sentences.488 The Diplock 
Report489 was published as a result of the recruitment of British mercenaries to join the armed 
forces of the FNLA in Angola, with the purpose of assessing whether the UK had sufficient 
controls in place to regulate British citizen recruitment for mercenary service. The assessors had 
to, therefore, agree on a definition of mercenaries in order to conduct the inquiry. They 
dismissed the factor of motivation, deeming it too vague and inconclusive to serve as the 
defining criterion. According to the Report, mercenaries can be defined only by reference to 
what they do, and not why they do it.490 A definition was consequently proposed in line with UK 
national jurisdiction, defining a mercenary as “any person who serves voluntarily and for pay in 
some armed force other than that of Her Majesty in the right of the United Kingdom”.491 This 
definition was formulated for the purpose of the inquiry, exclusively for the UK. While it could 
contribute to formulating a norm and a workable definition under IL, it has not evolved to 
acquire an international dimension and universality.  
The key debate concerning the Diplock Report was about the regulation of recruitment of 
mercenaries on the territory of the UK versus the enlistment of British citizens into foreign 
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armed forces abroad. As the former could be regulated by means of national jurisdiction, the 
report concluded that any new penal legislation should be aimed at prohibiting the recruitment 
of mercenary services and advertising of such recruitment in the UK.492 The latter, however, falls 
outside of national criminal law, as the state has no means of enforcing the prohibition of citizen 
enlistment outside of the UK.493 The report, therefore, proposed “the abolition of any statutory 
offence by a United Kingdom citizen of enlisting as a mercenary while abroad.”494 Outlining the 
challenges that the irregular conflict paradigms pose to national legislation, the Report 
concluded that the UK Government had no legal authority to prevent the enlistment or 
recruitment of mercenaries until the status of every party to the conflict in Angola was 
established under IL.495 Moreover, when the Diplock Report was published in 1976, serving as a 
mercenary was not considered an offence under IL.496  
While the norm was not codified in AP I until the following year, the OAU Convention had already 
made significant steps in outlawing mercenarism as a crime against peace and security in Africa. 
At the same time, a statute was included in the US Code,497 according to which a citizen may 
lose his or her citizenship by “entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state unless, 
prior to such entry or service, such entry or service is specifically authorized in writing by the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.”498 However, there have been no instances to 
date of this provision being enforced.499 
Additional Protocol I and the 1989 UN Mercenary Convention 
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Although it was not the first international legal effort undertaken to regulate the use of 
mercenaries, the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949500 provided the 
most widely accepted international definition of a mercenary. Unlike all previous definitions, 
the one formulated in AP I was the first universal codification of mercenaries under IL, applicable 
to all member states and geographically neutral.501 The AP I definition was charged with the 
complex task of providing a point of reference, broad enough to encompass all present and 
future political circumstances, while being narrow enough to limit the scope of political and 
ideological interpretation. Motivation and nationality were chosen as the two parameters to 
define mercenaries under IL. While this definition was formulated as a result of OAU codification 
initiatives, it made no reference to national liberation movements, or any other specific political 
circumstance beyond the references to ‘armed conflict’ and ‘hostilities’. The definition was 
narrow in comparison to that formulated in the OAU Convention; in order to be deemed a 
mercenary under AP I, all six criteria must be met.502  
Following AP I, the norm against the use of mercenaries was further solidified in 1989 by UN 
Resolution 44/34,503 which adopted the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Coming into force in 2001, it was more widely known as 
the UN Mercenary Convention. Article 1 clause 2(i) of the UN Mercenary Convention broadens 
the definition to include non-nationals recruited to overthrow a “Government or otherwise 
undermining the constitutional order of a State; or undermine the territorial integrity of a State.” 
While the definition of mercenaries is largely based on AP I, it is expanded by applying to “armed 
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conflict”504 and also to “any other situation”.505 Thirty-five countries are currently party to the 
convention.506  
Needless to say, the majority of states involved are those who suffered from mercenary activity 
to the detriment of their national liberation during the Cold War, while none of the UN Security 
Council member states has so far ratified the convention. Although mercenaries are excluded 
from prisoner of war status, the 1989 Convention offers the right to each of the member states 
to invite the ICRC to communicate with and visit alleged offenders in violation of this Convention 
held on its territory.507 This clause, therefore, provides a bridge between the Convention of 1989 
and IHL. Article 16 (a) of the Convention explicitly applies to the rules relating to the 
international responsibility of States. The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind Articles proposed by the Drafting Committee in 1991 called out mercenarism as an 
international crime regulated by the Code, “whenever agents or representatives of a State were 
involved.”508 This clause was not, however, included in the 1996 version of the Draft, leaving the 
issue open. When attempting to define the legitimacy of mercenaries, or their corporate 
successors, private military companies, both legal and political challenges arise. Whether 
examined from a historical angle, or that of nationality or motive, there is always a degree of 
irregularity present in the field of private military force. This needs to be recognised as a 
limitation. On the surface, it appears that the lessons of decolonisation and the tenacity of 
African countries succeeded in establishing and codifying norms against the use of mercenaries 
on the international legal level. In practice, however, these norms were not universally accepted 
and could be tactically bypassed.  
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While AP I provides the most widely accepted international definition of a mercenary, some 
states have not endorsed it and are instead governed by the previous Convention where the 
definition of combatant and, therefore, prisoner of war, is more inclusive. Furthermore, the 
definition is so specific, that it would be almost impossible to qualify any private military activity 
as illegal based on the specified criteria. While AP I applies only to situations of international 
armed conflict, the UN Mercenary Convention expands on the definition, and, like the OAU 
convention, it covers both international and internal conflicts.509 However, its authority does not 
cover those states which chose not to ratify it, and the act of mercenarism remains uncodified 
under its auspices. 
2. Pro-Mercenary Norms and the Vietnam War 
As an example of state practice that demonstrates the normative shift towards the use of private 
military forces in the twenty-first century, I would like to highlight a particular episode of the 
Cold War. The Vietnam war was different to the majority of small CIA-led operations as it was 
an example of direct US intervention against the direct influence of the Soviet Union and 
China.510 Despite its colloquial label, the ‘Vietnam war’ was fought in all of Indo-China.511 Known 
as America’s longest war, it lasted from 1950, with President Truman’s support of French 
military activity in Vietnam, until 1973, marking Nixon’s acceptance of the Paris peace 
accords.512 Vietnam’s importance was based on the domino theory, i.e. the growing perception 
that the loss of one state to communism would automatically trigger the loss of others, such as 
Laos and Cambodia.  
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Similar to other proxies, the US government provided South Vietnam with substantial military, 
economic, and technical aid. The Eisenhower administration took even more drastic and 
intrusive measures in Indonesia in their attempt to modify the future political direction of the 
most influential South-East Asian state.513 The American-supported army of Ngo Dinh Diem 
became the main driver for expanding the centralised authority over local power structures,514 
while the Nungs, Chinese hill people living in Vietnam, were hired and organised by the CIA as a 
mercenary force.515 
The increasing public distrust and doubts over the legitimacy of overseas intervention 
increasingly undermined the rationale for deploying citizen-soldiers.516 The Vietnam war was 
the only episode during the Cold War where US policy options were limited by growing popular 
opposition at home. This limitation was mainly caused by conscription, which ultimately 
converted citizens into soldiers and put their lives at risk for a cause that had little support or 
understanding from the US nation. In 1973 John Mueller’s study showed the direct correlation 
between public support and the US soldier casualties in the Korean and Vietnam wars, mounting 
by fifteen per cent from 100 to 1,000, and then another fifteen per cent as casualties increased 
from 1,000 to 10,000.517 In the Vietnam war, according to McCormick, the US government 
pursued the interests of Japan and the world system as a whole, rather than its own.518 Since 
the war was removed from national and public interest, using private troops could be a way of 
overcoming this limitation, limiting exposure and responsibility in the eyes of the public. The 
Vietnam war demonstrated the lack of popular support in sacrificing US citizens for a war that 
the public could not relate to. It undermined America’s legitimacy and swayed the government 
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towards the use of private military force in order to maintain public support while pursuing their 
foreign policy. By reducing the number of US citizen casualties, privatisation removed this issue 
from public concern and the public sphere of IL. It also helped the US government to overcome 
public aversion while continuing to pursue its foreign policy with substantially lower barriers.  
On one hand, the Vietnam war was a symbolic victory for the Third World, since for the first 
time such a conflict had brought down an American president and imposed limits on what only 
a few years before was seen as a limitless pattern of intervention.519 On the other hand, it 
created a very strong case for the use of private military resources for future American 
governments. Coupled with the legitimacy provided by the neoliberal policies of the 1980s,520 
the outsourcing of military functions has gradually become a standard state practice for both 
Britain and the US, with a significant increase in scale and breadth since the end of the Cold War.  
3. The Nicaragua Case  
Having examined the different normative views on the use of mercenaries in international 
treaties and customary law, I now turn my enquiry to case law to further explore the ways in 
which IL dealt with the rising volume of private and mercenary actors after 1945. This section 
discusses the role of mercenaries in the Nicaragua case within IL literature.  
The US relationship with Nicaragua, alongside its relationship with the rest of the Latin America, 
cannot be viewed in isolation as proxy warfare. In the 1850s the US felt obliged to intervene 
directly against local resistance to foreign control in Nicaragua. The trend continued towards 
the end of the nineteenth century with interventions in Cuba, the Caribbean, and Central 
America.521 Nicaragua has therefore a symbolic meaning in the challenges it presented to US 
proxy warfare, as even before the Cold War in 1933 its political leader Augusto César Sandino 
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proclaimed the country to be the centre of a new anti-US Central American movement, following 
his defeat to the US sponsored regime in the twenties.522 
In a similar vein, Nicaragua and Honduras also served as a training ground for the right-wing 
belligerent group – the Contras – that, in agreement with the Organisation of American States, 
were raised and armed by the US against the elected Guatemalan government of Jacob Arbenz 
in 1954.523 The Luis Somoza Debayle government also provided training bases for American-
sponsored interventions in Cuba in 1961 and supplied its own troops to join those of the US in 
the Dominican Republic in 1965.524 In November 1981 President Ronald Reagan signed a top 
secret National Security Directive authorising the CIA to spend $19 million to recruit and support 
the Contras, opponents of Nicaragua’s Sandinista government.525 When the US lost an ally in 
Somoza to the Sandinista revolution in 1979, they turned to previously deployed tactics of 
economic pressure, managed subversions, and the threat of a military intervention.526 In 
supporting the Contras, the CIA carried out several acts of sabotage without consent of 
Congressional intelligence committees. In response, Congress passed the Boland Amendment, 
prohibiting the CIA from providing aid to the Contras. While the Cold War provided the rhetoric 
for the regular subordination of the Third World to the will of the superpowers,527 this time IL 
had the ability and the scope to step in, resulting in the Nicaragua case.528  
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Key International Legal Themes of the Nicaragua Case 
On numerous occasions Ronald Reagan, alongside the representatives of his administration, 
openly spoke about the ideological and political reasons for intervening in Nicaragua and 
supporting the Contras.529 These statements mainly referenced international policy and not the 
law.530 The US did not claim the legal right of invitation to use force to overthrow the 
government of Nicaragua. First of all, the use of force was carried out through proxies, and not 
by direct forcible intervention of the US army. Secondly, it was done covertly through CIA 
operations and, arguably, did not call for legal justification.531 The law, specifically Article 2 (4), 
is clear on the inadmissibility of forcible intervention. The US covert operation qualified under 
IL as non-forcible support for forcible action by non-state actors.532 The Nicaragua case 
demonstrated that non-forcible support can still breach the non-use of force principle.533 
In April 1984 the Nicaraguan Government filed a claim with the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) on the basis of forcible military intervention by the US in “Nicaragua’s internal affairs, in 
violation of Nicaragua’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and of the 
most fundamental and universally accepted principles of international law.”534 The ICJ held that 
the US violated IL by supporting the Contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan 
government and by mining Nicaragua’s harbours. The Court concluded that “the action 
constituted a breach of international law in that it involved injuring citizens of Nicaragua without 
any lawful justification, and was a serious violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
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Nicaragua.”535 The Court established that the US committed a prima facie violation,536 meaning 
the evidence before trial was sufficient to prove the case unless there was substantial 
contradictory evidence presented during the trial.537 As for the self-defence argument, put 
forward by the US representatives, the Court dismissed it on the basis that there is no such rule 
in customary IL that would allow a state to exercise this right based on its own assessment: 
“where collective self-defense is invoked, it is to be expected that the State for whose benefit 
this right is used will have declared itself to be the victim of an armed attack.”538  
The key lesson of the Nicaragua case is the ICJ ruling on the nature of US intervention. IL allows 
a number of exceptions whereby intervention is permissible. While intervention by invitation of 
the state government is considered legitimate, the Court assessed that the US intervened with 
the purpose of assisting the opposition to forcibly remove the ruling government, which is 
forbidden under IL. The principle of non-intervention would become obsolete if forcible 
assistance to rebel groups was to be permissible.539 The ICJ formulated an authoritative general 
dictum according to which “it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-
intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the 
government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition.”540 
In terms of IHL, an intervention in support of the opposition would change the nature of the 
conflict from internal (or internationalised) to international. In other words, a foreign state who 
intervenes and sides with insurgents is effectively fighting the legitimate government of the host 
state.541 In the context of a civil conflict, the difference between international and internal 
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conflict occurs when the intervening state is either directly involved in the civil war, or is deemed 
to have full control of a party to the conflict.542 This distinction is important because there are 
no provisions for prisoners of war in non-international armed conflicts, and captured rebels 
would be subject to the domestic law of the state where the conflict is taking place.543  
Defining Mercenaries and State Responsibility in the Nicaragua Case 
The ICJ found the US Government to be in breach of the principles of non-intervention and non-
use of force, granting Nicaragua the sum of 370.2 million US dollars in reparations (which 
remains unpaid).544 My enquiry focuses on two closely related points. First is the legal status of 
the Contras under IL, and second is the attribution of authority to the US in relation to the 
Contras. The notion of state responsibility has traditionally been associated with the concept of 
territorial sovereignty.545 While there is no inherent justification for the state monopoly of 
violence, military power is typically concentrated where authority and legitimacy coincide. 
Whatever institution possesses sovereignty would also possess economic resources and, 
therefore, would be interested in providing security for its subjects as well as resources through 
the military means it controls. This correlation demonstrates the important link between the 
state, the military forces it controls, and the responsibility it upholds under IL. A violation of IL 
by a state creates responsibility in two scenarios. First, if loss or damage resulted from the act; 
and, second, if the delinquency can be imputed to the state.546  
The majority of contemporary legal instruments concerning the use and regulation of 
mercenaries were internationally established and available to the Court during the Nicaragua 
case proceedings. The 1977 AP I defined mercenaries, the 1974 Definition of Aggression 
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referenced their use and affiliation to the recruiting state, and of course the wars of liberation 
in Africa had provided an array of examples of the use of mercenaries by proxy. In their 
statements to the Court, Nicaragua described the Contras as “bands of mercenaries which have 
been recruited, organised, paid and commanded by the Government of the United States.”547 
On that basis they argued that the Contras had no real autonomy from the US Government, 
strongly implying the need for attribution of authority.548 In addition, the US government in 
numerous public statements referred to irregular armed groups as mercenaries; however, the 
Court made no such distinction. The Court’s judgement did not invoke the definition of 
mercenaries codified in AP I, even though the Contras were described exclusively in those terms 
by the Nicaraguan side in the case pleadings, oral arguments, and documents. The only mention 
of mercenaries in the ICJ judgement were in reference to the Nicaraguan claim concerning the 
extent of US government control and authority over the Contras, and other formulations made 
by Nicaragua.  
The question of the degree of control of the Contras by the US Government is central to 
establishing the attribution of responsibility to the US for activities of the Contras. To 
demonstrate the extent of US involvement, Nicaragua had recorded over 470 instances of US-
led mercenary attacks taking place between December 1981 and November 1984.549 These were 
attributed to “CIA-trained mercenaries” or “mercenary forces”, and included kidnapping, 
assassination, torture, rape, killing of prisoners, and killing of civilians not dictated by military 
necessity.550 Nicaragua asked for responsibility to be attributed to the US Government on the 
basis of US direct recruitment, financing, regulation, and organisation of the mercenary forces, 
on the strategic, tactical, and operational levels,551 concluding that the US Government was 
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“substantially involved” at every level of mercenary operations.552 This terminology was taken 
from the 1974 GA Resolution 3314, where a specific clause related to the use of mercenaries 
was included in the definition of aggression.553 While it provided legal grounds to classify US 
activity in Nicaragua as the use of force under Article 2 (4), at no stage in the Nicaragua case 
were the Contras defined as mercenaries by the ICJ. Attribution of authority was also claimed 
based on the proof that the US Government repeatedly ratified and approved acts of aggression 
by mercenary forces against Nicaragua.554  
All the evidence presented to the Court by Nicaragua pointed to the same conclusion: in the 
proxy war in Nicaragua, mercenaries were an instrument of US policy. Having examined the 
genesis, development, and activities of the Contra forces, in the Judgement summary of 27 June 
1986 the Court confirmed that the Contras were largely financed, trained, equipped, armed, and 
organised by the US Government.555 The ICJ also concluded that the evidence available to the 
Court was insufficient to demonstrate the total dependence of the Contras on the US aid, 
therefore leaving the Contras responsible for their own acts under international law. The Court 
stated that, “for the United States to be legally responsible, it would have to be proved that that 
State had effective control of the operations in the course of which the alleged violations were 
committed.”556 In its judgement the ICJ referred to the Friendly Relations Declaration on the 
matters of non-use of force and non-intervention. However, the judgement omitted to mention 
that the Declaration also sets out three rules specifically regulating the conduct of states with 
regard to insurgent or terrorist groups.557 The prohibitions are against “organising”, “inciting”, 
and “tolerating” irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for the purpose of 
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intervention into the territory of another state.558  
Furthermore, according to the Definition of Aggression, “substantial involvement” with an 
armed group acting against another state makes the actions of that group attributable to the 
state.559 Nor did the ICJ refer to the 1981 Declaration, which in Section 2 outlines the state 
obligation “to prevent on its territory the training, financing and recruitment of mercenaries, or 
the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of another State and to deny facilities, 
including financing, for the equipping and transit of mercenaries.”560 There was no further 
mention of the alleged IL violations by the Contra forces, or how these ought to be classified and 
regulated by the ICJ, or by domestic legal systems. Overall, it is clear that the regulation of 
mercenaries or irregular forces was not in the scope of the Nicaragua case from the standpoint 
of the Court. The Nicaragua case highlighted a significant overlap between the rules on forcible 
intervention and customary law in Article 2(4).561 The GA resolution 2625 (XXV)562 views the 
support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another state as a threat or use of 
force, therefore breaching the principle of non-intervention and the use of force.563 However, 
numerous incidents involving mercenary groups committing offences against Nicaraguan 
citizens were left out of the ICJ’s judgement.  
The issue here is twofold. First of all, the Contras were not defined as mercenaries by the Court. 
The lack of ICJ ruling on this matter is problematic as it removes a great degree of responsibility 
from the Contras themselves, leaving their legal status ambiguous. Second, it alleviates the issue 
of US responsibility. In other words, if the Contras were deemed mercenaries, they would 
inevitably have had direct connection and full financial dependency on the US Government, or 
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on the CIA who procured them. If, however, the Contras are considered to be freedom fighters, 
then they possess a valid motive under the AP I definition to fight independently from US 
support. Unfortunately, this debate was not held as part of the ICJ judgement, and the issue was 
omitted entirely. 
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Conclusion 
The international legal system of the twentieth century was founded upon the rules of 
Westphalian sovereign equality, non-intervention, and state monopoly of force, in order to 
promote human rights and to serve as a shield of protection against aggression and imperialist 
violations. However, these principles had been undermined for two centuries through imperial 
expansion on the part of the West. Equally, the two World Wars showed that nationalism does 
not only equate to citizenship, but often leads to political extremism, military conscription, and 
ethnic disasters. The premise of IL was not fit to serve the international system at the time and 
it was certainly not future-proof. World War II put an end to world empires and initiated the 
process of decolonisation, drastically changing the political landscape. Territorial empires gave 
way to two opposing superpowers that created and cultivated the framework of the Cold War 
through cultural imperialism, “the global carrier of the social practices of ‘modernity’ in all its 
manifestations”,564 and, most prominently, through proxy warfare.  
While Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter established the principles of non-intervention following the 
end of World War II, IL was not focused on regulating mercenarism. Mercenaries had not been 
widely deployed in Europe for centuries and the empires were still holding on to their fading 
authority over the colonial troops in their possession, which served as a plausible alternative to 
private contractors. There was no immediate legal precedent or normative state practice that 
would call for regulation on the subject of mercenarism. It was not until the wars of national 
liberation that mercenaries surfaced again, playing a major role in the belligerent activities of 
the Third World states, with some of the most severe and contentious episodes suffered in the 
countries of Central Africa. Decolonisation created a geopolitical loophole for powerful states to 
intervene, creating states with a new type of sovereignty, the “sovereignty of absence of 
                                                 
564 Golding, P. and Harris, P. (eds): Beyond Cultural Imperialism: The Many Cultural Faces of Imperialism 
by Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, SAGE Publications, London, 1997, p.51. 
127 
 
 
 
value”.565 The Third World has undergone a so-called liberal democratic ‘formatting’, leaving 
them with the postmodern sovereignty of globalisation and empire.  
Having analysed the attempts of IL to regulate mercenaries in the twentieth century, I draw 
several conclusions. First of all, the IL of the twentieth century was largely politicised.566 Treaties 
were considered the strongest binding mechanism for recognition and compliance with IL by 
the states. In essence, the nature of such IL is purely state-centric, as these are bilateral or 
multilateral agreements between states and states only. Treaty law, such as UN resolutions and 
International Conventions, and case law, such as court rulings, were frequently disregarded by 
states and deemed purely arbitrary. The outcome of the Nicaragua case is a testament to that. 
Although the ICJ clearly classified US intervention and the use of proxies in Nicaragua as 
illegitimate activities that undermine state sovereignty, the Court’s judicial procedure could not 
enforce the participation of both parties. Furthermore, following the US withdrawal from the 
case, the ICJ ruling, based on unilateral input, was not a strong enough authority to enforce the 
paying of US compensation to the government of Nicaragua. 
Another major challenge that twentieth century IL faced was the lack of universality in its 
relevance and applicability. While responding to anti-mercenary movements, it also provided an 
easy opt-out mechanism for states. States that did not ratify AP I are governed by the previous 
Conventions, and the definition of mercenaries does not apply to their conduct. While AP I was 
the legal response that African states were actively campaigning for, two challenges arise from 
the codification of mercenaries and their prisoner of war status in the AP I. The definition of 
mercenaries is so specific that it omits a range of irregular military actors, and, therefore, fails 
to provide comprehensive regulation. The original definition of mercenaries agreed by the OAU 
Convention was situational and political. It focused on the regional specificity of the issue of 
                                                 
565 Douzinas, supra, p. 289. 
566 See: Koskenniemi, M.: “International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities”, 2005, Vol. 23 (1), 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, pp. 61-92, at p. 63. 
128 
 
 
 
mercenarism, and therefore has legal limitations. While it cannot be used to define mercenaries 
universally across geographies and different forms of conflict, it is arguably more usable, as it 
targets a very distinct offence, common to African states during the Cold War, unlike the narrow 
definition of AP I. 
The Nicaragua case demonstrated the weaknesses of IL, which fell subject to the political 
interpretation of a more powerful state. When the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention was described by the US as a mere a statement of political intent, the ICJ did not 
contest that.567 The ICJ statement, according to which “intervention is allowable at the request 
of the government”,568 marks a departure from the stance taken in the 1960s and 1970s 
regarding state intervention and the use of foreign troops. This arguably stretches the norm on 
non-intervention further, weakening the sovereign integrity of states. Finally, the wording of the 
UN Mercenary Convention, alongside other international legal efforts, clearly aims to cater for 
the post-colonial misuse of mercenaries. However, is it apt to regulate the use of private military 
actors today? With UN efforts to regulate mercenaries applicable only to situations of 
international armed conflict or national liberation movements, and the act of mercenarism not 
being criminalised, twentieth century international law has left some significant gaps unfilled, 
and the question of the legality of mercenaries unanswered. 
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Chapter 4 
Neoliberalism, New Wars, and the Rise of PMCs 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the world was preoccupied with global wars 
fought by centralised states and their national standing armies. The prevalent mode of 
governance that characterised states during this time was a sovereign nation-state with its 
typology of a centralised ‘warfare’ government. Fulfilling the belligerent needs of the twentieth 
century, the strong state provided robust military infrastructure, manpower, as well as the 
necessary democratic controls through the choice of products, investment, and intervention in 
the internal management of private arms companies.569 The end of the Cold War brought 
significant demilitarisation, creating a pool of unemployed experienced military personnel, 
providing sufficient supply of security resources. It also marked a significant increase and spread 
of private military companies (PMCs) who until that point were never used overtly as part of 
official state policy.  
Both strong and weak states were promoting privatisation and the outsourcing of security; the 
former did so as a result of neoliberal policies, while the latter had little choice in the absence 
of strong existing military structures. Whether emerging from the collapse of Yugoslavia, or 
engrossed in the ongoing internal wars on the African continent, politically weaker states were 
on the receiving end of Western neoliberal ideas. With growing internal unrest, corruption, and 
fragmented governance, their fragile internal conditions were exacerbated by their economic 
dependency on the IMF and the World Bank for humanitarian and economic support.570 
According to Mann, the structural adjustment programs of the IMF and the World Bank were 
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refocused on the Global South, portraying a form of economic imperialism.571 The Washington 
Consensus was the neoliberal programme for indebted countries who received loans in 
exchange for a restructuring of their domestic economies towards neoliberal standards of 
privatisation, high interest rates, and reduced government spending.572  
This chapter examines the rise of PMCs at the end of the twentieth century, and their continuing 
proliferation until the present day. I explore what appears to be a sharp normative change from 
exclusive use of state-owned and organised military resources to a widespread commodification 
of security through privatisation and outsourcing. First, I consider the theory and practice of 
neoliberal principles in the UK and the US, focusing on the policy changes in the security sector. 
Neoliberalism provided the context to the mode of governance that prevailed in parts of the 
Western hemisphere from the 1980s. Its principles were indirectly imposed on the Global South 
through economic aid and various peacebuilding efforts. Most importantly, neoliberal reforms 
carried normative value, contributing to the changing perception of private security from 
categorically unacceptable at the start of twentieth century to a plausible and even preferred 
solution from the 1980s onwards. 
I then examine the rise of PMCs in the context of the changing conflict paradigm of the new 
wars. By analysing military aspects of ethnic wars in Bosnia and Sierra Leone, I highlight the trend 
for privatisation of violence both internally and internationally. In addition to the domestic 
resort to mercenaries and PMCs by the states in question, I evaluate the privatisation trend 
within the international involvement in these conflicts. I conclude this chapter with an analysis 
of PMC classification. By working through the taxonomy of PMCs, I define the scope for further 
analysis of contemporary PMC regulation under international and domestic laws. 
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Part 1: Neoliberalism 
In this section I discuss the role of neoliberalism573 in shaping the security sector in the UK and 
the US from the 1980s onwards, and the normative effect that neoliberal policies have had on 
the rise of PMCs. This section illustrates how the rise of neoliberalism, with its trend towards 
privatisation and outsourcing, contributed to the commodification of security. First, I look into 
the premise of the rise of neoliberalism and outline the key features of neoliberal thought. I then 
evaluate the government policy initiatives in Britain and the US that played a significant role in 
reintroducing and integrating PMCs into the domestic and international security landscape. I 
also raise questions of accountability and state control in the security sector under neoliberal 
policies. Finally, drawing on Michel Foucault and Wendy Brown, I examine neoliberalism not 
only as an economic factor, but also as political discourse that contributed to the rise of PMCs.574  
A number of economic and political factors contributed to the shift from the model of 
centralised government to that of a neoliberal state. Neoliberal ideals were fundamentally 
opposed to state interventionism, unlike those of John Maynard Keynes, which rose to 
prominence in the 1930s in response to the Great Depression.575 Contrary to welfare capitalism, 
neoliberalism promised greater cost efficiency and openness to private interests by reducing the 
role of government, replacing state planning with the free market mechanism, or, in other 
words, rolling back the state.576 According to neoliberal theory, the state favours strong 
individual private property rights, contractual obligation, and the institutions of freely 
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functioning markets and free trade.577 Its critics, however, interpret neoliberalism as a doctrine 
in which all forms of social solidarity are to be dissolved in favour of individualism.578 
Privatisation of state owned enterprises, liberalisation of trade, and deregulation of the 
economy have been identified by Manfred Steger and Ravi Roy as the three key features of 
neoliberalism.579 Coupled with competition, these elements ought to “eliminate bureaucratic 
red tape, increase efficiency and productivity, improve quality, and reduce costs, both directly 
to the consumer through cheaper commodities and services and indirectly through reduction of 
the tax burden.”580 Inadvertently, these also contributed to the acceptance and integration of 
private military forces into the defence policy. For example, the deregulation of all sectors 
opened up new areas of unrestricted market freedoms for powerful corporate interests.581 
According to Michael Bell’s582 statement in the 1994 NATO Colloquium, privatisation enabled 
the British Government to “pursue its policy of opening up defence procurement as fully as 
possible to competitive pressures.”583 Such competition in defence procurement, in its turn, 
“produced substantial economies to the defence budget”.584  
Some of the key connections between neoliberalism and the privatisation of security derive 
from Milton Friedman’s views on governmental power as a threat to individual freedom.585 
Friedman argued that in order to prevent the abuse of state power, first of all “the scope of 
government must be limited”586 and, secondly, state power must be dispersed.587 He suggested 
that eliminating the state monopoly on power through competition with the market would 
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establish a balance of power. In Friedman’s view an “appropriate free market arrangement [for 
the armed forces] is volunteer military forces; which is to say, hiring men to serve.”588 Following 
on from that rationale, ‘rolling- back’ of the warfare state opens up opportunities for the private 
military contractor to implement neoliberal principles in the armed forces.589 The market is seen 
as an alternative to the state monopoly of force that helps to divide coercive capabilities and 
ensure competition among multiple companies and between public and private agents, 
therefore preventing centralisation of power which could endanger the rights and freedoms of 
citizens.590  
Neoliberalism in the United Kingdom and the United States  
The UK and the US adopted neoliberalism as a new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy 
at the state level in 1979.591 Both countries were governed by leaders that truly believed in the 
neoliberal values of Friedrich Hayek and the Mont Pelerin Society. Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher promoted numerous policies of ‘rolling back the state’, and their success was carried 
forward well beyond their time in office, even by opposition parties.592 The UK Conservative 
Party leader and Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher,593 made neoliberalism her election 
programme, promising to dismantle the British warfare/welfare state.594  
Most commonly, Thatcherism is explained as a pushback against the Keynesian consensus 
prompted by the rise of a set of free market ideas.595 Fragmentation of security provision among 
public and private providers helped to portray Thatcher’s turn to neoliberalism as the 
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continuation of a Liberal political tradition dating back to the nineteenth century.596 Large-scale 
privatisation was at the top of the political agenda, offering a way to manage the state budget 
and raise capital. While neoliberalism was promoted in order to generate efficiencies, a more 
visionary goal was to transform political culture by introducing a new mentality of extended 
corporate and personal responsibility, innovation, and initiative.597 In this scenario the new role 
of the government was that of a customer rather than the sole manager of the security sector.598 
Furthermore, the absence of any constitutional or legal restrictions on the outsourcing of 
military services in the UK facilitated the privatisation of a wide range of military functions and 
services.599 
Since the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, Britain has pioneered the privatisation and the 
outsourcing of significant proportions of its national defence establishment.600 According to the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), privatisation meant the relocation of military services to private 
suppliers “depending on whichever is better placed to deliver required services at best value”.601 
Public-private partnerships and outsourcing contracts legitimised the private sector in the 
procuring and financing of security, and enabled the integration of civilians into the military 
realm. Increasing state reliance on outsourcing amplified the private sector’s presence in the 
supply of military services.602  
In addition to the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), the MOD sought to expand its use of private 
contractors under standard outsourcing agreements. To do so, the government initiated a 
comprehensive review of military functions to identify what kind of military support operations 
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could be contracted out to the private sector. In 1991 the Competing for Quality White Paper 
revised and built on Thatcher’s market-testing programme. Its focus was not privatisation per 
se; it was designed to improve state efficiency by promoting competition between in-house and 
private bidders for service delivery.603 The document outlined three types of services: those that 
were inappropriate for government and should be privatised or eliminated; those that were 
unsuitable for government delivery and should be outsourced; and services that were 
appropriate for government and should be decentralised and subjected to market-testing.604 
Most widely outsourced to the private sector was the management of military facilities, such as 
navy bases, garrisons, and airfields. Even the management of the Atomic Weapons 
Establishment at Aldermaston was contracted out.605 Other areas of private contracting 
included the MOD’s defence estate programme and repairs and maintenance. Since 2004 
logistic support has been a growing area for private contracting, with the MOD outsourcing the 
majority of logistic services to Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) under the Contract for Logistics 
Support arrangement.606  
While all of these areas of privatisation demonstrate the neoliberal trend in the security sector, 
the outsourcing of military training has particular significance. Large-scale PFI projects catered 
for private training, such as the Defence Training Review and the Military Flight Training Systems 
contracts, “which merged private military flight training for the army, navy and the RAF.”607 
Military training brings private contractors one step closer to active participation in combat, and 
therefore to the core function of the military. If one can train how to fight, one can also fight. 
Sean McFate, an academic and a former DynCorp military contractor, analyses this fine line 
                                                 
603 Maude, F., the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Hansard, HC Deb 18 November 1991 Vol 199 cc 
25-35, available at: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1991/nov/18/competing-for-
quality. 
604 HM Treasury, Competing for Quality: Buying Better Public Services, Cm 1730 (London: HMSO, 1991).  
605 White, D.: “MOD Trains Its Big Guns on Commercial Target”, Financial Times, 13 December 1993.  
606 Krahmann, supra, p. 93. 
607 Ibid., p. 94. 
136 
 
 
 
between military training and participation in combat in the context of peacekeeping 
operations. While in theory there is a clear distinction between support contractors, used for 
defence and training, and mercenaries, who stage offensive operations on behalf of a client, in 
practice “if you can do one, you can do the other.”608 By designating civilian contractor positions 
in a military realm, governments legitimise the notion of private military activity. While the 
government accepts liability when hiring individual civilian contractors who are incorporated in 
the military structure of the state, the issue of responsibility arises when corporate entities are 
involved in supplying the contractors to the state. I discuss this issue in more depth in the next 
chapter, however at this stage it is important to highlight the trend of normalisation and 
legitimisation of private security that derived from the state itself.  
Although Thatcher pioneered the neoliberal model, the Major and Blair governments developed 
it further, increasing the private sector contribution to national and international defence.609 
The number of civil servants in the MOD declined by 40 per cent between 1979 and 1990 as 
civilian positions were the first to be cut or replaced.610 By 2000, around £10 billion, or 45 per 
cent of the MOD’s annual function, had been reviewed for potential private sector involvement 
under the Better Quality Services (BQS) initiative.611 Overall, the above statistics reflect the 
increase of private military presence in the security sector, whereby the government had taken 
deliberate steps to implement this change. Affiliation of significant military figures with PMCs 
was another element that contributed to a gradual normalisation of the private military 
industry. For example, General Sir Roger Wheeler (former UK Chief of General Staff) and Lord 
Inge (former field marshal of the British Army) were board members of Aegis Defence 
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Services,612 and Lieutenant General Sir Cedric Delves (former British Army General and NATO 
Deputy Commander in Chief) joined the Olive Group in 2005 as a Senior Advisor.613 
In many ways paralleling Britain’s economic endeavours, US President Ronald Reagan 
introduced the ideological rationale for outsourcing military functions to private firms, thereby 
promoting the concept of the ‘small state’. The premise for outsourcing was originally laid out 
in 1966 when the US Government introduced specific procedures for comparing public and 
private sector provisions of goods and services in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Circular A-76.614 In order to determine what should and should not be outsourced, the A-76 
outlined ‘Inherently Governmental Functions’ which included management and direction of the 
Armed Services, and activities performed exclusively by military personnel who are subject to 
deployment in a combat, combat support, or combat service support role.615 Notwithstanding 
this definition, the A-76 process was fully set up to procure private military services. After 
notifying Congress and comparing bids from the military and the private sector, if a private 
sector bid was 10 per cent of the personnel cost or $10 million lower than the competing military 
bid, the private bidder was awarded the contract.616  
Additionally, following the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, the extent of the DOD’s acquisition 
of military services from private firms under the A-76 procedures nearly doubled.617 The 
functions that the DOD and the A-76 process defined as commercial rather than governmental, 
with the exception of large-scale armed combat, ranged from depot maintenance and repair, 
logistics, training, to intelligence services, armed guarding, and the management of 
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government-owned facilities.618 Not only had the latter been considered an inherently 
governmental function until the mid-1990s, these have also been amongst the largest growth 
areas in terms of outsourcing. 619  
Furthermore, the Competition in Contracting Act 1984 and two subsequent acts in 1986 had a 
significant impact on military procurement through deregulation, eliminating military 
specifications, and requiring “the military services to use competition in contracting in increasing 
amounts each year”.620 The Reagan administration provided the vital political backing for 
neoliberal ideology through further deregulation, tax and budget cuts, as well as attacks on 
trade union and professional power.621 As part of the deregulation initiatives, the Commission 
on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces advocated the elimination of restrictive legislation 
in the United States Code, Title 10 – Armed Forces, which prohibited the contracting-out of key 
military occupations.622 In 1985, ten years prior to the Commission’s regulation, the Logistics 
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) was established. It began as a US Army-administered 
forum for engaging private security and military firms to support US government missions 
abroad.623 Initially founded in order to outline the policies and procedures for using civilian 
contractors during wartime,624 in 1992 it became a centralised mechanism for PMC 
procurement. The key distinction of LOGCAP from any previous outsourcing endeavours lies in 
the “umbrella concept” it uses to obtain a wide range of support functions under one 
contract.625 The scope of LOGCAP spanned across operations in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Italy, 
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and South-West Asia, and it also provided crucial support and combat forces for peacekeeping 
missions in Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia.626  
While by 2001 it became clear that public-private cost comparisons and outsourcing were not 
producing the anticipated efficiencies, the neoliberal trend was not abandoned.627 In the ten 
years between 1996 and 2006 total spending on private military services increased by 146 per 
cent from $46 to $113 billion.628 So despite Reagan’s promise to roll back the state, federal 
spending increased as a result of growing military expenses.629 In fact, through military spending 
Reagan created the largest US deficit at the time, tripling Gross Federal Debt, from $900 billion 
to $2.7 trillion.630 By transforming the roles of the military and private businesses with regard to 
decision-making and the implementation of national defence strategies, Reagan’s reforms 
contributed to strengthening the private military position in government policy.631 Furthermore, 
through the tools of privatisation and outsourcing, neoliberalism promoted nodal or fragmented 
security governance, whereby the state retained only partial control over defence resources, 
and only in the form of a contract.  
Accountability and State Control 
As part of neoliberal doctrine, states outsourced and privatised numerous governmental 
functions that until the 1980s were under the direct control of the state. The work of neoliberal 
thinkers like Hayek and Friedman promoted the concept of a minimal state,632 something that 
both Reagan and Thatcher attempted to implement. In this context, state sovereignty is willingly 
surrendered to the global market in favour of commodity and capital movements.633 According 
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to Friedrich Hayek, “private monopoly is scarcely ever complete and even more rarely of long 
duration or able to disregard potential competition. But a state monopoly is always a state-
protected monopoly – protected against both potential competition and effective criticism.”634 
Hayek and his followers view state monopoly as a threat to individual freedom and see the 
market as the instrument most fit to perform the mediating function.  
In neoliberalism, “the sanctity of contracts and the individual right to freedom of action, 
expression, and choice must be protected.” 635 Friedman argued that the state should be the 
arbiter of contracts and, therefore, of law. However, this gives rise to two possible risks. If the 
state designs and puts in place legitimising mechanisms for private forces to enter the security 
market, then the market becomes an instrument for the consolidation of monopoly power. Such 
deregulation in the security sector could generate impunity if the military function, i.e. the 
function of killing, is left ungoverned. Also, in reality, the state may lose its hierarchical position 
in the face of contract law. Unless specifically stipulated, a contract between a PMC and the 
state creates a horizontal relationship between two equal parties to a contract.636 As a 
consequence, such a contract between a state and a PMC could immunise the state against 
responsibility under IL, as the state is no longer seen to be directing or controlling the private 
security provider.637 
As a political framework, neoliberalism also rationalised the legitimacy of the private military 
contractor. Amongst a number of set criteria, Additional Protocol I defined a mercenary as any 
person who is motivated “essentially by the desire for private gain”,638 who was promised higher 
rates of pay than the uniformed soldier, and who was not a national of a party to the conflict 
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nor a local resident. As observed in neoliberal practice, most PMCs recruit contractors based on 
eligibility and desired expertise, therefore removing political content from the military role 
performed by the contractor. The privatisation of the security sector and the outsourcing of 
multiple defence functions and facilities blurred the distinction between the professional soldier 
and the private military contractor. However, according to the neoliberal vision, this political 
neutrality on the part of the soldier should be viewed as an advantage in terms of democratic 
control and accountability.639 Equally, a profit motivation poses no issues to neoliberalism in 
ensuring democratic control and contractor accountability. While military services were legally 
exempt from outsourcing, the growing spectre of defence support functions that could and were 
contracted out, starting from the 1980s and continuing to this day, did in fact create a plausible 
environment for PMCs to exist and to prosper.  
Governance and Governmentality 
Although the shift towards the private sector is striking when analysing the late twentieth 
century security landscape in the UK and the US, it was extensively articulated through 
government policy and various state programmes. However, we can only truly appreciate the 
extent of this shift if we contrast it to the national defence structure of the rest of the twentieth 
century. In the context of the core argument of this thesis, the above examples of neoliberal 
states present a very important connection between the dominant form of governance and the 
type of military power. As in previous chapters, I refer to the composition of the army, the type 
of soldier that dominated the military landscape, and the shifting ownership of means of 
violence from state-centric to deferred or privatised.  
A neoliberal state is best described as a small, decentralised state and the characteristic military 
of such a state, as we have observed, is a mixed arrangement comprised of a professional 
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national army and private contractors. As Harvey noted, “the shift from government (state 
power on its own) to governance (a broader configuration of state and key elements in civil 
society) has therefore been marked under Neoliberalism.”640 In this context governance is 
understood as a broader configuration of the state as opposed to state power on its own. As 
part of this shift, the state monopoly of force has also been undermined.641 In addition, 
internationally the governance model is more open to interventions and alternative authorities, 
such as international regulatory bodies and PMCs.642 
When analysed through the lens of the overall methodology of this thesis, neoliberalism 
completes the full circle of types of governance, exhibiting some similarities to feudal fractured 
sovereignty.643 In other words, through neoliberalism we observe the return of fragmented 
sovereignty and decentralisation as the dominant form of governance. This is particularly 
important as a validation of the method I use to analyse existing and future regulatory efforts, 
i.e. there is a direct correlation between the prevalent form of governance and the type of 
military force it prefers to deploy. Moreover, this correlation demonstrates that there is a 
deeper explanation to the rise and proliferation of PMCs, entrenched in the form of governance. 
While the questions of ethics surrounding mercenary and private military actors are important, 
they tend to stand against a conscious governmental effort to restructure state-military 
relationships in one way or another. PMCs do not simply arise and operate haphazardly, pushing 
out professional armies. They are ‘welcomed’ by the governments who design their policies in a 
way that allows for private military firms to exist.  
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Finally, the transformation from a centralised ‘warfare’ state with a national army to a neoliberal 
‘small’ government whose defence policy includes private contractors is a very broad, yet 
blatant way to illustrate the normative change in the government-military relationship.644 
Having examined neoliberalism as an economic factor, it is important to also consider it as a 
political and legal discourse that contributed to the rationalisation of PMCs. In the Western 
hemisphere, the spread of neoliberalism transpired through changes in government policy, but 
also in the discourse of legality. Building on Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality, Wendy 
Brown explains the transformation of practices that were formerly unacceptable or irregular to 
becoming normal and legalised.645 Brown argues that the norms and principles of neoliberal 
rationality initiated a commodification of areas that were previously considered public, or 
“noneconomic”.646  
Brown’s and Foucault’s reading of neoliberalism as a “specific and normative mode of reason” 
could explain the changed perceptions in the sphere of private security. By articulating 
neoliberal ideals, the US and UK governments promoted privatisation and outsourcing across all 
sectors, including security, therefore changing the legal perception of its inherently public 
nature. The exponential growth of private military activity is directly linked to the current 
globalised form of governance. Whether failing or co-dependent, states no longer uphold the 
same extent of sovereignty as they did throughout the majority of the twentieth century. 
Moreover, they are overarched by global legal and political institutions and undercut by 
multinational corporations, shifting states further from the Westphalian concept of a monolithic 
entity that comprises all governmental functions behind its sovereign borders. Power is no 
longer administered by states alone.  
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While it is true that states continue to be the main owners and users of military power, the 
growing number of operational647 and advocacy648 NGOs, and the rise of transnational 
organisations,649 multinational corporations,650 and global political players such as the UN and 
NATO, changed the political and legal dynamic by adding new actors to the international arena. 
It is also important to mention terrorist organisations who not only claim authority, but also 
change the political landscape by resorting to asymmetric warfare. They are yet another non-
state actor that controls the means of power and violence, typically in parallel to a formal 
government.651 Finally, the growing presence of the private military industry today indicates that 
the market for force is shifting, marking a decline of the state monopoly of force. All these 
phenomena conceptualise ‘Neomedievalism’,652 a term coined by Hedley Bull, however never 
realised during his time. ‘Neomedievalism’ suggests an alternative to the Westphalian state 
system that is characterised by technological unification of the world synonymous with 
globalisation,653 the regional integration of states, the rise of transnational organisations, the 
disintegration of states, and the restoration of private international violence.654 All of these 
elements suggest a shift away from a Westphalian state system and highlight the decline of 
territorial sovereignty. While some characteristics of pre-modern governance are visible in 
contemporary security developments, the medieval world, as Foucault and others have insisted, 
is epistemically separated from our own and recovering the complexity of meaning and 
understanding from this period and applying them to our own is an impossible task. So, although 
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652 Neomedievalism is a metaphor loosely based on the world order of the European high Middle Ages, 
but it does not portend a literal return to the medieval period. It is an alternative to the Westphalian 
system researched by Philip Cerny, Mark Duffield, Jorg Friedrichs, Stephen Kobrin, and others. 
653 This closely resembles the trade and partnership networks of fifteenth-century Italian city-states. 
654 McFate, supra, 75. 
145 
 
 
 
‘Neomedievalism’ is too broad of a claim, it highlights the overlap of different jurisdictions that 
characterises the twenty-first century mode of governance. 
Part 2: The Rise of PMCs 
Unlike the ambiguous use of mercenaries in covert operations during the Cold War, private 
civilian contractors were much more openly integrated into military structures and government 
policy at the turn of the twenty-first century. The presence of contractors versus military 
personnel grew from one to fifty in 1991, to a staggering ratio of one to ten in 2003.655 The rise 
of PMCs at the end of the Cold War can be explained in different ways. Availability of resources 
as a result of military downsizing created a considerable supply of manpower, while the demand 
was driven by long-simmering conflicts, previously sustained by the logic of the Cold War and 
the balance of two superpowers.656  
Lineages of private force can also be traced in the changing form of governance that derived 
from neoliberal ideals. Neoliberalism offered to address the presumed short-term security 
demands which arose from multiple military interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq with the temporary hire of private military contractors rather than an 
increase in professional soldiers, allowing countries like the UK to “punch above their weight”.657 
In a methodological way, neoliberalism completes the full circle of types of governance, 
returning to a small government that resorts to nodal security. Although in the West 
privatisation of military services was conducted through neoliberal policies, in the rest of the 
world privatisation of violence was understood in the context of the failed state. While 
neoliberalism generated a new form of governmental rationality and state legitimacy,658 the 
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‘new wars’ that emerged after 1989 created new opportunities. The changing conflict paradigm 
at the end of the Cold War created a demand for a different kind of security. Mary Kaldor 
explains the rise of the new wars in relation to external pressures of cutting government 
spending, and loss of revenue and legitimacy, leading to disorder and military fragmentation.659 
Incapable of raising and maintaining their own military infrastructure and fighting the new kind 
of wars, failing governments all over the world became keen clients of private military firms, 
while utilising the surplus of arms and manpower that was generated by the Cold War.660  
A deliberate attempt to establish ethnically homogenous territories in the newly formed 
countries of the former Yugoslavia laid the foundations for ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-
Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995.661 The Bosnian conflict involved different types of military 
power.662 As in most new wars, the types of fighting units in Bosnia included paramilitaries, parts 
of the national army that were no longer controlled by the state, foreign mercenaries, organised 
criminal groups, and, later, external peacekeeping forces.663 Foreign mercenary groups varied 
from British servicemen siding with the Croats664 to Mujahedeen soldiers supporting Bosnian 
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Cleansing: a Case-Study from Rural Bosnia Hercegovina” 2000, Vol. 23 (1), Ethnic and Racial Studies, pp. 
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forces.665 Other mercenaries from Russia, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and the US were also 
involved in the Bosnian conflict.666 
Due to the multitude of fighting units and in the absence of a single source of authority or 
military command, this kind of war is run by horizontal coalitions that cooperate with one 
another on the basis of common projects and negotiated partnerships.667 The new wars can, 
therefore, be distinguished by the complete breakdown of the state monopoly of force. Besides 
the internal fragmentation of security which furthered the privatisation of violence, 
international involvement in the Bosnian conflict also brought private military contractors to the 
scene under the banner of peacebuilding operations. The severity of violence in Bosnia triggered 
the dispatch of UN peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR). To provide the necessary manpower, the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations contracted several PMCs, such as DynCorp and 
Defense Systems Limited (DSL) to carry out tasks such as crime prevention and detection, close 
protection, and border security duties.668  
Operation Joint Endeavour (OJE) in Bosnia, Hungary, and Croatia was the result of the Dayton 
Peace Accord. OJE was conveyed as part of the LOGCAP initiative following two previous 
operations in Somalia and Haiti. The explanation for the deployment of private forces as 
opposed to the US military partially lies in the political past of the Cold War. Until the Accord, 
there was no host nation support agreement between the US and the above countries due to 
their former association with the Soviet bloc, making LOGCAP a practical alternative for 
supplying combat and service support.669 Brown & Root, now KBR, was the private engineering 
and procurement company that provided logistics and a wide array of other services under the 
                                                 
665 Dzidic, D.: “Report Probes Mujahideen Killings During Bosnian War” 25 January 2016, Balkan 
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668 Ostensen, supra, p. 16. 
669 Col. Russell, supra, p. 12. 
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LOGCAP initiative in Bosnia.670 The LOGCAP II contract was awarded to DynCorp International to 
perform peacebuilding activities in Bosnia between 1997 and 2002.671 Unlike the other three 
LOGCAP initiatives, little can be found on the content of this particular programme in official US 
government sources. On the contrary, there has been a lot of controversy in the press 
surrounding the scandalous behaviour of DynCorp contractors involved in prostitution and 
human trafficking in Bosnia.672 The link to the US Army official programme was rarely explicit, 
and public blame and responsibility was placed mainly on the UN, which was arguably a more 
abstract and fluid target than the US government. Although since 1998 eight DynCorp 
contractors were sent back from Bosnia, they have not been prosecuted.673 Moreover, DynCorp 
was later selected for the LOGCAP IV contract in 2007 for a term of up to ten years.674 
International involvement did not stop there; in 1993, as a legal response to severe outbreaks 
of aggression, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.675 While the UN and 
NATO676 had been operating since the end of World War II, they were often perceived as a 
legitimising vehicle for US foreign policy.677 The ICTY and the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
on the other hand, were an evolving exception to this rule, since in some cases these institutions 
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investigate and try citizens of states that have not signed and ratified the Rome Statute.678 The 
ICTY addressed the issues of private violence through the mechanism of individual criminal 
liability. Dusko Tadic was the first accused to appear before the ICTY and was charged with grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.679 Tadic participated in the attack, seizure, murder, 
and maltreatment of Muslims and Croats both within and outside three prison camps, using 
military and paramilitary groups.680 The Bosnian Serb Army acted aggressively in their attempt 
to establish Republica Srpska on Bosnian territory in January 1992.681 As in the case of Nicaragua, 
it was essential to establish the relationship and the extent of control between the Yugoslavian 
state and the military and paramilitary forces in order to assign responsibility. Despite finding 
that the armed forces of the Republika Srpska “were almost completely dependent on the 
supplies of the [Army of the FRY] VJ to carry out offensive operations”, the Trial Chamber found 
the evidence insufficient to establish either full or effective control.682 The case then went 
through the Appeals Chamber, who affirmed that:  
The control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in 
the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organising, 
coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to 
financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group.683  
In the Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber found that there was “continuing payment of salaries, 
to Bosnian Serb and non-Bosnian Serb officers alike, by the Government of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”684 which indicates and proves control.685 The Appeals 
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Chamber concluded that the armed forces of the Republika Srpska acted under the “overall 
control” of and on behalf of the FRY, classifying the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
between the Bosnian Serbs and the central authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an 
international armed conflict.686 The link between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
conduct of the Bosnian Serb forces and paramilitary groups was established by ICTY and later 
also by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Bosnian Genocide case.687 However, the ICJ 
rejected the test for overall control, proposed by the Appeals Chamber, deeming it unsuitable 
as it stretches too far the necessary connection between the conduct of a state’s organs and its 
international responsibility.688  
Importantly, the Tadic case contributed to the construction of an essential element in the 
criminal liability for corporations, namely joint criminal enterprise.689 The principle of this 
collective liability depends on lowering the culpability threshold as one individual may be 
deemed liable for another’s actions when operating in a group. It also changed the perception 
of war crimes dating back to Nuremberg, to an idea that crimes against humanity can also occur 
outside of international conflict.690 While the ICTY made incredible progress in establishing 
individual criminal responsibility, there are still questions and grey areas surrounding the 
attribution of authority on a state and corporate level. Is prosecution of individual war criminals 
a proportionate legal response to ethnic and political disasters of such scale? Are the existing 
international legal mechanisms capable of effectively allocating blame and invoking 
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responsibility on states and corporate actors such as PMCs? While there was evidence of 
deploying private military forces, the issue of mercenarism was not raised at the time. 
Moreover, as mercenarism was not codified as an international crime under the Rome Statute, 
the ICC does not currently have any special jurisdiction over private military actors.691 
Sierra Leone was another typical example of a weak state, engrossed in ongoing internal 
struggles following the end of the Cold War.692 Its army, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military 
Force (RSLMF), was unable to neutralise the rebels and establish security.693 The lack of 
adequate training, funding, or a military ethos further exacerbated security issues and in 1995 
head of state Valentine Strasser first contracted Gurkha Security Guards and later Executive 
Outcomes (EO) to supply training and military support.694 However, the involvement of private 
military firms only aggravated the instability in the country and in the region, empowering 
corrupt governments through appropriation of all proceeds from mineral and oil concessions.695 
As part of the funding package to the financially struggling Sierra Leone, the IMF approved 
payments to EO.696 Following the neoliberal framework of global governance, the IMF would 
quite naturally see private military firms as the most fitting solution to Sierra Leone’s security 
problems.  
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Between 1994 and 1998 the network of EO’s shareholders and associated businesses included 
around 30 to 50 military-related and mineral companies, who worked together to facilitate EO’s 
operations in Africa.697 When in January 1993 EO first entered Angola on a two-month contract, 
they were not recruited by the Angolan government or any of its factions. Two British special 
service officers hired EO to capture and defend valuable oil tanks in the towns of Soyo and 
Kefekwena, controlled by UNITA forces.698 The next two-and-a-half-year contract with the 
Angolan government confirmed EO as a significant player in the private security field, and 
enabled its expansion both through capital and conflict opportunity. Their subsequent contract 
in Sierra Leone was aimed at defeating the Revolutionary United Front (who were later trained 
by an Israeli company, Spearhead Ltd), which ultimately led to free elections in 1996.699 EO’s 
outward mercenary profile was condemned by the international community and the South 
African government; the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 was the final 
nail in EO’s coffin. The Act precluded any South African citizen from participating in an armed 
conflict, nationally or internationally. It also specifically prohibited recruitment, use, training, 
financing or engaging in mercenary activity, thereby criminalising mercenarism both in South 
Africa and outside of its borders.700  
When in 1997 Sandline International was involved in suppressing an armed independence 
movement in Papua New Guinea, it subcontracted EO to facilitate armed forces and logistics 
needed for the military contract.701 Although EO has been formally dissolved and Sandline have 
taken over their operations in Sierra Leone, currently there are few legal mechanisms to track 
and prevent the subcontracting relationship between the two entities, creating an impunity 
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construct, known as the corporate veil.702 Most jurisdictions recognise the company law doctrine 
of “separate corporate personality”, whereby a parent company and its subsidiaries are 
considered to be separate legal entities, despite the link of shareholding.703 The doctrine was 
reinforced in Prest v. Petrodel704 as the UK Supreme Court asserted that the “courts may only 
‘pierce the corporate veil’ in exceptionally limited circumstances.”705 Such a construct of legal 
separation and limited liability allows for impunity on the part of PMCs and cannot be addressed 
by only invoking individual criminal responsibility of PMC employees and directors. 
As the main PMC clients, states welcomed the integration of private violence into their 
government policy, and were not prepared to outlaw it. Normalisation of private security came 
from every direction. Leading powers were promoting a neoliberal form of governance; weak 
and failing states lacked military structures and the capacity to sustain local security; 
international organisations, like the IMF and the World Bank, imposed impossible loan terms on 
developing nations while encouraging private military assistance. Finally, PMCs rose to the 
challenge as they acquired legal corporate status, thereby distinguishing themselves from 
illegitimate gangs and ‘soldiers of fortune’. Furthermore, the use of private force potentially 
enabled states to avoid traditional rules of engagement and shed some of the responsibility, 
which would have been inevitable when using uniformed personnel.  
This shifting conflict paradigm demonstrates that wars no longer took place in the same context 
as they did historically. From the mid-twentieth century they began to be replaced with 
phenomena such as proxy wars and struggles of national liberation across the Third World, 
leading to internal conflicts, ethnic tension, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping 
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operations, and post-conflict reconstruction at the turn of the century. PMCs emerged and 
thrived in the context of these new wars, which often allowed them to bypass traditional laws 
of armed international conflict. But before attempting a deeper analysis of contemporary PMC 
regulation, it important to examine the meaning behind the term ‘private military company’ and 
understand why regulating PMCs and their contractors poses a problem to IL. 
Part 3: PMC Classification 
According to Robert Mandel PMCs represent a modified form of organised corporate 
mercenarism, shielding their home states from international responsibility by concealing their 
participation or influence in conflicts.706 While there are plenty of critics blurring the lines 
between PMCs and mercenaries,707 it is important to distinguish the basic components of PMCs 
from a legal rather than ethical or political standpoint. From a corporate legal perspective, PMCs 
arose from the juxtaposition of civilian corporations and the lack of any clear criminalisation of 
mercenaries by the instruments of IL.708 Like mercenary groups, PMCs are still formed and run 
exclusively by civilians, albeit the majority are former military personnel. However, PMCs 
acquired a corporate legal personality which distinguishes them from their legally dubious 
predecessors. The construct of incorporation turned a private business of mercenarism into a 
limited company.  
While the legitimacy of PMC activity is widely debated under IL, it is important to establish the 
starting point of their status. Incorporated as companies with subsidiaries, investors, and profit 
reports, PMCs enjoy the same protection by corporate law as any other company. In other 
words, all PMCs are a priori legitimate, since according to the legal definition of corporate and 
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contract law, no company can be formed with the purpose of engaging in illegal activities.709 As 
argued by Hin-Yan Liu and also demonstrated in Chapter 3, IL failed to criminalise the act of 
mercenarism, therefore leaving a loophole for PMCs to exploit. I discuss the regulation of PMCs 
under corporate and contract law in more detail in Chapter 5, however the above clarification 
was necessary to identify the starting point for PMC classification.  
There is no one right way to classify a PMC. Peter Singer divides PMCs into three ‘‘business 
sectors’’: (i) military provider firms supplying ‘‘direct, tactical military assistance’’ that can 
include serving in front-line combat; (ii) military consulting firms that provide strategic advice 
and training; and (iii) military support forms that provide logistics, maintenance, and intelligence 
services to armed forces.710 Wulf divides the companies in five categories, identifying (i) private 
security companies; (ii) defence producers; (iii) private military companies; (iv) non-statutory 
forces; and (v) mercenaries. He further differentiates PMCs by the nature of their activity, i.e. 
provision of consulting, logistics and support, technical services, training, peacekeeping and 
humanitarian assistance, and combat forces.711 McFate separates PMCs into ‘mercenary and 
military enterprisers’.712 South Africa’s Executive Outcomes713 and London based Sandline 
International714 fall under McFate’s classification of mercenary enterprisers, defining them as a 
private army conducting autonomous military campaigns. According to McFate, raising rather 
than commanding military forces is a distinct feature of military enterprisers, such as 
Blackwater, DynCorp International, or Triple Canopy.715 Meanwhile the industry itself classifies 
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private military and security companies (PMSCs) as “private business entities that provide 
military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves.”716 
While as of March 2011 there were 90,339 contractors in Afghanistan, compared to 
approximately 99,800 uniformed military recruits,717 the armed contractors represented a 
minority of approximately 16% of all DOD contractor personnel.718 This is important when 
conceptualising the scope of PMC activities, as the majority of contractors fulfil purely civilian 
functions, such as logistics and transportation of supplies, maintenance, etc. PMC taxonomy is 
made problematic by the ambiguous use of the term ‘security’ or ‘military’ in the context of 
private civilian-formed companies. The term ‘military’ is the contentious part of the term 
‘private military company’, as it creates an automatic assumption that the company is 
belligerent and armed. While PMCs are used by governments to provide support in their military 
operations abroad, the term ‘military’ can be somewhat misleading, implying that this is the 
direct function of the company. It also becomes an oxymoron, as the term ‘military’ which, 
according to current rules and regulations of IHL, is inherently governmental, is juxtaposed 
against the term ‘private company’, contradicting public state ownership of legitimate means of 
violence. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, when referring to a PMC, I propose to 
address the fraction of private security contractors that are armed, and could directly participate 
in hostilities, as well as the companies themselves. The use and regulation of weapons in the 
context of private security varies greatly, ranging from 2 per cent of armed private security 
providers in Croatia, India, and Sweden, to 80 per cent in the Dominican Republic, and 85 per 
cent in Colombia.719 
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Although there is a range of academic critique condemning the privatisation and outsourcing of 
any governmental functions,720 the majority of PMC activity, such as logistics support, 
construction, communication, and maintenance, does not pose codification or accountability 
issues under IL. While ethical arguments are valid in condemning the mercenary motive, and the 
impact on democratic accountability,721 these are often disproportionate to the reality of the 
armed contractor issue. On an institutional level, the norm against the use of private force on 
ethical grounds was demonstrated in 1994, when Executive Outcomes approached Kofi Annan 
at the outbreak of Rwandan atrocities. The UN decision was firmly against using a PMC to 
address the crisis. However, the inability to mobilise public forces in a timely manner, and the 
reluctance to defer to a PMC resulted in over 800,000 casualties, which combined exceeds the 
number of victims in Iraq and Afghanistan.722 However, since then, the UN has been using PMCs 
both directly and through US procurement for their peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations.723  
Conclusion 
By acquiring an international military dimension, PMCs became relevant to IL and international 
armed conflict. At the same time, these companies pose a significant challenge to IL as they 
create a situation whereby civilians have access to direct participation in hostilities. Through 
                                                 
720 See for example: Dickinson, L. A.: ‘‘Government for hire: Privatizing foreign affairs and the problem of 
accountability under international law’’ 2005, Vol. 45 (1), William and Mary Law Review, pp. 137-237; 
Dolovich, S.: “State Punishment and Private Prisons” 2005, Vol. 55 (3), Duke Law Journal, pp. 437-546; 
Metzger, G. E.: “Privatization as Delegation” 2003, Vol. 103 (6), Columbia Law Review, pp. 1367-1502.  
721 See: Pattison, J.: The Morality of Private War: The Challenge of Private Military and Security 
Companies, OUP, Oxford, 2014; Pattison, J.: “Outsourcing the Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian 
Intervention and Private Military and Security Companies”, 2010, Vol. 2 (1), International Theory, pp. 1-
31; Tesón, F.: “Humanitarian Intervention: Loose Ends”, 2011, Vol. 10 (3), Journal of Military Ethics, pp. 
192-212; Percy, S.: “Morality and Regulation” in Chesterman, S. and Lehnard, C. (eds): From Mercenaries 
to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies, OUP, Oxford, 2007. 
722 McFate, supra, p. 38. 
723 Ostensen, A. G.: “UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies”, The 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, SSR Paper 3, 2011, available at: 
http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/UN-Use-of-Private-Military-and-Security-Companies-Practices-and-
Policies. 
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outsourcing and privatisation, states have handed over a portion of inherently governmental 
functions to private companies, allowing PMCs and their employees to obtain a certain form of 
power and governance that resembles that of fifteenth-century Italy. This chapter has explained 
the premise for the legitimisation of PMCs and scrutinised the critical political, strategic, and 
economic factors that brought private military forces back into the international arena. 
Neoliberal reforms, new wars, and the rise of PMCs marked the transition from state centrism 
to fragmented governance which remains prevalent in today’s forms of power and legitimacy. 
The rise of neoliberalism was an important factor in integrating private military contractors into 
UK and US security from the 1980s onwards. Its ideology and economic policy allowed PMCs to 
find and establish a growing security market that significantly accelerated following the Cold 
War. In the context of domestic and international security, this phenomenon is accompanied by 
the rise of international organisations, corporations, and various military groups, all competing 
for authority and legitimacy alongside sovereign states on the international arena.  
The shrinking of the state in favour of the free market economy coincided with the decline of 
state sovereignty, as international legal organisations and multinational corporations gained 
increasing gravitas and regulatory powers. Current regulation and classification of PMCs pose 
numerous issues to IL. These companies are no longer mercenaries in legal terms; they are 
registered and operating openly under a licence. However, the remit of their legitimate activities 
is still under question, and the liability issue remains unresolved. PMCs transformed the private 
military landscape of colonial troops and disreputable mercenaries into a legitimised business 
of civilian security, while post-Cold War demilitarisation provided the numbers to support the 
industry and its proliferation.  
How we arrived at such a widespread and seemingly unregulated use of PMCs at the end of the 
twentieth century can be explained in the context of neoliberal policies. Extensive privatisation 
and outsourcing not only made room for private providers in the security sector; more 
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importantly, it changed the perception of normality and the legality of private security. Of 
course, this statement does not apply universally, otherwise PMCs would not be facing such 
significant criticism. However, this change of perception was substantial and touched enough 
states and international institutions to allow the idea of security privatisation to enter the 
governmental sphere. What was unimaginable 50 years ago at the time of the World Wars has 
become an obvious and plausible solution.  
The neoliberal doctrine, coupled with new wars, PMC corporate identity, and the absence of 
criminalisation of mercenarism provides the context for contemporary use and regulation of 
PMCs, and the subsequent challenges this poses. This context challenges the view that considers 
PMCs a new issue under IL, providing a more comprehensive explanation of their rise, beyond 
the simple demilitarisation claim. Building on this background, I now focus on the questions of 
accountability, codification, and the aptitude of existing domestic and international legislation 
to effectively regulate the contemporary security sector. This juxtaposition of existing norms 
against the use of mercenaries and the prevailing economic and governance ideology promoting 
privatisation and outsourcing is the starting point for my contemporary analysis of the use and 
regulation of PMCs. By analysing all applicable regulation, I highlight the conflicts and gaps in 
contemporary international law concerning mercenary and PMC activity.  
  
160 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Legal Analysis of PMC Regulation 
When a private company is involved in committing a gross violation, such as accidentally killing 
a number of civilians while performing a military support operation abroad, who should be held 
responsible and in what way? Would it be the contractor who fired the gun? Or perhaps the 
company he was recruited by, which may have instructed him to do so, or which did not provide 
the appropriate training? Or should it be the state that outsourced the support of military 
activities to a PMC?  
Both military conduct and human rights are viewed as primary concerns of states, rather than 
private entities or individuals.724 The presence of armed contractors abroad, whether deemed 
as combatants or civilians under AP I, adds an inter-state aspect which plays an important part 
in these questions. In other words, it is no longer a matter of one state’s national committing an 
offence abroad against a foreign national. The premise of such an offence is defined by the 
contracted operation initiated by the client state, without which the contractors would not have 
found themselves in close proximity to hostilities. Equally, if the context of the professional 
occupation of a PMC is removed, the situation can appear as simple as one civilian killing 
another. This means that all three components, the contractor, the company, and the client (the 
state) are crucial to establishing responsibility in PMC conduct.725  
                                                 
724 Ruggie, J.: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Guiding Principles for the 
Implementation of the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework; Principle 6 State-
Business Nexus; Commentary, p. 8. 
725 In the context of this chapter the terms ‘liability’ and ‘responsibility’ are interchangeable, with 
‘liability’ referring to legal responsibility of an actor. 
161 
 
 
 
The question of regulation of private military forces remains critical regardless of the century. 
The move from mercenaries to standing armies has been observed during Absolutism with the 
purpose of establishing control of mercenaries and private armies.726 Today, neoliberal policies 
reintroduced private forces to the security landscape.  This change in governance model created 
a market for force that runs parallel to the established system of public security regulated by 
states and the international humanitarian law. The private segment of security, however, loosely 
resembles the interdependent relationship of feudal contracts or the fragmented security model 
of Italian condottieri.727 Overall, this signals the weakening the controls of states over the private 
security sector as they become increasingly reliant on PMCs for provision of security, and 
introduces a system of overlapping PMC regulatory mechanisms. 
There are a number of regulatory bodies that make provisions for PMC regulation; some are 
international, some domestic, some binding, others self-regulating and voluntary. The outcome 
of such an active regulatory response concerning private military conduct is a complex network 
of binding and voluntary provisions that all claim to regulate the private military space. What 
complicates this picture further is the domestic jurisdiction invoked by the corporate nature of 
PMCs, therefore introducing company law, contract law, and tort law into the mix. There are 
norms and treaties that ensure that a state cannot evade its responsibility by transferring its 
functions to a private entity. The UN Human Rights Council has also produced a number of 
comprehensive, legally binding, and voluntary guidelines aimed at enhancing the responsibility 
of transnational businesses to respect human rights, including prevention, mitigation, and 
remediation. Equally, there is a set of well-established international and domestic legal 
mechanisms to invoke individual criminal responsibility. 
                                                 
726 See Chapter 2, pp. 50-56. 
727 See Chapter 2, pp. 50-53; 57-63. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to navigate through these bodies of law in order to identify the 
gaps and overlaps in the existing regulatory structure for PMCs.728 My enquiry is concerned with 
the application and the effective exercise of regulation in order to analyse the gap between 
existing and future regulation of private military space, and the resolution that this regulation 
can provide in the event of gross violations within the PMC industry. When analysing existing 
and emerging regulation, I take into consideration the lessons learned from the historical 
chapters in terms of the relationship between government and the military. These patterns can 
help shape future policy as well as identifying weaknesses in existing regulatory approaches. 
This chapter examines all three types of responsibility, individual, state, and corporate, in the 
context of a gross human rights violation or a war crime by a private military company. This 
chapter also raises the broader issue of a parallel power relationship between states and PMCs, 
rooted in the analysis of different governance models.729 Created by the horizontal nature of a 
contract and exacerbated by states’ reliance on PMCs to provide security, the state/military 
relationship of the twenty-first century differs significantly from the trends observed in more 
recent governance models. Instead it shows resemblance to the sovereignty claims of feudal 
lords who controlled their own troops.730 Internationally recognised industry self-regulation will 
be examined here as an attempt for PMCs to assert themselves as a governing entity and claim 
legitimacy by establishing control and oversight mechanisms. 
Part 1: Individual Liability for PMC Contractors 
On 16 September 2007 in Nisour Square in Iraq, Blackwater contractors opened fire and killed 
seventeen Iraqi civilians, while twenty-four were wounded. PMCs provided three types of 
services in Iraq: personal security for senior civilian officials, non-military site security, i.e. 
                                                 
728 A table summarising the bodies of law and if they apply to individuals, corporations, and states can 
be found in Appendix 1 and 2, pp. 249-250. 
729 In Chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
730 As discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 50-52. 
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buildings and infrastructure, and non-military convoy security.731 The massacre took place in 
2007; going back a few years, during the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administration in 
Iraq,732 a legal framework was established stipulating the regulation of PMC activities: 
In accordance with international law, the CPA, Coalition Forces and the military and civil 
personnel accompanying them, are not subjects to local law or the jurisdiction of local 
courts. With regard to criminal, civil, administrative or other legal process, they will 
remain subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State contributing them to the 
Coalition.733 
The reference to international law does not seem to bear any judicial or practical meaning as it 
was not mentioned at all during the proceedings of the Blackwater Trial,734 making a clear 
statement about the civilian status of PMC contractors and disabling the vehicle of IHL. Such 
legal configuration puts the blame on the company and the contractors, entirely bypassing IL 
and leaving the hiring state free from responsibility. While the CPA, and the reference to IL, may 
have lost its relevance in 2007, the contractors were not tried in the local Iraqi courts. Instead, 
a bill was passed to subject all private contractors operating in combat zones to the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA).735 The MEJA was originally passed by Congress in 2000, 
giving federal courts jurisdiction over felonies committed by persons “employed by or 
accompanying the armed forces” overseas.736 By extending the MEJA jurisdiction to private 
contractors, the US government ensured the Blackwater employees were not tried in Iraq, 
where the crimes were committed, but instead remained under the authority of US courts. 
                                                 
731 Isenberg, D.: “Private Military Companies in Iraq” in Chesterman, S. and Lehnard, C. (eds): From 
Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies, OUP, Oxford, 2007, p. 
84. 
732 21 April 2003-28 June 2004 
733 Office of the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad, Iraq; Public Notice 
regarding the Status of Coalition, Foreign Liaison and Contractor Personnel, 26 June 2003. 
734 J. Stewart, Inside the Blackwater Trial, conference paper presented at the Institute for Global Law 
and Policy, Harvard Law School, June 2015. 
735 Meyer, J. and Barnes, J. E.: “Congress moves to rein in private contractors” 4 October 2007, Los Angeles 
Times, available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/04/nation/na-blackwater4; Madhani, A.: 
“House: No pass for contractors. Blackwater shooting in Iraq spurs curbs” 5 October 2007, Chicago 
Tribune, available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-10-05/news/0710050148_1_security-
company-blackwater-usa-private-contractors-private-security. 
736 Public Law 106-523—Nov. 22, 2000. 
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In the Blackwater case, the contractors disputed the applicability of MEJA jurisdiction due to 
their contract with the State Department, rather than the Department of Defence (DOD). The 
legal wording of the MEJA creates uncertainty and potential jurisdictional gaps.737 During the 
trial, Gordon England, former Deputy Secretary of Defence, testified that at the time of the 
shooting, Blackwater contractors were supporting the Department of State mission only, rather 
than the Department of Defence.738 This distinction is important because in 2004 Congress 
extended MEJA jurisdiction to cover  
the civilian employees, contractors, and employees of contractors of any Federal agency 
or provisional authority, and their dependents, to the extent that the employment 
relates to the mission of the Department of Defence overseas or to operations within 
territory that the United States occupies solely or jointly.739  
According to Gordon England, there was no cooperation between the Department of State and 
the Department of Defence, and since Blackwater was formally contracted to the Department 
of State, the MEJA jurisdiction could not be applied to invoke state responsibility.740 Ultimately, 
four contractors were prosecuted in the US District Court for the District of Columbia;741 they 
were found guilty and were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.742 
The principle of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is not exclusive to the US. In the UK, for 
example, according to the Armed Forces Act 2006 (UK), PMC contractors working for the UK 
Armed Forces are subject to service discipline. This, however, does not apply to contractors 
recruited abroad for UK Armed Forces missions.743 In English law, any criminal act committed by 
                                                 
737 Cameron, L. and Chetail, V.: Private Military and Security Companies under Public International Law, 
CUP, Cambridge, 2004, p. 624. 
738Stewart, J. and Gray, S.: “The Blackwater Trial: Part 2 – Two Legal Issues” 27 October 2014, Just 
Security, available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/16807/blackwater-trial-part-2-legal-issues/. 
739 H.R. 4390 (108th): MEJA Clarification Act, 5/19/2004, available at: 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr4390/summary. 
740 Stewart and Gray, supra. 
741 Estate of Himoud Saed Atban, et al. v. Blackwater USA, et al., the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, 2007. 
742 Nick Slatten was sentenced to life in prison, and the other three guards, Dustin Heard, Evan Liberty, 
and Paul Slough, to 30 years each. 
743 Cameron and Chetail, supra, p. 625. 
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an employee of a company would lead to a breach in contract.744 However, this is not clear-cut 
in the private military industry, where the legality and criminality of contracted activities cross 
over. The International Criminal Court Act 2001 provided jurisdiction to prosecute core crimes, 
such as crimes of aggression, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity,745 committed 
by British nationals in or outside the United Kingdom. 
Where national courts lack extraterritorial reach to prosecute offences committed by their 
nationals abroad, the International Criminal Court may exercise its jurisdiction. Based on the 
principle of complementarity, the ICC may only apply authority when national legal systems are 
unable or unwilling to do so. Moreover, the Rome Statute provisions relating to individual 
criminal responsibility do not undermine the responsibility of states under IL.746 The ICC and the 
ad hoc tribunals are the most obvious avenues for ascribing international criminal responsibility 
for the most serious of crimes.747 The jurisdiction of the Court is, however, limited to the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.748 PMC contractors bear 
criminal responsibility as individuals, regardless of their status under IHL. While the applicability 
of war crimes provisions is equal to both civilians and combatants, a link to an armed conflict 
needs to be established for an offence to qualify as a war crime.749 ICC Articles 11, 12, and 13 
define more specifically the conditions for international criminal prosecution. However, it is 
Article 25 of the ICC that defines the parameters of individual criminal responsibility.750 The 
Court has jurisdiction over natural persons only, as opposed to states or corporations, and it can 
                                                 
744 Pinto, A. and Evans, M.: Corporate Criminal Liability, 2nd edition, Thompson, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2008, p. 23. 
745 White. N. D.: “Regulation of the Private Military and Security Sector: Is the UK Fulfilling its Human 
Rights Duties?”2016, Vol. 16 (3), Human Rights Law Review, p. 596. 
746 Rome Statute of the ICC, Art. 25 (4). 
747 On individual criminal responsibility see: Van Sledregt, E.: “The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals 
for Violations of International Humanitarian Law” 2004, Vol. 2 (3), Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, pp. 932-936; Eser, A.: “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in Cassese, A., Gaeta, P. and Jones, J. 
(eds): The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, OUP, Oxford, 2002. 
748 Rome Statute of the ICC, Part 2, Article 5 (1). 
749 Cameron and Chetail, supra, pp. 597-598. 
750 Rome Statute of the ICC, Art. 25. 
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ascribe criminal responsibility and be held liable for a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.751 Individuals can be either held directly liable for the offences they committed, or be 
deemed responsible for ordering, soliciting or inducing, as well as aiding, abetting, or otherwise 
assisting the commission of a crime.752 
Another important aspect of individual criminal responsibility develops from the idea of superior 
or command responsibility.753 The theory of command responsibility arises from the laws of 
armed conflict and was firmly entrenched in treaty law in 1977 as part of Articles 43 and 87 of 
AP I.754 Under the doctrine of command responsibility, a commander, or the one performing the 
role and the duties of a commander, may be held liable for the conduct of his subordinates.755 
In order to deem a PMC employee or director personally liable, they must have proven de facto 
control over their subordinates, and have the material ability to prevent and punish the 
commission of the crime.756 ICC Article 28 on ‘Responsibility of commanders and other superiors’ 
clearly stipulates criminal responsibility of “a military commander or person effectively acting 
as a military commander” for the crimes committed by subordinates under their effective 
command and control.757 In other words, their civilian status does not shield PMC employees or 
directors from criminal responsibility via application of Article 28. When a contractor is entitled 
to give orders, his responsibility may be invoked on the basis of being a de facto military 
commander.758 Lindsey Cameron and Vincent Chetail suggest that, when performing tasks that 
                                                 
751 Ibid., Art. 25 (1); (3). 
752 Ibid., Art. 25 (3) (a), (c). 
753 For more on superior responsibility, see: Arnold, R. and Triffterer, O.: “Article 28. Responsibility of 
Commanders and other Superiors” in Triffterer, O. (ed.): Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 2nd edition, Hart, Munich, 2008; Mettraux, G.: The Law of Command 
Responsibility, OUP, Oxford, 2009; Olasolo, H.: The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military 
Leaders as Principals to International Crimes, Hart, Oxford, 2009. 
754 Cameron and Chetail, supra, p. 616. 
755 Ibid., p. 613. 
756 Case law: Celebici Trial Chamber Judgement 2001, paras 354, 378; Semanza Trial Chamber 2003, 
para. 402; Kordic and Cerkez Trial Chamber Judgement 2001, paras 414-415. 
757 Rome Statute of the ICC, supra, Art. 28 (a). 
758 Cameron and Chetail, supra, p. 605, p. 619. See also: Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Trial 
Chamber Judgement, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T; para. 397.: “The giving of orders or the 
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give PMC employees or directors de facto control over soldiers of states whose armed forces 
are not fully developed, their inaction and silent by-standing in the place where crimes occur 
could merit engaging their responsibility. Following the same logic, it may be sufficient to 
establish de facto control, rather than de jure incorporation of PMCs into state armed forces, in 
order to attribute their actions to the state they are representing. However, this connection 
seems far-fetched because it concerns state responsibility, even though a similar rationale is 
applied.759  
PMC-Specific Regulation and Individual Responsibility 
As part of the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, a number of states have adopted 
a range of approaches to invoke individual liability for PMC contractors, such as direct 
extraterritorial legislation and enforcement, whereby criminal regimes allow for prosecutions 
based on the nationality of the offender beyond national borders.760 However, besides domestic 
legal systems, there has been an active development on the international level, specific to PMC 
regulation. The Working Group (WG) on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human 
Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination was established 
in 2005. In 2009, the WG introduced a new framework of regulation in the form of the Draft 
Convention. The purpose of the new draft was to strengthen accountability and extraterritorial 
provisions, especially to address the complex environments in which PMCs operate.761 At its 
15th session, on 1 October 2010, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 15/26, by which 
it decided the following: 
to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group with the mandate to 
consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework, including, 
                                                 
exercise of powers generally attached to a military command are strong indications that an individual is 
indeed a commander. But these are not the sole relevant factors”, p. 132. 
759 See Nicaragua case. 
760 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, New York and 
Geneva, 2011, p. 4. 
761 A/HRC/30/47, Art. 33 (g), p. 10. 
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inter alia, the option of elaborating a legally binding instrument on the regulation, 
monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security companies, 
including their accountability, taking into consideration the principles, main elements 
and draft text as proposed by the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means 
of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination.762  
Since 2010 three more sessions have been held, and the mandate of the open-ended 
intergovernmental working group had been further extended twice in order for it to undertake 
and fulfil its mandate, and it is currently entering its final year with a projected close date of 
August 2017. Following its fourth session, which was held from 27 April to 1 May 2015, the group 
presented its recommendations to the Council at its thirtieth session. Article 21 of the Draft 
Convention proposed to establish rules on individual criminal responsibility. Similarly, as it 
applies to legal entities, the Draft Convention exercises its jurisdiction over individuals through 
the domestic laws of state parties.763 It obliges each state party to take necessary measures 
when: 
(a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State;  
(b) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that State or an aircraft 
registered under the laws of that State at the time the offence is committed; or  
(c) The offence is committed by a national of that State.764  
Although it is not explicit in the above provision, one can assume that Article 21 requires state 
parties to take responsibility for their nationals committing offences not only on their territory, 
but also abroad. This approach is distinct from the majority of domestic regulation, though it is 
in line with the OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries.765 The Draft Convention 
also suggests, although it does not strictly require, that states establish jurisdiction over the 
offences committed against their nationals or permanent residents,766 while Article 23 covers 
                                                 
762 A/HRC/RES/15/26, p. 2. 
763 Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and 
Security Companies, 13 July 2009, (The Draft Convention), Article 21. 
764 Ibid., Article 21 (1) 
765 The OAU Convention called for states to introduce laws forbidding their nationals from engaging in 
mercenary activities. OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, O.A.U. Doc. 
CM/433/Rev. L. Annex 1, 1972, Article 3 (a). 
766 The Draft Convention, Article 21 (2). 
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obligations related to prosecution, ensuring effective remedies for victims.767 The most valuable 
provision relating to individual responsibility stipulates that state parties must ensure that no 
immunity agreement is granted to PMCs and their contractors for violations of international 
human rights law.768 The significance of this passage lies in its direct attempt to eliminate the 
impunity that PMCs and their personnel have enjoyed through granting of protection.769 The 
same clause mentions the enforcement of IHL, however no details are specified on how states 
should go about this process through the premises of domestic judicial systems.  
Today, a number of European Union member states allow for extraterritorial legislation 
concerning human rights by virtue of the application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).770 However, it does not apply outside the ECHR espace juridique,771 which 
therefore significantly limits the scope of its jurisdiction. Also, provided that PMC-caused human 
rights violations are more likely to occur in conflict zones and outside the ECHR founding states’ 
judicial remit, the exact parameters of the ECHR’s extraterritorial reach would ultimately rely on 
individual states’ jurisdiction, and individual extraterritoriality clauses. 
Individual Responsibility under the Montreux Document 
Another significant attempt at regulation of PMCs was initiated by the Swiss Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross in 2005. 
Industry and civil society actors were closely engaged in the process, which comprised five 
                                                 
767 Ibid., Article 23 (1). 
768 The Draft Convention, Article 23 (2). 
769 On immunity mechanisms see: Simpson, G.: Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the 
Reinvention of International Law, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 17. 
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intergovernmental and four expert meetings.772 At the fourth meeting on the ‘Swiss Initiative’ 
in September 2008, the Montreux Document was finalised and adopted by consensus of the 
participating governments.773 Although lacking legally binding standing, the Montreux 
Document outlines obligations and responsibilities that individual PMC directors and employees 
ought to follow. It references contractor obligations under relevant domestic laws, and all 
human rights and IHL provisions imposed upon them nationally.774 According to the Montreux 
Document, the personnel of PMCs are: 
protected as civilians under international humanitarian law, unless they are 
incorporated into the regular armed forces of a State or are members of organized 
armed forces, groups or units under a command responsible to the State; or otherwise 
lose their protection as determined by international humanitarian law.775  
To interpret this statement, unless a PMC forms part of a state’s military, either for various or 
one specific operation, PMC contractors are classified as civilians. The Montreux Document 
subsequently extends IHL protection to an organised group of armed civilians recruited by a 
state, or a non-governmental entity. This protection is, however, revoked if the contractors are 
participating in hostilities.776 Could this be the normative genesis of the legal vacuum that is 
increasingly growing in scale and complexity?   
The Document also offers a very vague provision on superior responsibility, referring to 
government officials, with no particular explanation as to what establishes their superiority over 
PMC employees and PMC directors.777 Furthermore, James Cockayne suggests that this 
provision “sidesteps the difficult question of the nature of the knowledge and intent a superior 
                                                 
772 Cockayne, J.: “Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation, 
Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document” 2009, Vol. 13 (3), Journal of Conflict & Security 
Law, p. 402. 
773 Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Section for International Humanitarian Law, available at 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc. 
774 The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, 17 September 2008, Section E. 
PMSCs and their personnel, paras 22-23, p. 14, available at: 
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776 Ibid., para. 25, p. 14. 
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must possess in order for his or her responsibility to be triggered”,778 as it asserts that superior 
responsibility arises from “effective authority” and “in accordance with the rules of international 
law”779 without explicitly referencing any particular rules or laws. 
Between Civilians and Combatants: Immunity of Private Contractors 
Having reviewed the existing legal frameworks that govern PMC contractors both domestically 
and internationally, an important question arises. Are there any impunity mechanisms that 
would prevent domestic extraterritorial jurisdictions and the international criminal law 
framework provided by the ICC and the ad hoc Tribunals from treating PMC employees in the 
same way as all other civilians in the event of a human rights violation in the context of 
international crimes? Immediately, there appears to be a conflict between the independent 
procedure of the ICC to try grave crimes, and the political influence of the Security Council and 
certain individual states.780 There are currently different immunity mechanisms, such as the 
Forces Agreement between the UK and Afghanistan,781 and the Article 98 agreements782 that 
shield UK and US military personnel from ICC investigations.  
Another source of individual impunity for PMC employees has been legal immunity, provided to 
contractors by the hiring state.783 In Abu Ghraib lawsuits against CACI International784 and Titan 
Corporation (now L-3 Services),785 the US federal court established that “Titan employees 
performed their duties under the direct command and exclusive operational control of the 
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military.”786 Establishing the presence of military control meant that government contractor 
immunity was extended to Titan employees and the plaintiffs’ claims could be pre-empted. 
While CACI employees were found to have operated under a dual chain of command, supervised 
by both military and company managers, the court found CACI employees to have been 
integrated into a military mission, and, therefore, also in possession of government contractor 
immunity. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the defendants on 
11 September 2009.787 
Part 2: State Responsibility 
Why is it important to invoke state responsibility in the context of PMC conduct? First of all, the 
military nature of PMCs sets them apart from other companies, as their business is set up to 
conduct military support operations on behalf of a client. PMC clients are predominantly multi-
national corporations, international organisations, or states. In the case of the former, PMCs are 
likely to provide security for an as extraction business or similar activities. However, when their 
clients are states or international organisations, such as the UN, PMCs are likely to be recruited 
to support military or peacekeeping operations abroad. Contractors would work alongside 
military personnel, fulfilling a number of functions from logistics to military training. This 
proximity to combat and the potential for direct participation in hostilities brings PMCs into a 
grey area of legality and closer to the realm of international armed conflict. PMCs are reliant on 
state contracts to ensure their presence in these areas, and therefore it is crucial to examine the 
extent of state responsibility in this relationship. 
The second reason for state involvement is tied up in the high risk of human rights violations 
associated with PMC operations in conflict and tension zones. In his capacity as the Special 
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Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations, John Ruggie argued that:  
states individually are the primary duty-bearers under international human rights law, 
and collectively they are the trustees of the international human rights regime. 
Therefore, the closer a business enterprise is to the State, or the more it relies on 
statutory authority or taxpayer support, the stronger the State’s policy rationale 
becomes for ensuring that the enterprise respects human rights, quite apart from any 
legal obligations States may have in certain circumstances.788 
In 2001 the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted a complete text of the Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles), together with 
accompanying Commentaries. More specifically, articles 4, 5, 8, 9, and 11 of the ILC cover the 
conditions for attribution of private conduct to the state. The Montreux Document and the Draft 
Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security 
Companies are the industry-specific regulatory bodies that outline the obligations of states who 
hire, host, and domicile PMCs. In addition, the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework 
sets out the guiding principles for states, as well as businesses, to ensure human rights values 
are promoted and followed. Finally, the relationship between a hiring state and the PMC is 
administered by a contract under which both parties are liable. If the terms of the contract are 
breached, the jurisdiction of contract law would apply, adding an extra layer of surveillance and 
legal enforcement to the realm of private forces. On the surface, these regulatory bodies provide 
a comprehensive structure for the state to administer PMC conduct, and for state responsibility 
to be invoked in the event of gross violations by PMCs. This section examines the existing legal 
mechanism with regards to state responsibility, in order to establish the effectiveness of the 
existing regulatory regime.  
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights stipulate that home states should 
require businesses “to respect human rights abroad, especially where the State itself is involved 
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in or supports those businesses.”789 As part of the initiative, a Reporting Framework, created 
and overseen by John Ruggie, was established to help businesses implement and follow the 
Guiding Principles. The section on the State-Business Nexus (principles 6-8) emphasises state 
responsibility under international human rights law,790 and stresses the continued existence of 
such responsibility in the event of outsourcing to a private company.791 While these documents 
promote human rights values in a corporate realm and imply overarching state responsibility 
over the actions of its “formal and informal agencies”, there are some fundamental weaknesses. 
First of all, the major instruments of corporate social responsibility are not legally binding and 
lack punitive mechanisms, or any form of legal enforcement. Second, their regulatory rhetoric 
is significantly undercut by the existing limitations of IL in ascribing responsibility to the state, 
which I explore next.  
1. Gaps in the ILC Articles on Attribution of Conduct 
In order to fully understand the extent and limitations of regulatory frameworks concerning 
PMC conduct, it is first important to consider the relationship between PMCs and their primary 
clients, states. By the nature of their business, PMCs are service providers who operate on behalf 
of a client rather than independently. While PMCs do not have a political agenda, as they carry 
out another party’s strategy, states are seen to increasingly rely on PMCs for provision of 
security, therefore relinquishing some of their power and control. PMCs, on the other hand, 
operate a market for force, keeping a firm hold on the private sources of power. This dynamic 
of supply and demand of security services is administered by two legal frameworks, a contract 
that defines the terms of agreement between a state institution and the PMC, and a set of 
International Law Commission Articles (ILC Articles) that outline the criteria for ascribing private 
conduct to the acts of a state. It is noted in the Guiding Principles that states which privatise the 
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delivery of services should continue to ensure that companies adhere to human rights norms. 
Failure to do so “may entail both reputational and legal consequences for the State itself.”792 
While with the proliferation of neoliberal ideas, privatisation and the outsourcing of numerous 
services became increasingly widespread, certain functions are still considered purely 
governmental. The UN Working Group on Mercenaries asserts that  
certain functions were inherent to the State, for which it retained ultimate responsibility 
regardless of whether or not it outsourced that function. Some inherent State functions 
might not be outsourced, namely direct participation in hostilities in armed conflict, and 
detention and interrogation of prisoners of war, as defined in the Geneva Convention 
of 12 August 1949.793  
Despite this statement, the nature of PMC activity brings companies and their employees into 
conflict zones, where the risk of participation in hostilities is very high. Equally, PMCs like CACI 
International and Titan Corporation (now L-3 Services), were officially contracted by the US 
Government to conduct interrogation and translation services at military prisons in Iraq.794 
According to ILC Articles, “every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
responsibility of that State.”795 ILC Article 4 provides the basic rule of attributing the conduct of 
state organs to the state:  
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any 
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and 
whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of 
the State.796 
In this scenario, the relation to the PMC is irrelevant unless the PMC acts as a state agent, i.e. is 
officially incorporated into the organs of government. Amongst the examples are companies 
such as Sandline and Executive Outcomes whose personnel were enrolled as “Special 
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Constables” on an assignment to Papua New Guinea.797 As seen from the previous section, PMC 
employee incorporation into the military chain of command had been proposed in order to 
extend contractor immunity to CACI and Titan employees. However, state responsibility was not 
invoked, therefore spreading the legal vacuum around PMC activity and fostering impunity. 
ILC Article 5 covers entities that are empowered by the state and are exercising elements of 
governmental authority. For a state to carry responsibility over PMC actions, the PMC must be 
empowered by the state to exercise governmental authority. There is little clarity on what the 
empowerment should look like, besides the fact that only the entities that are empowered by 
internal law can exercise governmental authority.798 While a contract between a state and a 
PMC could be considered an instrument of domestic law, it is the element of empowerment that 
is crucial to attribute private conduct to the state and, therefore, establish responsibility. 
Without a specific empowerment clause, a contract can be reduced to a horizontal service 
agreement between two equal parties. Similarly, ILC Article 8 attributes responsibility to the 
state for conduct carried out under its direction or control. These examples may include 
auxiliaries and volunteers who do not necessarily form part of the armed forces but who are 
authorised by the state to carry out a particular mission.799 When a state deprives an individual 
of liberty, as for example in the case of detention, it takes control over the detainee’s life, rights, 
and conditions. The state, therefore, also yields a heightened level of responsibility to protect 
that individual’s rights.800 Consequently, there is a strong argument to invoke state responsibility 
in situations when detention and correctional facilities have been outsourced to a private 
company, regardless of the contract in force. Nigel White acknowledges that the principles of 
state responsibility are extremely abstract, and “do not concern themselves with practical 
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means and methods of implementation and enforcement.”801 Indeed, the lack of specific 
parameters defining ‘direction and control’ makes it almost impossible to attribute PMC conduct 
to a state. The lack of precedent in historically significant cases like Nicaragua and Tadic 
reinforces states’ impunity when irregular forces are used.  
ILC Articles 9 and 11 prove to be even weaker mechanisms; Article 9 comes into play when the 
private entity is “in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or 
default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those 
elements of authority”, and Article 11 actually requires a state to “acknowledge and adopt the 
conduct in question as its own.” 
The UN Guiding Principles explicitly state that the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights exists independently of state responsibility to fulfil their human rights duties, and, most 
importantly, does not diminish those duties.802 This is distinct from the question of legal liability, 
which remains defined largely by national law provisions in relevant jurisdictions.803 Similarly, 
the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) “does not replace 
the control exercised by Competent Authorities, and does not limit or alter applicable 
international law or relevant national law.”804 This means that neither Human Rights law, nor 
the voluntary industry regulation, can enact the ILC Articles to effectively manage state 
responsibility in the context of private company conduct. Therefore, in practice, the ILC Articles 
provide a weak legal framework for establishing state responsibility over the conduct of a 
contracted PMC.  
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Institutional Responsibility  
While this research does not elaborate in detail on institutional responsibility, it is important to 
mention the core principles and initiatives in this realm. In 2011 the ILC adopted a set of Articles 
on the Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO), ascribing international legal 
personality to international organisations, thereby subjecting them to IL.805 This meant that 
same rules ought to apply to international organisations hiring PMCs as they would to states. 
The UN had previously engaged armed PMCs in selected duty stations as a last resort in 
Afghanistan, Haiti, and Somalia, “in an effort to strengthen the safety and security of its 
personnel and to enable the Organisation to deliver its programmes and mandates in high-risk 
environments.”806 The principles of the deployment and use of private security resources is 
outlined in the UN Policy on Armed Private Security Companies.807 The engagement and use of 
such services is governed by a clear accountability and responsibility framework, and clear 
operational standards and oversight, stipulated in the Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security 
Services from Private Security Companies.808 However, the document only articulates ‘Daily and 
Monthly Operations Reviews’, omitting to explicitly state whether or not the UN is ultimately 
accountable for the private forces they deploy, and who is liable in the event of a violation 
committed by a private contractor. White and McLeod suggest that the absence of an equivalent 
attribution clause in the Draft Articles on Institutional Responsibility may present a legal 
loophole for private military contractors since there is no separate provision for attribution of 
the conduct of individuals.809 So, in principle, institutional responsibility should apply in the same 
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manner as state responsibility. However, if neither state nor the hiring international 
organisation can establish authority, command, and control, then, unless a less stringent test of 
attribution is used, the issue would be considered solely from the perspective of corporate 
responsibility.810 Nonetheless, simply because an international organisation does not exercise 
full control over individual states’ PMC contingents, it should not evade accountability for the 
overall operation and the acts or omissions of PMCs during that operation.811 
In reality, however, the concept of effective control in IL seems to operate on a separate plane 
to that of structural organisation. For example, in its capacity as a US government agent, the CIA 
trained, financed, and organised the Contras to conduct insurgency operations. In the Nicaragua 
case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) required the establishment of ‘effective control’ in 
order to define and attribute responsibility to the American state.812 In the end, there was 
insufficient evidence to establish effective control, and, therefore, a link to the American 
government. Similar logic applies to the UN peacekeeping forces who, on the surface, are far 
less controversial in nature. These forces are supplied to the UN by member states to conduct 
peacekeeping operations. However, IL is constructed in such a way that it hinders the 
establishment of responsibility over these forces and their conduct. A priori, the law itself 
renders the use of these forces problematic, as it defers the act of establishing the accountable 
party. In other words, neither the UN as the ultimate ‘recruiter’ of the peacekeeping troops, nor 
the member states as their ‘provider’, are responsible for their conduct, unless ‘effective 
control’ can be established. In this way, IL promotes a culture of blamelessness and 
irresponsibility for international organisations, states, and corporations, whereby liability is 
established after the fact, rather than at the outset. 
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2. States as PMC Clients and Limitations of Contract Law 
Contract law plays an important part in PMC regulation as it is a necessary element that defines 
the relationship between a PMC, as a service provider, and the state as its client. I therefore 
here explore the role and the limitations posed by contract law in the context of state 
responsibility. The basic principle of modern contract law is based on the compensation of the 
innocent party for moneys lost due to a breach.813 Laura Dickinson identifies contracts as the 
vehicle of military privatisation, and, contrary to Liu, believes that contracts should be used in 
order to transfer the norms of public IL into the private sector.814 In other words, a contract 
between PMCs and their clients can and should be drafted in a way that reflects necessary 
oversight, enforcement, and conduct requirements applicable to private military contractors. 
According to Dickinson, contracts “could resolve any lingering ambiguities about the 
applicability of international human rights and humanitarian law” by incorporating specific 
provisions for training of the personnel, accreditation of the company, etc. Dickinson proposes 
to also include relevant IHL provisions applicable to governmental actors in order to define the 
boundaries of state responsibility at the outset.815 However, it is important to consider the 
relationship that a contract constructs between the state and the private provider of security. 
As a client, the state is reliant on the PMC for provision of security or, in other words, protection. 
Therefore the client’s ability to effectively control a PMC’s behaviour is hamstrung by the nature 
of this relationship.816 Furthermore, when a state enters into a contract with a PMC, it arguably 
loses its hierarchical position of authority and becomes a private party to a contract.817 The 
contract between the state and the PMC, therefore, immunises the state against responsibility 
under ILC Article 8 as the state is no longer seen to be directing or controlling the PMC, instead 
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entering into a ‘horizontal’ agreement where both parties are equal under the construct of a 
contract.818 This is a serious limitation to state responsibility imposed by the structure and the 
nature of contract law.  
While the margins of accountability are an obvious gap, created by current IL and the way the 
ILC Articles are drafted, the inclusion of such a provision would automatically expose the 
government should a PMC commit an act of gross misconduct, a situation that existing IL is 
keeping obscure and undefined. Potential evasion of responsibility is arguably part of the 
rationale for state outsourcing to a private company instead of using uniformed troops, though 
Dickinson does not agree with this argument. Furthermore, her proposal does not negate the 
‘effective control’ argument. Nor does it solve the issue of the horizontal nature of a contract, 
whereby both parties are equal and neither one is subordinate to the other, unless responsibility 
of state is explicitly attributed in the contract. Since liability is defined through agreement, 
contract law has serious limitations, as its rule is restricted to the agreed scope between the 
parties to the contract, becoming a very narrow means of regulating PMCs. Therefore, in the 
event of non-compliance with IHL and human rights, third parties are unable to make a private 
claim as the contract only applies to the contracting parties: the PMC as the service provider, 
and the state as the client. There are numerous exceptions to compensation: “innocent parties 
cannot recover punitive damages, damages for pain and suffering or attorney’s fees. [...] 
[I]nnocent parties are almost assured of not being fully compensated for their losses.”819 To that 
end, Dickinson proposes adjusting the structure of the contract to enable third parties, affected 
by a PMC’s activity, to enforce the terms of the agreement.820 However, the possibility of 
implementing these changes is low due to the breadth of detail that will unravel, should third 
party claims be made possible under contract law. Although Dickinson recognises the likelihood 
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of state objections to increased contractual regulation, she argues that the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility address the gaps of privatisation.821 She deems invalid the argument that states 
use PMCs to avoid accountability, because there are international legal mechanisms that can 
ascribe PMC conduct to the state. As demonstrated above, while these provisions exist in 
principle, their actual applicability is extremely narrow and requires substantial supporting 
evidence, that both states and companies often fail to produce. 
Although contract law has obvious gaps in regulating PMCs, there is no need to rely solely on 
one type of regulation. Contract law should, in turn, serve as a kind of audit to keep the terms 
of the PMC contract in check. While contract law is not subordinate to IL by default, it can 
explicitly articulate the ICoC clauses concerning human rights and overall standards, which is a 
common practice in typical service agreements across a number of sectors. In addition, the 
horizontal nature of state/PMC contracts is a vehicle that enforces PMCs’ position of power. To 
ensure a state’s authority over the means of private violence, the contract ought to explicitly 
state that the client, any entity that is recruiting a PMC, is superior and, therefore, assumes 
overall accountability for the PMC and the actions of its employees, who is the subordinate in 
terms of the contract. If such provisions are not stipulated in the contract, then states and PMCs 
will continue to exist in an equal relationship, circumventing the ILC attribution framework and 
reinforcing PMCs’ claims to power and legitimacy.822   
3. State-Centric Regulation Concerning PMCs  
The Montreux Document  
The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for 
States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict  
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is an intergovernmental document intended to promote respect for IHL and human rights law 
whenever PMCs are present in armed conflicts.823 As of May 2016, the Montreux Document is 
supported by fifty-three states and three international organisations as its signatories.824 The 
Montreux Document is largely state-centric in nature. Its guidelines relate to the obligations of 
a ‘contracting state’ entering into a contract with PMCs; the ‘home state’ where the companies 
are registered; and the ‘territorial state’ where PMCs operate.825 This classification is arguably 
an important soft legal norm that constitutes an explicit recognition by signatory states of a 
specific duty to protect human rights during PMC operation.826 The Document does not create 
any new legal obligations either for states or PMCs, and while it provides guidelines, it is not 
necessarily a step towards a new treaty.827  
Nevertheless, the Document reinforces the narrative of the ILC Articles on attribution of 
responsibility by affirming that “entering into contractual relations does not in itself engage the 
responsibility of Contracting States.”828 The four conditions829 whereby PMC violations are 
considered an act of the state are also consistent with the ILC Articles, and therefore with 
customary IL. The Document’s full title indicates its specific application ‘during armed conflict’. 
However, White argues that PMCs are more likely to be deployed outside of an armed conflict, 
for example, during a post-conflict reconstruction.830 While insisting that PMCs do not operate 
in a legal vacuum, the Montreux Document seeks no binding authority from participating states 
or non-state actors using private security services. It elaborates on different agreements 
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(interstate, belonging to international organisations, national laws, etc.831) that stipulate state 
behaviour in relation to the PMCs. 
To draw upon the historical typologies and the relationship between the form of governance 
and the military force,832 the Montreux Process offers a state-oriented approach to a network-
based private field of activity, rendering its regulation largely ineffective. By offering a normative 
framework for regulated PMC participation in an armed conflict, while at the same time lacking 
legal enforcement, the Document inadvertently normalises and rationalises civilian participation 
in hostilities. A member of the UN WG, Gomez Del Prado believes that the ICRC stamp of 
approval was premature, and that the Document “recognises de facto this new industry and the 
military and security services it provides. It legitimises the services the industry provides, which 
still remain unregulated and unmonitored.”833 In addition, the Montreux Document contains a 
section labelled “PMSCs and their personnel”834 which refers to obligations, yet it makes no 
mention of PMC responsibility as companies. Nevertheless, the Document contains a particular 
provision on superior responsibility that could develop into a valuable precedent for corporate 
criminal responsibility internationally. In September 2008, seventeen states (including the US, 
the UK, China, and South Africa) officially agreed that the idea of superior responsibility, 
grounded in international criminal law, has a potential role in assigning responsibility for 
international crimes to PMC directors and those contracting PMCs.835 According to the 
Montreux Document,  
Superiors of PMSC personnel, such as: a) governmental officials, whether they are 
military commanders or civilian superiors, or b) directors or managers of PMSCs, may 
be liable for crimes under international law committed by PMSC personnel under their 
effective authority and control, as a result of their failure to properly exercise control 
over them, in accordance with the rules of international law. Superior responsibility is 
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not engaged solely by virtue of a contract.836  
While in its current form the Montreux Process focuses predominantly on states, it is important 
to recognise the opportunity it creates for international criminal responsibility for corporations. 
The Draft Convention 
Critical of the over-inclusive nature of the Montreux Document and the self-regulatory profile 
of the Code of Conduct,837 the Working Group proposed a legally binding Draft Convention on 
Private Military and Security Companies (Draft Convention).838 Unlike the Montreux Document, 
that allows for all services to be outsourced to PMC contractors (other than direct participation 
in hostilities), the Draft Convention does not allow for inherently governmental functions to be 
performed by anyone other than the state. 839 Inherent, or “Fundamental State functions” are 
classified in the Definitions of the Draft Convention as: 
functions that a State cannot outsource or delegate to non-State actors. Among such 
functions, consistent with the principle of State monopoly on the use of force, are 
waging war and/or combat operations, taking prisoners, law-making, espionage, 
intelligence and police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention, including 
the interrogation of detainees.840 
Resistance from the UK and the US, as well as from the EU to ratify the Convention, however, is 
not surprising, considering that these states welcome private security providers. The 
relationship between the form of governance and the type of military power used by the state 
comes into play. As highlighted in Chapter 4, countries that follow neoliberal ideals of ‘small 
government’, deregulation, and privatisation are likely to outsource numerous functions and 
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activities, including security. Whereas those states with greater centralisation are less lenient 
towards integration of PMCs as it contradicts their governmental model.  
The Draft Convention is a suppression convention,841 meaning it requires states to establish 
jurisdiction over ‘treaty crimes’ or crimes of ‘international concern’ committed on their territory, 
when extradition is not possible.842 It does, however, offer means of international supervision 
in the form of a Committee on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and 
Security Activities (Oversight Committee).843 Article 4 (1) on state responsibility towards PMCs 
states that “each State party bears responsibility for the military and security activities of PMSCs 
registered or operating in their jurisdiction, whether or not these entities are contracted by the 
State.” This fundamentally contradicts the basic principle that the state is only responsible for 
its own actions. Furthermore, it is not in line with the attribution clauses of the ILC Articles. In 
theory, the Draft Convention attempts to create a firmer legal position on state responsibility. 
In practice, however, it creates a vast discrepancy between existing public IL and an emerging 
treaty, therefore polarising the PMC regulatory space. Failure to explicitly define the parameters 
of secondary levels of responsibility leaves the existing gap in the rules on attribution of conduct 
unfilled. The protection of all human rights under state jurisdiction is the only standing legal 
responsibility that states are bound by in the realm of PMC regulation. This means that the Draft 
Convention does not, in fact, impose any additional responsibility on states using PMCs. 
Furthermore, the Draft Convention is old-fashioned in the sense that it does not consider 
contemporary governmental trends, nor the trends of globalisation and the spread of free 
market principles.844  
                                                 
841 On suppression conventions and human rights see: Boister, N.: “Human Rights Protection in the 
Suppression Conventions” 2002, Vol. 2 (2), Human Rights Law Review, p. 199. 
842 Del Prado, J. L. G.: Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating 
human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, 2 July 2010, 
A/HRC/15/25 Art. 21 (5). 
843 White, Supra, p. 22. 
844 Based on the analysis conducted in chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
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While both the Montreux Document and the Draft Convention outline the obligations of home, 
host, and contracting states, neither process has reached an effective implementation of these 
procedures. Besides the challenge of incompatibility between the legally binding nature of the 
Draft Convention, the contradicting content of the evolving Montreux Process, and the self-
regulating PMC industry, there is a risk of polarisation between party states.845 Two diverging 
regulatory cultures are likely to progress, with PMC-welcoming states endorsing the Montreux 
Process, and the ‘non-aligned’ countries striving for a stricter, more punitive regulation. The 
choice faced by the international community is represented by the two procedures and is 
informed by a deep scholarly division between the advocates of a state-oriented binding 
approach, and those who consider that collective self-regulation regulation and soft norms are 
the key to upholding industry standards and the elimination of human rights violations by the 
PMCs.  
Part 3: Limitations to Corporate Liability 
This section examines the bodies of law that attempt to regulate private military companies as 
corporations, and the ways in which they invoke corporate responsibility. The importance of this 
analysis lies in the problem posed by PMCs’ corporate legal status and the absence of strong 
international criminal accountability mechanisms applicable to legal persons. With state 
responsibility being a highly theoretical matter,846 and individual criminal responsibility only able 
to address PMC contractors or directors, there appears to be a strong case to better understand 
how PMCs, as companies, can be liable for gross human rights violations or crimes of 
international significance. This section assesses both international and domestic regulations that 
claim jurisdiction over corporations and, more importantly, it identifies their weaknesses, 
omissions, and gaps which could lead to corporate impunity.  
                                                 
845 White, Supra, p. 30. 
846 Simpson, supra, p. 56. 
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First, I examine domestic and transnational avenues for invoking criminal and social corporate 
liability. I highlight the key doctrinal and territorial limitations that obstruct access to an effective 
corporate criminal procedure, and provide a number of examples to showcase the disparity of 
PMC and mercenary-specific provisions in a number of domestic legal systems. I continue my 
enquiry into the legal standing of corporate responsibility through the theory and practical 
application of tort law as I analyse a number of recent case studies, whereby PMCs were sued 
as companies, rather than as individual contractors.  
On the international level, I analyse the most recent UN and industry initiatives concerning 
business conduct and proposed best practices. Such non-binding regulatory framework forms 
part of the ‘responsibilisation’ approach and is often referred to as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR).847 I evaluate the unhelpful effects of self-regulatory voluntary bodies, which 
create a false sense of legitimacy and regulation. By applying the concepts of power and 
legitimacy, industry self-regulation is analysed not only as a step towards the commodification 
of security to fit the framework of the free market, but also as an attempt by PMCs to extend 
their authority, by claiming legitimacy in the form of self-regulation.848 Meanwhile, at the other 
end of the spectrum we observe the surfacing of legally binding UN initiatives, actively promoted 
by the Human Rights regime, which attempt to impose stricter controls within the current 
international security landscape. This part also outlines the contemporary challenges of the 
polarised approach to PMC regulation. Competing approaches of ‘responsibilisation’, promoted 
by the industry, and the prospective criminalisation of UN initiatives, are hardly complementary, 
and create a divisive environment that prevents coherent and effective regulation of PMCs. 
                                                 
847 Accounts that consider the relationship between CSR and law: Segerlund, L.: Making Corporate Social 
Responsibility a Global Concern: Norm Construction in a Globalised World, Ashgate, Surrey, 2010; Zerk, 
J.: Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in International 
Law, CUP, Cambridge, 2006; McBarnet, D., Voiculescu, A. and Campbell, T.: The New Corporate 
Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law, CUP, Cambridge, 2009; Olufemi, A. (ed.): 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights and the Law, Routledge, Abingdon, 2011. 
848 Building upon the overall methodology of the thesis. 
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Finally, I highlight the importance of international criminal law (ICL) as an antidote to the 
obstacles posed by other areas of law attempting to regulate criminal corporate responsibility.  
1. Limitations Arising from the Corporate Status of PMCs: Domestic & Transnational Law 
Unlike states and international organisations who are the recognised subjects of IL,849 
corporations fall outside this remit. Nor are they effectively governed by international criminal 
and humanitarian laws concerning genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, applying 
to natural persons.850 The language of criminal law assumes that the state will exercise its 
coercion against the crime committed by one individual over another, leaving corporations 
outside of this paradigm.851 The lack of corporate criminal liability in many legal systems poses 
additional legal obstacles. It is important to explore how corporations fit into a criminal justice 
system. Understanding the reach of criminal law over corporations in different national 
jurisdictions helps us to identify and create a norm and set a precedent for corporate criminal 
liability, both domestically and internationally. It is particularly important in the realm of PMCs, 
where multinational corporations can both be a provider and the client of lethal services, often 
operating transnationally. 
Procedural Obstacles 
The corporate status of the company poses a number of issues to its recognition and treatment 
under criminal law. In countries like France and Germany, for example, the principle of societas 
delinquere non potest – “a legal entity cannot be blameworthy” – long prevented imposition of 
criminal liability at all.852 In Ferguson v. Wilson (1886), Lord Cairns concluded that “a company 
cannot act in its own person for it has no person, it can only act through directors, who are the 
                                                 
849 Akande, supra, p. 251. 
850 Fafo Report, Business and international crimes: assessing the liability of business entities for grave 
violations of international law (2005), p. 19, available at: 
http://www.fafo.no/index.php?option=com_zoo&task=item&item_id=3742&Itemid=927&lang=en. 
851 Wells, C.: Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, OUP, Oxford, 2001, p. 15. 
852 Diskant, supra, p. 129. 
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agents of the company.”853 Described by Viscount Haldane L. C. in the judgement of the civil case 
of Lennard’s Carrying Co. Ltd v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd854 as “an abstraction”, a corporation 
could only bear liability through its agent, who carries out its acting and directing will.855 If 
corporations are understood as inanimate tools run by individuals, the responsibility will be 
placed on natural rather than juridical persons.856 Not only does such an approach pose doctrinal 
obstacles to holding companies criminally liable, it also defeats the purpose of assigning 
corporations with a legal personality.857 A positivist approach creates significant limitations to 
corporate criminal liability, as, according to Kramer, “recognition of the corporation as a legal 
person has largely carried with it protections without the imposition of corresponding 
responsibilities and obligations.”858   
Individuals and corporations alike can bear vicarious liability, when liable for the acts of another, 
or personal, when liable for their own actions. Until 1944 all cases brought forward against 
corporations concerning criminal responsibility in England were based on vicarious liability.859 In 
the context of PMCs, the application of vicarious liability transfers criminal responsibility from 
an individual employee to the corporation itself, while the agent or employee remains 
responsible for the crime committed.860 However, three cases, DPP v. Kent & Sussex Contractors 
Ltd,861 R. v. ICR Haulage Co. Ltd,862 and Moore v. Bresler Ltd,863 demonstrated that companies 
can have direct personal liability, as it was established that acts of certain employees can under 
                                                 
853 Ferguson v. Wilson, 1866, Chamber of Appeals 77, p. 89. 
854 1915, A. C., 705. 
855 1915, A. C., 713. 
856 Moore, M.: Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics, OUP, Oxford, 
2010, pp. 246 -247, p. 623. 
857 Liu, supra, p. 248. 
858 Kramer, R.: “Criminologists and the Social Movement against Corporate Crime” 1989, Vol. 16 (2), 
Social Justice, p. 157. 
859 Pinto and Evans, supra, p. 39. 
860 A/HRC/32/39, p. 19. 
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862 1944, K. B. 551. 
863 1944, 2 K. B. 515. 
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certain circumstances be viewed as the acts of a company itself.864 The doctrinal value of these 
cases lies in their introduction of the ‘doctrine of identification’ to criminal law in the cases of 
personal liability for corporations.865 This meant that the courts recognised that the acts of a 
company’s agents can be viewed as the acts of the company.866  
Criminal liability for a corporation is made problematic by the ‘black letter’ reading of the law. 
For example, it is considered that a company cannot commit murder, because only an individual 
can bear the lawful sentence, life imprisonment, for such crime.867 It is complicated further by 
the definition of homicide, whereby it is understood as “the killing of one human being by 
another human being.”868 The same logic applies to crimes such as bigamy, incest, rape, and 
conspiracy with a company’s sole director. While most jurisdictions stipulate that a company 
cannot commit a murder per se, it can be found guilty as a secondary party.869 Nourse L. J. in 
Odyssey Re (London) Ltd & Another v. OIC Run Off Ltd870 established that “there would be an 
unacceptable shortcoming in company law if evidence given on behalf of a company was 
incapable of being treated as the evidence of the company.” Moreover, legal persons cannot be 
compared to physical individuals like for like. So, why should jurists attempt to apply the same 
jurisdictional methods to these incomparable legal personalities? According to Celia Wells, part 
of the problem arises from attempting to apply the same legal framework to physical and legal 
persons. While the law recognises both individuals and companies, the legal treatment and 
approach to responsibility should be tailored to suit the social construction of both subjects.871 
Criminal law and its liability mechanisms are focused on the individual, and are problematic 
should they be applied to a corporation unchanged. 
                                                 
864 Pinto & Evans, supra, pp. 39-42. 
865 Ibid., p. 44. 
866 Ibid., p. 39. 
867 Ibid., p. 5. 
868 R. v. P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd, 1991, 93 Criminal Appeal Reports, p. 72. 
869 Pinto & Evans, supra, p. 90. 
870 Formerly Sphere Drake Insurance Plc and Orion Insurance Co. Plc, respectively. 
871 Wells, supra, p. 74. 
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In the UK, procedural obstacles of criminal prosecution were addressed by the s. 33 (3) Criminal 
Justice Act 1925, which allowed a corporation to enter a plea through a representative.872 
Furthermore, procedural complexities of corporate indictment were also linked to the need of 
a defendant being present in court. On the practical side, limited budgets and the costs of 
litigation can be an obstacle that discourages public prosecutors from investigating and indicting 
what tend to be complex matters.873 Drawing on the work of John Braithwaite and Brent Fisse,874 
a significant development has been introduced in Australian criminal law to that end. Criminal 
courts can convict companies of offences based on a body corporate’s failure “to create and 
maintain a corporate culture that required compliance with the relevant provision.”875 
In 2007 the UK Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act was published to create a 
new offence in relation to corporate responsibility. It shifted the focus of liability from individual 
guilt to identifying gross negligence in the way a corporation organises and conducts its 
activities. Under the Act, a company could be criminally liable if its conduct “causes a person’s 
death, and amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the 
deceased.”876 As a corporation, a PMC would have a relevant duty of care in regards to its 
contractors in the event of a corporate manslaughter offence. Contract law would establish that 
only parties to a contract can invoke liability as a result of a breach. It is, therefore, debatable 
whether or not a PMC would owe a relevant duty of care to individuals outside of company 
employees. On the other hand, PMCs that are signatory parties to the ICoC commit to upholding 
human rights values. Perhaps it could be argued that this commitment to conduct their activities 
in adherence with human rights values could be sufficient to establish a relevant duty of care in 
regards to non-employees. However, in regards to private military activity a “relevant duty of 
                                                 
872 Pinto & Evans, supra, p. 19. 
873 “Corporate Responsibility for International Crimes”, Chatham House International Law Programme, 
Meeting Summary, 19 May 2015, London, p. 5. 
874 Fisse, B. and Braithwaite, J.: Corporations, Crime and Accountability, CUP, Cambridge, 1993. 
875 Section 12.3(2)(d) Commonwealth Criminal Code Act of 1995, Australia. 
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care” is limited. An offence committed by private military contractors who are incorporated in 
state forces, or if the PMC is contracted by the Ministry of Defence, does not invoke a “relevant 
duty of care” and, therefore, would not be subject to this legislation.877 This example 
demonstrates the complexity and the fundamental inefficacy of overlapping laws and 
regulations concerning PMC activity. As a result, the hard laws prevail, while the human rights 
norms and industry self-regulation create only a veneer of legality.  
Corporate law produces another source of impunity that is highly relevant in the realm of PMCs, 
namely the company law doctrine of “separate corporate personality” that most jurisdictions 
recognise. According to this doctrine, a parent company and its subsidiaries are considered to 
be separate legal entities. Such a construct of legal separation and limited liability allows for 
impunity, commonly referred to as the ‘corporate veil’, whereby a parent company will not be 
held liable for acts or offenses committed by its subsidiary merely on the basis of 
shareholding.878 The Human Rights Council recognises the discrepancies across national 
jurisdictions of parent companies’ legal responsibilities to identify, prevent, and mitigate human 
rights abuses, and acknowledges the associated barriers to remedying them, through added 
legal costs and delays.879 While this liability gap is recognised by Human Rights Law, it is in the 
early stages of development and is currently unable to address the challenges of the corporate 
veil.880  
Criminal responsibility may not apply to other businesses as much as it does to PMCs, whose 
activities and employees have a close connection with hostilities and the use of lethal force. 
Notwithstanding the ascribed legal personality that companies have acquired, the account of 
                                                 
877 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, p. 5. 
878 A/HRC/32/19, Art. 22, p. 9; Schutter, O. D.: “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool for Improving the 
Human Rights Accountability of Transnational Corporations”, December 2006, p. 36, available at: 
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rationality and autonomy, explored by Wells, appears to exclude corporations from the legal 
realm based on the assumption that they are not persons in a metaphysical sense.881 
This juxtaposition between the corporate immunity of societas delinquere non potest and 
deniability of corporate criminal responsibility is one of the origins of PMC (and other company) 
impunity with regards to criminal law. What the PMC legal status could achieve, is the potential 
to attribute responsibility to a legal person. However, without a more granular definition, the 
attribution on its own fails to clarify and solidify the process of holding a corporation liable.882 
Peter French argues that “corporations are not just organised crowds of people [...] they have 
metaphysical-logical identity that does not reduce to a mere sum of human members.”883 When 
examining the nature of PMC activity and the failure to adequately punish significant 
wrongdoings, such as human rights violations or war crimes, this approach becomes extremely 
relevant. Take the infamous Blackwater case, for example. The company committed crimes that 
no one disputes, yet its founder and former CEO moved on to a new endeavour in the same 
sector, while the company itself has been renamed, sold, and then once again renamed. It 
continues to offer military and security services, and, ironically, is also a signatory company to 
the International Code of Conduct. The only outcome of the Nisour Square atrocities is a few 
contractors behind bars, while the company that facilitated the intelligence, the arms, and other 
means, continues to prosper, albeit under a different name. 
Territorial Limitations & Examples of Domestic Jurisdiction on PMCs 
Domestic criminal legal systems are often challenged by the extraterritorial nature of PMC 
activity. For example, the world’s largest private security company, G4S, employs more than 
623,000 people on six different continents, of whom more than three-fifths are in Asia, the 
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Middle East, and Africa.884 When the two components of criminal liability, actus reus (criminal 
act) and mens rea (criminal intent), are identified to be in the same place, the place of the crime 
and, therefore, acting jurisdiction, is straightforward.885 However, when it comes to the 
corporate liability of PMCs, in most scenarios the criminal act would occur in a different country 
to that of the PMC headquarters or incorporation address. In 1988 the Council of Europe urged 
its member states to support the practice of corporate criminal responsibility due to the 
limitations of individual criminal liability of corporate officers, which left a regulatory gap that 
corporate criminal responsibility could fill.886 Although today a number of member states allow 
for extraterritorial legislation concerning human rights, most of the laws do not extend to 
companies.887 
To tackle this gap, the UK enacted the International Criminal Court Act of 2001. While not 
specific to PMCs, it can impose criminal liability on corporations acting both in and outside of 
British territory.888 In addition, the UK Security Industry Authority was set up under the Private 
Security Industry Act 2001, which is “responsible for regulating the private security industry by, 
inter alia, operating a licensing regime for individual security operatives and a voluntary 
approvals scheme for security businesses.”889 In France national legislation encompasses 
corporate criminal liability for businesses that operate abroad. The same legal framework exists 
in Canada, Norway, and the US.890 In the US, “corporations – as entities – can be criminally tried 
and convicted for crimes committed by individual directors, managers, and even low-level 
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employees.”891 While in the US companies are criminally liable and could face criminal 
prosecution, in reality the risk of an actual trial is very low. Edward Diskant explains this 
phenomenon through shifting liability from corporation to individuals. The companies forfeit 
any protections and avoid criminal liability in exchange for agreements to waive their privilege, 
to deny indemnification to employees, and to cease any support provided to those individuals 
under investigation.892 
Since developing the Draft Convention in 2011, the Working Group on the use of mercenaries 
has been conducting a study across a number of states on domestic laws that are aimed 
specifically at regulating private military and security companies.893 For the purposes of the 
review, the WG defined PMCs as “a corporate entity which provides on a compensatory basis 
military and/or security services by physical persons and/or legal entities.”894 To date, it has 
reviewed national legislation of twenty-one African states,895 eight selected countries in Asia 
and the Middle East,896 eight countries in Central America and the Caribbean,897 eight countries 
in South America,898 as well as the US and Switzerland,899 and France, Hungary, and the UK.900 
The study found that, with the exception of South Africa, none of the African, Asian, or Central 
and South American countries reviewed had legislation that covered the export of military or 
security services.901 Equally, French law does not contain relevant provisions on the direct 
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participation of private military and security company personnel in hostilities.902 In the 
meantime, the Belgian legislature revoked provisions for extraterritorial corporate liability in 
2003,903 as a result of the US threat to move the NATO headquarters out of Brussels.904 A similar 
trend was noted in the Spanish legal system, as the Parliament “acted to limit the jurisdiction 
over human rights cases in 2009.”905  
To address the growing numbers of South Africans with military skills and experience offering 
their services abroad in the post-apartheid era, South Africa passed the Regulation of Foreign 
Military Assistance Act No. 15 in 1998, which covers both mercenary activity and private military 
companies.906 While the definition of a ‘mercenary’ in South African legislation differs from that 
in international or regional regulations, it specifically outlaws mercenary activities and “requires 
permission for the rendering of military or security services to a party to an armed conflict or to 
a designated country.”907 When it became known that a number of South African citizens 
participated in a coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea in 2004,908 stronger legislation was 
adopted.909 In 2007, the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities 
in the Country of Armed Conflict Act came into force. The extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Act 
applies to individuals as well as corporations, therefore criminalising both mercenaries or 
private military contractors as well as the companies they work for.910  
                                                 
902 A/HRC/30/34, Art. 28, p. 7. 
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Domestic criminal jurisdictions are often limited by the extraterritorial nature of PMC and 
mercenary activity.911 Even those domestic legal systems that cater for extraterritoriality are 
frequently dependent on transnational cooperation. In the thirtieth session of the HRC as part 
of the open-ended intergovernmental working group (IGWG) the South African delegation 
expressed their disappointment at the lack of cooperation among countries where foreign 
military activities had taken place, which were often those countries involved in the Montreux 
Document and International Code of Conduct processes.912 Non-cooperation renders the 
enforcement of the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act No. 15 of 1998 impossible, and 
the Act itself ineffective. Nonetheless, South Africa has got one of the most (if not the most) 
elaborate and comprehensive domestic legal frameworks to regulate mercenaries and PMCs. 
The country is openly opposed to private security in a military context, and their stance was 
presented in the abovementioned HRC session. The South African delegation suggested that 
“norms should be elaborated in international law to (a) define private military and security 
companies; and (b) hold such companies accountable under international humanitarian and 
international human rights law.”913 
The Swiss draft law on the provision of private security services abroad is one of the most recent 
national efforts to address the issues of PMC regulation. The draft law prohibits selected 
activities, such as direct participation in hostilities in an armed conflict, and the hiring, training, 
and provision of security personnel for direct participation in hostilities. However, it does not 
ban PMCs per se.914 In the US, besides the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act that invokes 
individual criminal responsibility, legislation covers “possible criminal charges under the False 
Claims Act for those private security companies which falsely stated that they were in 
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compliance with the required standard.”915 None of the other states reviewed by the WG have 
appropriate laws or regulations to address military-like activities or PMSCs, nor do they provide 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for companies.916 The laws of the Russian Federation currently do not 
cater for extraterritorial PMC activities. In the HRC’s thirtieth session, the Russian delegation 
argued that this is due to those functions being deemed inherently governmental and only being 
undertaken by state institutions.917 There was no mention of the PMCs registered and domiciled 
on the territory of the Russian Federation, nor was this statement challenged at any point during 
the session.918 The WG plans to continue its enquiry and analysis of domestic legislations with 
the purpose of highlighting the legislative gaps in national jurisdictions and establishing a legally 
binding international regulatory instrument as a way of ensuring consistent regulation.919  
While domestic legal systems are inconsistent and patchy when it comes to corporate 
responsibility and specific PMC provisions, the absence of a strong norm of international 
criminal liability for corporations creates another major regulatory gap. To counter that 
perception and demonstrate strong precedent, a joint project of the International Peace 
Academy and the Norwegian think tank Fafo on Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for 
Grave Violations of International Law (Fafo report) identified the premise for criminal liability 
for corporations in many jurisdictions.920 The report lists contemporary cases brought against 
corporations that were believed to have committed war crimes. Amongst them are cases of 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy921 and Sarei v. Rio,922 whereby the defendant 
corporations are charged with aiding and abetting certain war crimes including military 
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bombings and assaults on civilian targets, torture, rape, and genocide.923 Additionally, the cases 
of Doe v. Unocal, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Wiwa), Bowoto v. Chevron (Bowoto), John 
Does v. Exxon Mobil Corp (Exxon Mobil), Rio Tinto, and Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran Inc.,924 were 
brought forward on the bases of crimes against humanity.925 Also, in Argentina there are 
currently a number of criminal proceedings pending against large Argentine as well as EU and 
US companies concerned with corporate complicity in dictatorship crimes.926 
Limitations of Social Liability in Tort Law  
The corporate identity of PMCs creates a legal gap for regulation. On one hand, corporate law 
assigns juridical personhood to companies, legitimising their status to the extreme of societas 
delinquere non potest. On the other, IL does not characterise corporations as subjects with rights 
and respective responsibilities for their wrongful acts. This challenge is particularly evident in 
the jurisdiction of the Alien Tort Statute. The 1789 Alien Tort Statute (ATS), also known as the 
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), is a piece of legislation that enables US federal courts to assert 
jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”927 As the ATS does not ascribe criminal responsibility, 
legal persons cannot stand criminal trial. Therefore the torts committed by a company, however 
substantial, are limited to being a civil wrong under the ATS.928  
There are a number of cases that were brought specifically against PMCs under the ATS. 
DynCorp was contracted to combat production of illicit drugs in Colombia by aerially spraying 
cocaine and poppy plantations with the herbicide glyphosate. In September 2001 a group of 
bordering Ecuadorian farmers, who claimed to be affected by the spraying, filed a class action 
                                                 
923 Fafo Report, supra, p. 17. 
924 All the above-mentioned cases were heard in the US courts. 
925 Fafo Report, supra, p. 17. 
926 Kaleck and Saage-Maasz, supra. 
927 https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/alien-tort-claims-act-6-30.html. 
928 Liu, supra, p. 266. 
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against the company, known as Arias v. DynCorp. The suit was filed under the ATS, the Torture 
Victim Protection Act (TVPA), and state law claims in US federal court.929 The court found that 
the claims raised by the plaintiffs were outside the scope of the Congressional authorisation of 
DynCorp’s contract.930 In addition, the plaintiffs raised an international legal question, by 
claiming that defendants were operating as a “wilful participant in joint activity with the State 
or its agents”, were “controlled by an agency of the state”, or were “entwined with 
governmental policies.”931 They claimed that the “Defendants’ activity which allegedly caused 
plaintiffs’ harm was cloaked in the authority of the U.S. State Department and the Colombian 
government.”932 In February 2013 the court ruled in favour of the PMC, and the District of 
Columbia judge dismissed all claims.933 However, a parallel complaint (Quinteros v. DynCorp) 
was filed in 2006 by Ecuadorian citizens before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
for the lack of enforcement of a ruling of the Constitutional Court, ordering all relevant ministries 
to adopt all necessary measures to remedy the damage suffered by communities on the 
northern border of Ecuador, as a consequence of the aerial herbicide sprayings on the 
Colombian side of the border, and to prevent further damage from being caused. However, a 
decision on the admissibility of the complaint is still pending.934 Aerial Herbicide Spraying 
(Ecuador v. Colombia) was then brought before the ICJ in March 2008. Ecuador subsequently 
moved to discontinue the case in September 2013, following an agreement between the parties 
“that fully and finally resolves all of Ecuador’s claims against Colombia” in the case.935 
                                                 
929 Arias v. DynCorp, 517 F.Supp.2d 221 (2007), United States District Court, District of Columbia. 
930 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre available at: http://business-
humanrights.org/en/dyncorp-lawsuit-re-colombia-ecuador-0. 
931 Arias v. DynCorp, 517, supra. 
932 Ibid. 
933 Arias v. DynCorp, 752 F.3d 1011 (2014), United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. 
934 The DynCorp Case in Colombia, Environmental Justice Organisations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT), 
August 2015, p. 2, n. 5, available at: http://www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/FS-
47.pdf. 
935 Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colombia), International Court of Justice, No. 2013/20, 17 
September 2013 at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/138/17526.pdf. 
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One of the most infamous and media-covered PMC lawsuits was the Blackwater case of the 16 
September 2007 Baghdad incident. During the proceedings of this case, individual, corporate, 
and state responsibility were examined. From the corporate liability perspective, however, a 
very limited result was achieved. The case was filed under the ATS in a US federal court against 
Blackwater, its parent company The Prince Group, and Blackwater founder and chairman Erik 
Prince. The company was charged with opening fire on unarmed civilians, which constituted 
extrajudicial killings and a war crime.936 In December 2010 Blackwater argued that the US 
government, and not the company itself, should be held accountable for the shooting incident 
because it was providing security to State Department personnel. As demonstrated in the 
previous section, this argument did not stand due to technical grounds, and was thereafter 
dismissed by the court. Blackwater consequently settled the wrongful-death lawsuit out of court 
in 2012 for an undisclosed sum.937 
Despite its capacity to try corporate cases, the extent and capacity of the ATS have been 
hamstrung over the years. First of all, in a 2004 case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the scope of the 
statute was narrowed to include only claims based on fundamental principles of customary IL 
on the basis that they could be incorporated into American federal common law.938 In other 
words, a claimant must bring forward a “cause of action in international law sufficiently 
fundamental to have developed into a customary norm.”939  
Second, historically, there has not been a coherent view on the applicability of the ATS to legal 
persons, and after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. PLC it has reduced significantly. According 
to the claim, Nigerian military and police forces attacked Ogoni villages, committing atrocities 
and looting the property of the residents. Meanwhile the respondents, the Royal Dutch 
                                                 
936 https://business-humanrights.org/en/blackwater-usa-lawsuit-re-16-sep-2007-baghdad-incident-1. 
937 Apuzzo, M.: “Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings” 22 October 2014, The New York 
Times, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html?_r=0. 
938 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
939 Kirshner, supra, p. 9. 
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Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company, aided and abetted these 
offenses by “providing the Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and compensation, as well 
as by allowing the Nigerian military to use respondents’ property as a staging ground for 
attacks.”940  
In 2002 Royal Dutch/Shell was sued in a US Federal court for illegal detention, torture, 
extrajudicial killing, and other violations pursuant to the ATS. The court dismissed the motion in 
2010 on the basis that a direct business relationship between the US and its Nigerian subsidiary 
(the Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria) had not been established in order for ATS to 
apply.941 After numerous appeals, the Second Circuit dismissed the entire complaint in 2013, 
reasoning that the law of nations does not recognise corporate liability.942 Judge Cabranes’s 
statement in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. PLC provides a strong normative insight 
regarding the readiness of US courts to arbitrate corporate responsibility. He concluded that 
“modern international tribunals make it abundantly clear that, since Nuremberg, the concept of 
corporate liability for violations of customary international law has not even begun to ‘ripen’ 
into a universally accepted norm of international law.”943 
In principle, corporate liability under ATS is permissible, but the statute cannot be breached by 
private action alone without the ‘colour of law’.944 There is a requirement for a related state 
action to be established in order to punish a corporate entity under the ATS. This provision 
immunises corporations that directly violate human rights, reducing PMC responsibility to the 
mode of complicity and liability as an accessory. Furthermore, the liability of a state actor is 
undercut by sovereign immunity that the state could choose to extend to the PMC in question.945 
                                                 
940 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S. (2013), p. 2, available at: 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/10-1491_l6gn.pdf. 
941 https://business-humanrights.org/en/shell-lawsuit-re-nigeria-kiobel-wiwa#c9306. 
942 569 U.S. (2013), supra, p. 3. 
943 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. PLC, 2010, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
p.137. 
944 Liu, supra, p. 280. 
945 Ibid., p. 281. 
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Finally, the ATS is not fit to address human rights violations by PMCs. The structure of its 
jurisdiction only allows for social/civil liability, which practically reduces gross criminal violations 
to mere civil wrongs that can be financially reimbursed. To paraphrase James Stewart, if former 
military and political leaders indicted at the ICC for war crimes deserve criminal punishment, 
how can a company, that participated in the same crimes, circumvent criminal charges simply 
by paying a fine?946 
The concept of prosecuting a legal entity is a difficult task, as it could only be found liable to the 
extent that the actions of an employee could be in fact attributed to the corporation. This poses 
significant evidentiary challenges when dealing with corporate criminal liability.947 However, 
according to Liu, if corporate liability is excluded from the ATS it would not only immunise 
corporations, but also their profit-making through the violation of human rights.948 The issue of 
war economies is a separate international legal gap, as there is no general rule against economic 
pursuit in armed conflict. As Kaleck and Saage-Maasz put it, “profiting from armed conflict is not 
forbidden under international law.”949 Although on the surface the ATS and the TVPA appear to 
have the potential to invoke PMC liability, the legislation of both is very narrow and conditional 
in their current form. As such, all extraterritorial claims are excluded from the ATS’s jurisdiction, 
while TVPA liability is limited to natural persons and does not extend to corporations. 
While such legal practice sets a precedent for multinational corporations who hire PMCs, if 
considered under IL, the limitation of ‘effective control’ arises. Furthermore, as the court 
judgements swayed in favour of the corporations, the cases brought against private military 
companies do not set a strong precedent for international criminal responsibility for companies 
that enter into force. Nonetheless, academic and legal coverage of these cases helps to create 
                                                 
946 Stewart, supra, p. 55. 
947 Fafo Report, supra, p. 14. 
948 Liu, supra, p. 272. 
949 Taylor, M.B.: “Unchartered Territory” 22 April 2015, Fafo Research Foundation, available at: 
http://jamesgstewart.com/uncharted-territory/. 
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a new historical narrative which is an important first step towards formulating corporate 
responsibility and ending impunity.950 PMCs may not have declared wars and initiated hostilities 
but, due to the nature of their business, they have and are capable of perpetrating serious 
human rights abuses. There is, therefore, a need for criminal corporate responsibility because 
states would not be responsible for every offence committed by PMCs they hire, and individual 
responsibility does not prevent the company from continuing to conduct their business, and 
potentially committing future crimes. 
2. Limitations of International Regulation  
Under current IL, corporate liability of PMCs predominantly exists in the form of voluntary, self-
regulatory industry standards, such as the International Code of Conduct (ICoC), the Montreux 
Document, or the Human Rights driven initiatives, such as the UN guidelines aimed at 
implementing the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Broadly characterised in this 
thesis as the ‘responsibilisation’ approach, these voluntary norms and standards are created by 
the industry to invoke corporate social responsibility (CSR). As argued by Edwin Mujih951 and 
Saleem Sheikh,952 the lack of an authoritative definition of the concept of CSR poses a problem 
to understanding its legal application. CSR can broadly be understood as a corporation’s 
responsibility to be socially aware, ensuring plausible working standards for its employees and 
their families,953 ethical conduct towards society and the company’s stakeholders954 beyond the 
maximisation of profit, and basic regulatory standards with the purpose of making a positive 
                                                 
950 Kaleck and Saage-Maasz, supra. 
951 Mujih, E.C.: Regulating Multinationals in Developing Countries: A Conceptual and Legal Framework 
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Engagement, Kumarian Press, 1999, p. 32. 
954 Watts, P. and Holme, Lord: Meeting Social Expectations: Corporate Social Responsibility, World 
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contribution to the society.955 What CSR implies in the context of my argument and beyond the 
mere need for punishing corporate misconduct is that companies have established such an 
extent of power and governing authority that, just like states and international actors, they 
ought to carry a responsibility equivalent to their status and the scope of their activity.956 While 
the non-binding ‘responsibilisation’ approach currently dominates the stage of PMC regulation, 
a pressing need to recognise international criminal responsibility for corporations is driving the 
development of legally binding instruments. In this section I explore the challenges that CSR 
poses to PMC regulation and consider the narrative it creates for the legitimacy of international 
corporations in the private military sector. I also analyse the implications of simultaneously 
emerging criminalisation and ‘responsibilisation’ approaches, and what this polarisation means 
for the future of PMC regulation. 
Industry-Driven Regulation: the ICoC, the Montreux Document and Other Industry Bodies 
On the international level, the most prominent PMC regulation emerges from the industry itself. 
Amongst a number of industry standards, the ICoC is the most relevant regulatory body 
specifically focusing on private security providers. The ICoC is an international, industry-driven 
initiative that originated from a 2005 Swiss Federal Council report on private military and 
security companies that “recommended pursuing further dialogue and action in this area.”957 
While based on the Montreux Process, its purpose and content are aimed at businesses, rather 
than states. It is also administered by the industry, making it a self-regulatory body. The purpose 
of the ICoC is to set out a range of industry-developed principles and standards to guide PMCs 
on matters of international human rights and humanitarian law: 
Signatory Companies will exercise due diligence to ensure compliance with the law and 
                                                 
955 Khan, F.: “Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy” 1997, 
Vol. 44 (3), UCLA Law Review, p. 628; Slaughter, C.: “Corporate Social Responsibility: A New Perspective” 
1997, Vol. 18 (10), The Company Lawyer, p. 321. 
956 Drawing on the concepts of power and legitimacy as per the historical chapters of the thesis. 
957 ICoC, p. 5. 
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with the principles contained in this Code, and will respect the human rights of persons 
they come into contact with, including, the rights to freedom of expression, association, 
and peaceful assembly and against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy or 
deprivation of property.958 
Furthermore, the Code stipulates that signatory companies must comply with the outlined 
grievances procedures,959 as well as ensure that they have “sufficient financial capacity in place 
at all times to meet reasonably anticipated commercial liabilities for damages to any person in 
respect of personal injury, death or damage to property.”960 The issue arising from this liability 
clause is the implication that human rights violations can be mitigated or punished through a 
financial settlement. In other words, if a company is found to have committed a human rights 
offence that under the ICoC is considered inadmissible, this company would have to undergo a 
self-imposed grievance procedure, and, as a result, establish the amount of a ‘reasonable’ 
financial damage, while not being legally bound to do so. 
While the Code states that “the procedures must allow complaints to be brought by personnel 
or third parties”,961 the only practical repercussions against violations of the Code is aimed at 
PMC personnel and could result in dismissal.962 The ICoC contains provisions concerning PMC 
respect for human rights and mandates that “Signatory Companies will adhere to the Code 
whether or not the Code is included in a contractual agreement with a Client.”963 However, 
another conflict of regulation arises. According to contract law, the contracting party is obliged 
to follow only those provisions that are explicitly listed in the contract. In other words, if the 
human rights provisions are not stated in the contract, the client cannot expect them to be 
adhered to.964 The concluding paragraph in the liability section reinforces this point, stating that 
the provisions listed in the Code cannot replace or override any contractual requirements or 
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specific Company policies or procedures concerning wrongdoings.965 This provision presents a 
moot point, as it highlights the obvious fact of a legally binding contract between a PMC and its 
client prevailing over a set of voluntary norms. In September 2013 the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association was established. While the aim of 
this external governance and oversight mechanism was to improve accountability in the sector 
and provide a forum for third party complaints, currently the Association does not have the 
necessary resources to fulfil this opportunity.966 
The language used in the ICoC is extremely important as it inflates the legal significance of the 
document. The ICoC creates a false sense of legitimacy by referencing IHL and including extracts 
from the Rome Statute on the definition of war crimes.967 Despite its legitimising framework, 
the ICoC currently lists over 700 companies, including the above-mentioned DynCorp and Xe 
(formerly Blackwater).968 In analysing the future of PMC impunity, scholars like Liu and White 
are concerned with the effectiveness of self-regulation, suggesting that the industry would 
create the appearance of regulation, and could even prevent other, more robust, enforcement 
mechanisms from emerging in the realm. While Liu acknowledges that self-regulation could lead 
to greater compliance to industry standards, he notes that its extra-legal nature leaves the 
question of PMC accountability unresolved.  
Self-regulation raises another important issue in the context of a changing governance, a 
method developed throughout this thesis.969 Since the 1980s states have been transferring 
functions and services to the private sector through privatisation and outsourcing. The 
companies that have subsequently taken on the functions formerly owned by states have also 
                                                 
965 ICoC, para. 68, p. 53. 
966 A/HRC/32/39, p. 11. 
967 ICoC, pp. 27-31. 
968 708 as of 1 October 2013, see: https://business-humanrights.org/en/conflict-peace/special-
initiatives/initatives-on-private-military-security-companies/international-code-of-conduct-for-private-
security-service-providers-icoc-a-process-aimed-at. 
969 See chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
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inadvertently acquired a form of governance. In the case of PMCs, we can trace the shift in 
governance from the state to a corporation, whereby PMCs perform the bureaucratic functions 
of logistics, organising security operations, training and, ultimately, killing. Along with the 
military power that these companies possess, PMCs are also making claims to a form of 
legitimacy by establishing a self-governing body that is being recognised by the industry, but 
also by states and international organisations. 
Other Industry Bodies 
Although the norms of corporate responsibility vary across states and industries, the human 
rights regime has been urging corporations to respect human rights in their conduct.970 
Regulating companies on human rights grounds commenced as early as the mid-nineties. 
Established in 1999, the UN Global Compact (GC) is a network of corporate and civil society 
participants, all of whom work with the freestanding Global Compact Office and a variety of UN 
agencies.971 The GC was formed as a result of public scrutiny relating to Nike’s use of child labour 
and general poor employment conditions, in order to promote the principles of human rights 
across businesses.972 The military, security, and defence sectors appear to be omitted from 
categories of participating companies.973  
The OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are an instrument of Corporate Social 
Responsibility and consist of recommendations regarding social and environmental standards. 
The Guidelines are voluntary in nature and limited in scope.974 The standards apply to 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) based in OECD states, which in turn agree to promote 
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observance of the Guidelines among MNEs and ‘good practice’ in the spheres of human rights, 
labour standards, and the environment.975  
A very recent development by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the Toolkit for Addressing 
Security and Human Rights Challenges in Complex Environments.976 The Toolkit is a guidance 
document which addresses real-life security and human rights challenges identified through 
engagement with many stakeholders. For each listed “Challenge”, the Toolkit outlines good 
practice and recommendations, offering practical tools such as checklists, templates, and case 
studies.977  
In September 2015 the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) published its new 
Management System for Private Security Operations: Requirements with Guidance (ISO 
18788).978 It provides PMCs and their clients with a business and risk management framework 
ensuring compliance with law, human rights, and relevant voluntary regulatory measures ISO is 
party to. ISO standards have earned a strong and healthy reputation across a number of 
corporate sectors, from finance to manufacturing.979 While the industry alone is not robust 
enough to regulate private military providers and invoke corporate responsibility, it could form 
a solid complementary foundation for standards and measures of quality. If PMCs are required 
to obtain ISO certification before they can contract out their services, this could replace the 
vague vetting process of the UN Guiding Principles and help standardisation across the sector.  
As different regulatory standards emerge, it is important to consider the possible effects on the 
PMCs themselves and what the practical results may be. During the HRC’s thirtieth session, 
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Paul Gibson, Director of the Security in Complex Environments Group, raised a significant point, 
highlighting the PMC perspective on emerging and future regulation and associated costs. He 
recalled that PMCs are profit-driven businesses, therefore any regulatory endeavours should be 
financially viable for PMCs to comply with. In other words, it is “important that the costs of 
increasing regulation should not make companies uncompetitive – so as not to penalise those 
who wished to comply.”980 
The Human Rights Regime: UN Guiding Principles, UN Resolution 26/9, UN Draft Convention 
The Human Rights regime has arguably been the most active area of IL in developing a range of 
initiatives to address corporate impunity. Although the work of the Human Rights Council and 
various working groups has been extensive and multi-faceted, no legally binding mechanisms 
have been established to date. In 2011 the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
were approved. The HRC endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4. The previous 
section discussed their role in regards to state responsibility and human rights. As this section 
focuses on corporate liability, I examine the second pillar of the Guiding Principles, namely “the 
role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society performing specialized functions, 
required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights.”981 
The Guiding Principles address the responsibilities of states and corporations and require them 
to respect, protect, and comply with all applicable laws to uphold human rights. They further 
acknowledge corporate responsibility to respect human rights and stress that it exists 
independently of a state’s responsibility to fulfil their human rights duties, and, most 
importantly, does not diminish those duties.982 They also highlight the lack of clarity in corporate 
law regarding the human rights requirements for companies: “laws and policies in this area 
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should provide sufficient guidance to enable enterprises to respect human rights, with due 
regard to the role of existing governance structures such as corporate boards.”983 Reference to 
the ‘governance structures’ resonates with the overall argument of this thesis concerned with 
developing a regulation that would be more aware and adaptable to the changing forms of 
power and legitimacy not only amongst states, but also corporations. Having acknowledged that 
the risk of human rights violations is higher in areas affected by conflict, the guidelines propose 
an increased state presence in the form of identifying and monitoring the risks; denying access 
to public support and services to a business that is found to have violated human rights; and 
ensuring adequate liability mechanisms are in place.984  
Nevertheless, the premise of the Guiding Principles does not build a strong foundation for 
corporate liability. The guidelines do not mention an adequate vetting process that ought to be 
undertaken by the state prior to engaging a PMC, nor do they stipulate for human rights 
provisions to be explicitly incorporated into the terms of the contract. The Principles 
misleadingly point to the provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC when discussing the sources 
of corporate criminal liability for companies, while in fact referring to national jurisdictions.985 
As a response to the shortcomings of the Guiding Principles, the HRC established an “open-
ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights.”986 The IGWG was launched to consider the possibility 
of developing an international regulatory framework, including the option of drafting a legally 
binding instrument on the regulation, monitoring, and oversight of private military and security 
companies.987 The resolution instructs the IGWG to create a legally binding international 
instrument to increase corporate accountability and ensure access to remedy for victims of 
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business-related human rights abuse. Although the resolution was passed, out of the five 
permanent UN member states only China and Russia were in favour its adoption. A number of 
delegations expressed their opinion that the Guiding Principles  
did not get to the core of the discussion on maximum protection of human rights and 
access to remedies, and that a complementary international instrument was needed in 
order to strengthen national capabilities to ensure human rights protection in the 
domestic sphere.988  
Furthermore, there was a lack of consensus as to what the main focus of the IGWG should be, 
the implementation of the legally binding instrument or the Guiding Principles. While the overall 
strategy is yet to be defined, its current form appears to have some notable gaps. The treaty is 
limited to gross violations, therefore not covering other types of corporate human rights abuses. 
With its main focus on transnational corporations, the resolution does not apply to national 
companies, and currently does not provide a definition of what exactly is considered a 
transnational organisation.989 It is also currently not clear whether the instrument would define 
available remedies and access to those remedies if states fail to act on obligations, or if it would 
focus on establishing corporate liability, or both.990 Importantly, the special nature of PMCs was 
called out by a group of NGOs during the session. Referring to corporate impunity, they argued 
that states and international organisations should not extend any kind of immunity to PMCs that 
would allow them to escape corporate liability or limit access to remedy for victims.991 This point 
is particularly relevant in the light of a fundamental shift in the balance of power between 
corporations and states, driven in particular by the rise of new technologies that facilitate cross-
border management of companies and deregulation across multiple sectors.992 Even at the UN 
level there is a general polarisation between the ‘responsibilisation’ and criminalisation 
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approaches to regulation. While the IGWG insists that the legally binding instrument will be 
designed to complement the Guiding Principles, there is a lack of coherence in the overall UN 
approach. The proposed instrument was more of an afterthought in the absence of a legally 
binding mechanism to invoke company liability.  
UN Draft Convention  
To evaluate PMC-specific UN regulatory efforts I now examine the applicability of the Draft 
Convention to corporations. The Draft Convention is designed to be a binding legal mechanism 
that would apply to all states that are party to the treaty. Although Article 20 includes provisions 
covering corporate liability, it does not specify direct liability provisions for PMCs. Instead, it 
requires each state party to implement national legislation that allows the affected party to 
make a complaint.993 Whether criminal, civil, or administrative,994 the liability is to be 
determined at state discretion and in line with state party domestic legal principles.995 While this 
provision clearly shows that the Draft Convention supports criminal corporate responsibility in 
principle, the lack of uniformity and reliance on domestic law is likely to create a disparate 
practice. This could also lead to PMCs choosing to register their company in home states that 
have weak or no corporate liability laws in order to continue operating in a legal vacuum. These 
provisions do not negate contractor individual criminal liability for committing the offences in 
questions.996 Finally,  
Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance 
with this article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-
criminal sanctions, including fines, economic sanctions, prohibitions of further 
employment, obligation to provide restitution and/or compensation to the victims.997 
                                                 
993 Draft Convention, Article 20 (1) Liability of legal persons and entities. 
994 Or a combination of all three. 
995 Draft Convention, Article 20 (2). 
996 Ibid., Article 20 (3). 
997 Ibid., Article 20 (4). 
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This provision bears great relevance and importance, as it actually mentions tangible 
consequences that companies could be facing if found guilty of an offence. These are adequate, 
measurable, and applicable to corporations in the same way that criminal punishment is 
applicable to individuals. This provision goes beyond a mere financial penalty, and could 
arguably be a proportionate punishment for human rights violations. However, by instructing 
each state party to assume accountability for corporations and adequate jurisdiction over their 
actions, the Draft Convention inadvertently distances itself from identifying and placing 
responsibility directly on the companies. According to Nigel White, by not addressing PMCs, the 
Draft Convention reveals the weaknesses of IL.998 The fact that it does not recognise companies 
as independent bearers of responsibility could add another barrier to the formation of 
international corporate liability. 
Article 20 exactly mirrors the wording of Article 10 of the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime,999 issued in 2004. Reference to legal persons also features in Article 31 on 
Prevention, as it instructs all state parties to take necessary measures to “reduce existing or 
future opportunities for organized criminal groups to participate in lawful markets with the 
proceeds of crime, through appropriate legislative, administrative or other measures.”1000 Such 
prevention measures would include establishing public records on companies that committed 
an offence and temporary disqualification of company directors, also to be included in the public 
record.1001 Public shaming of this kind could in fact serve as an effective regulatory mechanism, 
potentially preventing PMCs from misconduct. As profit-driven companies, PMCs have to 
manage their reputational risk, as in an overflowed security market bad press can cost PMCs 
                                                 
998 White, supra, p. 29. 
999 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, 2004, 
available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-
crime/UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PR
OTOCOLS_THERETO.pdf. 
1000 Ibid., Article 31 (2). 
1001 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Article 31 (2)(d)(i)-(iii). 
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their business. Nonetheless, the above argument applies, and all the above-mentioned 
enforcement mechanisms first depend on states ratifying the treaty and, second, are subject to 
domestic jurisdiction concerning legal entities. 
The Draft Convention remains at an early stage of its formulation, as no accord has been reached 
in its regard amongst the UN intergovernmental working group.1002 To visualise the difficulties 
of obtaining consensus on the Draft Convention, it is enough to recall that, to date, only thirty-
five states have ratified the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries, which would be a logical first step and a sign of 
endorsement of the WG’s strategy on the part of the states. In practice, the Draft Convention is 
diametrically opposed to the ICoC self-regulating non-binding principles.  
The co-existence of these regulatory mechanisms is problematic as it puts policy choice at a 
crossroad. The issue may not be immediate, as each address a different audience, with the Draft 
Convention aimed at states, and the ICoC at the industry. However, in the long term the 
opposing approaches to PMC regulation are likely to create a divide and prevent the 
development of coherent norms and standards internationally. The polarisation of regulatory 
models is challenging and is unlikely to produce a coherent solution for PMC regulation. 
According to White, “states connected to the industry are more likely to stick with and entrench 
the Montreux Process, and those opposed to PMCs as a modern form of mercenarism are more 
likely to support the Draft Convention process.”1003 The same applies to the companies 
themselves, so, unless a domestic legal system has reach over unlawful PMC activity, there is no 
legally binding way to invoke corporate liability. 
 
                                                 
1002 A/HRC/30/47, Art. 39, p. 11. 
1003 White, N.: “The Privatisation of Military and Security Functions and Human Rights: Comments on the 
UN Working Group’s Draft Convention” 2011, Vol. 11 (1), Human Rights Law Review, p. 150. 
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Conclusion 
While there is a need to ensure parity of legal obligation for corporations, currently prospective 
international codification of corporate criminal liability is made problematic by the 
inconsistencies across national legislation. Nonetheless, there is a strong scholarly and case-
based demand for corporate liability that cannot and will not be left unnoticed. As Andrew 
Clapham argues,  
as long as we admit that individuals have rights and duties under customary 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, we have to admit 
that legal persons also have the necessary international legal personality to enjoy some 
of these rights and conversely be prosecuted or held accountable for violations of their 
international duties.1004  
Therefore, any corporation, including PMCs, should be accountable for any breaches of IL, in 
particular war crimes and violations of human rights.1005 The existing legally binding 
mechanisms, such as domestic criminal jurisdictions and the Alien Tort Statute, are insufficiently 
effective to address the international extent of corporate criminal liability. By establishing a 
presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ATS, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
significantly reduced the reach of the Statute. It found that this presumption may only be 
bypassed if the alleged tort sufficiently touches and concerns the United States.1006 
Furthermore, the ATS “allows federal courts to recognise certain causes of action based on 
sufficiently definite norms of international law.”1007 
                                                 
1004 Clapham, A. “The Questions of Jurisdiction under International Criminal Law over Legal Persons: 
Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court” in Kamminga, M. T. and Zia-
Zarifi, S. (eds): Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law, The Hague, Kluwer, 2000, 
pp. 139, 190. 
1005 Stewart, supra, pp. 1-78; see also Stewart’s work on corporate accountability and criminal justice at: 
http://jamesgstewart.com/category/blog/corporate-accountability/; White, N. and MacLeod, S.: "EU 
Operations and Private Military Contractors: Issues of Corporate and Institutional Responsibility" 2008, 
Vol. 19 (5), European Journal of International Law, p. 967. 
1006 “Corporate Responsibility for International Crimes”, Chatham House International Law Programme, 
Meeting Summary, 19 May 2015, London, pp. 3-4. 
1007 569 U.S. (2013), supra, p. 5. 
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The work of the UN Human Rights Council has been extensive and elaborate. The IGWG 
intelligently identified the gaps in corporate liability, while the WG on mercenaries is working 
towards a consensus on the possible Draft Convention. The intensity and breadth of HRC activity 
supports the Special Rapporteur’s claim that “the extraterritorial applicability of human rights 
law, and specifically human rights treaties, is crucial to the regulation of the sector.”1008 
However, according to James Stewart, basic notions of retributive justice stipulate that the 
Business and Human Rights movements cannot erase past offences “out of a laudable 
commitment to future compliance.”1009 In other words, a former serial murderer cannot avoid 
responsibility by discontinuing their criminal conduct and claiming compliance. Nor should this 
method be extended to corporations. Equally, the liability gap that fosters the corporate veil 
cannot currently be mitigated by Human Rights Law.  
With the extraterritorial scope of the ATS recently limited, and the industry bodies as well as 
Human Rights Law setting the standards and providing guidance only, there is a need for an 
alternative avenue that would allow for extraterritorial claims to be pursued against 
corporations for international crimes. PMCs are different from other corporations on the basis 
of the military nature of their activity. Even if mercenarism was to be criminalised and the issue 
of contractor participation in hostilities addressed, PMCs continue to support military 
operations and operate in highly sensitive and risky environments. As such, the nature of PMC 
activity increases the risk of serious offences, including human rights violations. Finally, the 
imbalance created by the horizontal nature of the contracts and states’ reliance on PMCs for 
provision of security rationalises the self-regulation of the private security industry. This newly 
acquired governance of PMCs signals, in turn, the need for a mechanism that could invoke 
corporate responsibility. 
                                                 
1008 A/HRC/32/39, p. 19. 
1009 Stewart, supra, pp. 66-67. 
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Therefore, it is important to establish criminal responsibility for PMCs on a company level, and 
not just for individual contractors and directors. Furthermore, since PMC activity is largely extra-
territorial, with almost all contracts based outside of the home state, this signals a need for 
international criminal corporate responsibility. Having examined existing fora that attempt to 
address the issues of corporate impunity, it appears that international criminal law could offer 
a more effective regulatory answer to the PMC-specific challenges of corporate liability. Unlike 
the self-regulation by the industry and other voluntary initiatives, international criminal law 
provides a binding legal framework that is highly relevant in the context of high-risk PMC activity. 
Establishing international criminal responsibility would also help drive the standards of 
corporations concerned with military activity; this includes, but is not limited to, the arms trade, 
the production of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, PMCs, etc. It would also add 
gravitas to the ILC Articles on attribution of conduct to the state, therefore strengthening the 
case for invoking state responsibility where human rights violations occur as a result of PMC 
transgression.   
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Chapter 6 
International Criminal Responsibility for Corporations 
Although corporations do not currently possess an international legal personality, in other 
words, they are not considered to be actors under international law (IL), PMC activity extends 
internationally. Therefore, PMC regulation has to be considered an international issue where 
the military and civilian realms meet and overlap. International criminal responsibility for PMCs 
is required for a number of reasons. Having analysed existing regulatory bodies and legal 
frameworks that are tasked with PMC regulation, it became apparent that none of them take 
into consideration the mode of global governance that private military actors operate in. Social 
liability is not sufficient to address gross human rights violations, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity. While there are numerous self-regulatory industry bodies that claim to raise the 
standards of PMC services and spread human rights awareness, they cannot tackle serious 
violations adequately or bring justice to victims. Although a rapidly developing field, domestic 
criminal corporate responsibility is disparate and territorially restricted. Moreover, PMCs are 
different to other corporations due to the military nature of their activity, and therefore should 
be treated with greater scrutiny. Finally, the formulation of international criminal liability for 
corporations would reinforce state responsibility and drive down impunity for PMCs. This, in 
turn, will ensure a more efficient and controlled use of private military resources by states and 
international organisations. 
One of many practical advantages of using international criminal law (ICL) and universal 
jurisdiction (UJ) as criminalisation tools is that these avenues allow for the trial of international 
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crimes potentially committed by PMCs, such as war crimes1010 and crimes against humanity. 
Neither the International Law Commission nor the ICC are competent for the international 
criminal regulation of companies. To better understand this phenomenon and to evaluate the 
potential trend of international corporate criminal responsibility into the future, I will introduce 
a brief historical background on the formation of the concept of corporate responsibility. 
Part 1: International Criminal Law and Corporate Responsibility 
Historically, the main purpose of IL was to regulate relations between states. As principal actors, 
states were sanctioned in the event of violation of norms or treaties through political, economic, 
or territorial measures.1011 This was the case until the end of WW2, when the idea of 
international criminal responsibility for individuals materialised through the establishment of 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals.1012 Unlike individuals and states, who can be tried 
at the ICC (and the ad hoc Tribunals) and the International Court of Justice respectively, 
corporations cannot be held criminally liable on an international level. Equally, the UJ doctrine 
has only ever been applied to natural rather than legal persons. However, the international legal 
personality of companies has developed over a lengthy period of time. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, the British and Dutch East India Companies operated as sovereign entities managing 
their respective empires abroad as early as the seventeenth century. On the basis of Royal 
Charters these companies exercised key governmental functions, including local administration, 
tax collection, and the control of armed forces. The British East India Company had “the right to 
have its contracts treated as international treaties and the right to make war”.1013 As a result, 
                                                 
1010 Due to PMC’s civilian status, it is unlikely that their conduct can be considered as part of an 
international conflict. Article 3 in each of the 1949 Conventions provides a description of war crimes 
that are applicable to non-international conflicts. 
1011 Zolo, D.: Victors’ Justice: From Nuremberg to Baghdad, Verso, London, 2009, Introduction: p. ix; also: 
Germany following the Treaty of Versailles; a more recent example is the US in the Nicaragua case. 
1012 Nuremberg Prosecutor Jackson claimed there was precedent for the idea of individual criminal 
responsibility under customary IL in cases of piracy, see: Lauterpacht, H.: “The Law of Nations and 
Punishment of War Crimes” 1944, Vol. 21, British Yearbook of International Law, pp. 61, 64; Heller-
Roazen, D.: The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations, Zone Books, New York, 2009. 
1013 Garrett, A.: “The Corporation as Sovereign” 2008, Vol. 60 (1), Maine Law Review, p. 133. 
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some scholars have evoked the international corporate personality of the East India Companies 
as a valid precedent and norm to promote the establishment of international corporate criminal 
responsibility.1014  
Cameron and Chetail believe that the Nuremberg Trials provide grounds for a theory of 
corporate criminal liability.1015 According to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal,  
in cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the 
competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals 
to trial for membership therein before national, military or occupation courts.1016  
The criminality of corporations was, therefore, used in order to establish individual criminal 
responsibility.1017 Contrary to Cameron and Chetail, Liu evokes the Nuremberg Trials as he traces 
the normative roots of corporate impunity. He argues that by criminalising civilian industry 
leaders of German arms production rather than the corporations that facilitated the war crimes, 
the Nuremberg international legal proceedings set the precedent in favour of individual criminal 
responsibility over the corporate one.1018 According to Bush, corporate criminal liability was 
explored in depth at Nuremberg, and was never rejected as legally unsound.1019 However, he 
disagrees with those who claim that Nuremberg signalled a normative move towards the 
establishment of corporate criminal liability.1020 Jonathan Bush argues that the reasons for not 
criminalising German armaments companies were economic rather than legal. US prosecutors 
did not want to hamper the reconstruction of the German economy.1021 
                                                 
1014 White and MacLeod, supra, p. 969; see also: Robins, N.: The Corporation that Changed the World: 
How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational, Pluto Press, London, 2006; Stone, C.: 
Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour, Harper and Row, New York, 1975, p. 15. 
1015 Cameron, L. and Chetail, V.: Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under Public 
International Law, CUP, Cambridge, 2013, p. 584. 
1016 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, London, 8 August 1945, Article 10. 
1017 Cameron and Chetail, supra, p. 585. 
1018 Liu, supra, pp. 252-254. 
1019 Bush, J.: “The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What 
Nuremberg Really Said” 2009, Vol. 109, Columbia Law Review, p. 1239. 
1020 Bush, supra, p. 1237, see n. 559 for a list of works.  
1021 Ibid., p. 1240. 
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In addition, Cameron and Chetail have identified the preparatory works of the Rome Statute as 
the foundation of international corporate criminal liability. It is important to note at the outset 
that to this day the ICC has no jurisdiction over corporate entities, nor was the act of 
mercenarism codified as an international crime under the Rome Statute, therefore leaving the 
ICC toothless in exercising any jurisdiction over PMCs. Notwithstanding this, the question of 
corporate criminal responsibility was raised in the early ILC discussions on the creation of an 
international criminal legislative body.1022 However, the notion faced significant criticism and 
was rejected due to its novel and controversial nature.1023 Ironically, while private armies 
dominated the security landscape at many periods throughout history, PMCs are often 
considered a novelty under the different bodies of IL.1024 The first preliminary statute of the ICC 
(1998) contained provisions for criminal corporate responsibility. However, consensus could not 
be reached, mainly for technical reasons.1025 In 2000 a reference to the liability of legal persons 
was made in Article 10 of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime,1026 
although it was removed in later revisions. 
There have been some instances of institutional practice within the ICL of recognising criminal 
corporate responsibility. There are existing emerging exceptions that support international 
criminal liability for corporations. One example is the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which 
is currently prosecuting two media corporations for contempt of court.1027 However, as this does 
not amount to a core crime under the STL’s statute, it is arguable that the precedent for 
international corporate liability in this case is weak.1028 There is another much more prominent 
regional example that could amount to a strong precedent in IL. Following the struggles of 
                                                 
1022 1951/53 Reports of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction of the ILC. 
1023 See: Clapham, A. in Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi (eds), supra, pp. 171-172. 
1024 Liu, supra, p. 289. 
1025 See Clapham, Jurisdiction over Legal Persons, p. 191; Schabas, supra, p. 81. 
1026 225 UNTS 275. 
1027 Prosecutor v. Mohamed et al., STL-14-05 (2014); Prosecutor v. Al Amin et al., STL-14-06 (2014). 
1028 “Corporate Responsibility for International Crimes”, Chatham House, supra, p. 6. 
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national liberation from 1960s onwards, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights has 
emerged as the driving force behind the establishment of international and regional anti-
mercenary norms. It is therefore not surprising that it became the first international court to 
recognise and criminalise corporate liability for international crimes.1029 In June 2014 members 
of the African Union (AU) approved a protocol that extended the Court’s jurisdiction “over legal 
persons, with the exception of States.” While the Court’s legislation does not contain any clauses 
specific to PMCs, its international criminal jurisdiction does recognise the crime of 
mercenarism.1030 Sadly, as noted above, there is a significant disconnect, whereby the Statute 
defines only a mercenary, and not mercenarism as an activity. In addition, the Statute’s 
definition of a mercenary derives from the International Convention against the Recruitment, 
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries of 4 December 1989, which is narrow and 
contextual.1031 
Arguably, until the act of mercenarism is defined, it cannot be used to criminalise private military 
companies for the crime of mercenarism under the jurisdiction of the Statute. In its current 
form, it can only be applied to individuals and does not prevent a company from incorporation 
with the purpose of delivering private military services. Nonetheless, the list of other crimes 
under the Court’s jurisdiction includes crimes against humanity, war crimes, corruption, and 
trafficking in persons, drugs and hazardous wastes, all the serious violations which can 
potentially be committed by PMCs and can now be tried for as corporations. This regional 
precedent is highly promising as it has the potential to contribute to the establishment of 
international legal personality for corporations in domestic and international legal systems. 
                                                 
1029 Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, May 15, 2014, STC/Legal/Min/7(I) Rev. 1, Art. 46C, available at: 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/African_Court_Protocol_-_July_2014.pdf; see also the Decision on 
the Draft Legal Instruments, Doc. Assembly/AU/8(XXIII), at 1 in African Union, Decisions, Declarations 
And Resolution, Assembly/AU/Dec.517-545(XXIII), available at: 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/decisions/9661-assembly_au_dec_517_-_545_xxiii_e.pdf. 
1030 STC/Legal/Min/7(I) Rev. 1, Article 28A, International Criminal Jurisdiction of the Court, p. 15. 
1031 See Chapter 3, pp. 113-114.  
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Part 2: How Could ICL Help Prevent Corporate Impunity of PMCs? 
There is a need to prosecute international crimes committed by corporations. How can it be 
done in the absence of international legal personality for companies and an internationally 
recognised crime of mercenarism, not to mention the existing deficiencies of international 
regulation for PMCs and given the jurisdictional limits of international tribunals?1032 
Contemporary international criminal law is normally associated with individual responsibility 
and is often envisaged through the ICC and the ad hoc Tribunals where this law is usually 
exercised.1033 While I consider the limitations associated with the application of ICL through the 
ICC, I propose to decouple the two and envisage ICL as the appropriate law that can address 
international crimes committed by corporations.1034 Just like the IMT at Nuremberg and the ICTY 
in the case of Tadic asserted jurisdiction over individuals on the basis of commission of 
international crimes,1035 the international element is integral to PMC conduct and the 
subsequent offences that may occur.  
According to Article 1 of the Rome Statute the ICC is complementary to national jurisdictions, 
which is different from the primary relationship of the ICTY and ICTR tribunals.1036 It obliges 
domestic legal systems to prosecute international crimes, and steps in if national courts are 
unwilling or unable to do so. Although it puts more pressure on national systems to develop an 
international criminal legal procedure, it also allows for some flexibility in classifying the crimes, 
which are narrowly defined at the ICC level. It also decouples ICL from the context of 
international courts and tribunals, allowing it to shift between the domestic and international 
                                                 
1032 For example, the ICC’s limit to territory of state parties and nationals of state parties. 
1033 On the ICL procedure and the ICC see: Schabbas, W.: Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court, 4th edition, CUP, Cambridge, 2011; Cryer, R., Friman, H., Robinson, D. and Wilmshurst, E.: An 
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 3rd edition, CUP, Cambridge, 2014; Schwobel, 
C. (ed.): Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction, Routledge, Abingdon, 2014. 
1034 Echoed in Schwarzenberger, G.: “The Problem of an International Criminal Law” 1950, Vol. 3 (1), 
Current Legal Problems, pp. 263-296. 
1035 Simpson, supra, pp. 44-45. 
1036 Rome Statute, Art. 1. 
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domains.1037 While the ICC is a forum for the prosecution of the most grave crimes,1038 it was not 
set up to adjudicate isolated cases. So it is important to establish whether the offences 
committed by PMCs could fit within the current categorisation of the Rome Statute. Crimes 
under the jurisdiction of the Court include genocide, aggression, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.1039 The crime of aggression,1040 defined at the Kampala Conference in 2010, is directly 
linked to state armed forces, and cannot, therefore, be applied to PMCs who are always 
contracted to deliver services on behalf of a client. The crime of aggression could only be 
extended to PMCs if they were formally incorporated into state national forces, or if their 
conduct could otherwise be attributed to the acts of the state.1041  
Arguably, it is also less possible that genocide could be perpetrated by PMC employees, as it 
requires “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”,1042 
which is unlikely to occur, especially systematically, under the contracted services of the 
company. Individual acts associated with war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as 
murder, hostage-taking, rape, or torture, are more likely to occur and do not necessitate the 
special intent (intent to destroy) of the international crime of genocide.1043 However, the 
definition by the Rome Statute of crimes against humanity imposes a limitation by considering 
these acts “as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population.”1044 Article 8 further stipulates that in order for the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction 
                                                 
1037 Simpson, supra, p. 53. 
1038 Bassiouni, C. M.: “Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and 
Contemporary Practice” 2001, Vol. 42 (1), Virginia Journal of International Law, p. 82; Cryer, R.: 
“International Criminal Law” in Evans, supra, p. 754. 
1039 Rome Statute, Art. 5 (1). 
1040 Ibid., Art. 8 bis, inserted by resolution RC/Res.6 of 11 June 2010. 
1041 See ILC Articles on attribution of conduct. 
1042 Rome Statute, Art. 6. 
1043 Simpson, supra, pp. 68-69. 
1044 Rome Statute, Art. 7 (1). 
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over war crimes, these ought to be part of a broader “plan or policy”, or identified as “part of a 
large-scale commission of such crimes”.1045 
Critics of international criminal law have questioned the autonomy and impartiality of the courts 
and prosecutors, the respect for the accused’s rights of pre-trial release, and the quality of the 
punishment.1046 Trying corporations would also make criminal court processes longer and more 
expensive.1047 Amongst the main critiques of international criminal justice is also the selectivity 
of crimes that reach the tribunals.1048 The lack of justice following the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
atomic bombings in 1945, NATO’s bombing raids on Serbia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo in 1999, are 
only a few examples that characterise the bias of so-called victors’ justice.1049 Gerry Simpson 
disagrees with the victors’ justice frame and considers war crimes trials to be political, as the 
concept of what is political is at play all the time. Compromising between idealism and realism, 
war crimes trials set out to carry out prosecutions in the political realm while also guaranteeing 
immunity to the hegemons.1050 To an extent, victors’ justice and increased politicisation are 
present across all aspects of IL.1051 Although limiting the ‘universality’ of ICL and UJ, these 
concerns should not prevent the development of the international criminal justice system. 
Daniele Archibugi sees all existing bodies of ICL as “the embryos of more robust ones that will 
be needed to guarantee global legality”, and argues that “a fully fledged international criminal 
                                                 
1045 Rome Statute, Art. 8 (1). 
1046 Zolo, supra, p. 140. 
1047 Amann, D. M.: “Capital Punishment: Corporate Criminal Liability for Gross Violations of Human 
Rights” 2000, Vol. 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, p. 334. 
1048 See: Cryer, R.: Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law 
Regime, CUP, Cambridge, 2005; McCormack, T. and Simpson, G. (eds): The Law of War Crimes: National 
and International Approaches, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997; Bull, H.: The Anarchical 
Society, Macmillan, London, 1977; Kelsen, H.: “Will the Judgement at Nuremberg Constitute a Precedent 
in International Law?” 1947, Vol. 1 (2), International Law Quarterly, pp. 153-171; Kelsen, H.: Peace 
Through Law, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1944; Roling, B. V. A.: “The Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Trials in Retrospect” in Bassiouni, C. and Nanda, U. P. (eds): A Treatise on International 
Criminal Law, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, 1973. 
1049 Zolo, supra, p. xi. 
1050 Simpson, supra, pp. 18-19. 
1051 Greene, T. P.: Wilson at Versailles: Problems in American Civilization, D.C. Heath and Company, 
Lexington, 1957; Koskenniemi, M.: “Between Impunity and Show Trials” 2002, Vol. 6, Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law, pp. 1-35.  
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court needs to be set up.”1052 Furthermore, companies operate on a different plane to 
individuals and so ICL could tackle the corporate veneer that is currently producing corporate 
impunity in the absence of criminal responsibility norms for corporations. For the same reasons, 
the implementation of the principles of UJ may clash with political interests and diplomacy, and 
this could hinder its development.1053 
The question remains as to why international criminal law should be deployed in order to invoke 
corporate criminal responsibility? ICL is based on the principle that certain human rights are so 
widely acknowledged in IL that abuses should be punished regardless of the location of the 
offence.1054 In other words, serious international crimes naturally enjoy extraterritorial 
application. Another part of the attraction of ICL is that it largely circumvents customary IL and 
common law.1055 As demonstrated in Chapter 5, corporate criminal liability for international 
crimes is available in many European jurisdictions and in the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights without resort to customary IL.  
The legislative mandate for corporate criminal liability for international crimes is enabled 
through domestic legal systems by incorporating the language of ICL.1056 Between 2004 and 
2005, Fafo conducted a study of sixteen national jurisdictions across a variety of legal systems 
and traditions to identify the practice of corporate criminal liability. The results of the survey 
showed that eleven out of sixteen countries, namely Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have 
developed provisions for the criminal liability for corporations, while Argentina, Germany, 
                                                 
1052 Archibugi, D.: “Demos and Cosmopolis” 2002, Vol. 13, New Left Review, p. 36. 
1053 Philippe, X.: “The Principles of Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity: How Do the Two 
Principles Intermesh?” 2006, Vol. 88 (862), International Review of the Red Cross, p. 376; Langer, M.: 
“The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of 
International Crimes” 2011, Vol. 105 (1), American Journal of International Law, pp. 1-49. 
1054 Thompson, R. C., Ramasastry, A. and Taylor, M. B.: “Translating UNOCAL: The Expanding Web of 
Liability for Business Entities Implicated in International Crimes” 2009, Vol. 40 (4), George Washington 
International Law Review, pp. 845-846. 
1055 Stewart, supra, p. 40. 
1056 Ibid., p. 47. 
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Indonesia, Spain, and Ukraine currently do not recognise such liability.1057 The importance of this 
research is that it is an indication of the growing inclusion of corporate persons into national 
criminal practice. At the same time, there has been an increasing trend of national courts 
extending their reach to international crimes.1058 
According to Stewart, if international crimes are defined by IL and incorporated into domestic 
legal systems, then more varied standards of blame attribution could be applied to these 
“international-crimes-made-national”.1059 Aiding and abetting, or complicity, was the most 
prominent method of attributing responsibility to corporations both in domestic legal systems 
and through the ATS.1060 ICL, on the contrary, offers a much wider selection of “modes of 
liability”, including superior responsibility, joint criminal enterprise, and more.1061 As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, by the means of the Montreux Process, seventeen states 
(including the US, the UK, China, and South Africa) officially agreed that the idea of superior 
responsibility, grounded in ICL, has a potential role in assigning responsibility for international 
crimes to PMC directors and their clients.1062 While lacking legal enforcement, the Montreux 
Process creates a clear norm concerning corporate responsibility, that can be leveraged through 
ICL.  
                                                 
1057 Ramasastry, A. and Thompson, R. C.: “Commerce, Crime and Conflict. Legal Remedies for Private 
Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law. A Survey of Sixteen Countries, Fafo report 536, 
2006, p. 13, available at: http://biicl.org/files/4364_536.pdf. 
1058 Simpson, supra, p. 134. 
1059 Standards of attribution would depend on and vary by domestic legal system; Stewart, supra, p. 40. 
1060 See: Talisman, Khulumani, etc. 
1061 See: Sepinwall, A. J.: “Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International 
Law” 2008, Vol. 30 (2), Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 251-304; Damaska, M. R.: “The 
Shadow Side of Command Responsibility” 2001, Vol. 49 (3), American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 
455-496; Van Sliedregt, E.: Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law, OUP, Oxford, 2012; 
Jain, N.: Perpetrators and Accessories in International Criminal Law: Individual Modes of Responsibility 
for Collective Crimes, Hart, Oxford, 2014; Ohlin, J. D.: “Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of 
Joint Criminal Enterprise” 2007, Vol. 5 (1), Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp. 69-90. 
1062 Chapter 5, pp. 182-183; The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, 17 
September 2008, available at 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/psechi.html. 
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Universal Jurisdiction and Piracy 
Another method adopted by ICL to address the problem of international crimes is through 
universal jurisdiction (UJ). Stephen Macedo describes UJ as “part of a wider set of political and 
legal movements to expand legal accountability and the global rule of law, and thereby to end 
impunity for serious crimes under international law.”1063 The purpose of UJ is its ability to invoke 
criminal responsibility “in respect of certain crimes irrespective of the location of the crime and 
the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”1064 Approximately 150 of the 197 UN member 
states provide for UJ for at least one of the four recognised international crimes.1065 Also, cases 
such as Demanjuk1066 in 1985, Pinochet1067 in 1999, Butare Four1068 in 2001, Pascal 
Simbikangwa1069 in 2014, and most recently the Hissène Habré trial by the Extraordinary African 
Chambers in 2015,1070 validate the practical applicability of UJ as a method of trying international 
crimes.1071 However, there is an ongoing debate amongst states as to its sources, scope, and 
application. In the sixty-fourth UN General Assembly (GA) session in 2009,1072 the delegations 
disagreed on whether the principle had become part of customary IL, or if the crimes covered 
under the principle of UJ belong to treaty law.1073 Some delegations raised concerns about an 
                                                 
1063 Macedo, S. (ed.): Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under 
International Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2004, p. 5. 
1064 International Law Association Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice: “Final 
Report on the Exercise of universal jurisdiction in respect of gross human rights offences”, 2000, p. 2. 
1065 Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2016, p. 4; note that e.g. Reydams is critical of NGO data 
collection; see: Reydams, L.: Universal Jurisdiction. International and Municipal Legal Perspectives, OUP, 
Oxford, 2004. 
1066 Demanjuk v. Petrovsky, US Court of Appeal, 6th Cir., 31.10.1985, ILR 79, 546. 
1067 House of Lords, 24 March 1999, 2 WLR 827. 
1068 Cour d’Assises de Bruxelles, 8 June 2001, available at: https://www.legal-
tools.org/en/browse/record/a70d94/. 
1069 See: Trial International, available at: https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/pascal-
simbikangwa/#section-2. 
1070 See: “The Trial of Hissène Habré”, Human Rights Watch, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/tag/hissene-habre. 
1071 Langer, M.: “Universal Jurisdiction is Not Disappearing. The Shift from ‘Global Enforcer’ to ‘No Safe 
Haven’ Universal Jurisdiction” 2015, Vol. 13 (2), Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp. 245-256. 
1072 See: http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/64/UnivJur.shtml. 
1073 Following Pinochet, a debate arose over whether the authority to prosecute the crime of torture 
derived from universal jurisdiction, or if it was the principle of customary international law (aut dedere 
aut judicare). 
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expansion of the crimes covered under UJ and suggested that it should only be used as a last 
resort, while disagreeing on the scope of crimes under the jurisdiction.1074  
For centuries the doctrine of UJ was applied only to the prosecution and punishment of the 
crime of piracy, whereby any nation could capture and try pirates it found on the high seas.1075 
The pirate was regarded as hostis humani generis or hostis omnium, an “enemy of all 
mankind”.1076 This lay the foundation for the principle that piracy should be considered a 
paradigmatic crime for which IL authorises and even requires universal enforcement and 
punishment.1077 What makes the crime of piracy a universal one is the indiscriminate harm that 
pirates cause to their victims and trade regardless of political views, geographies, or nationality. 
Piracy affects all states without discrimination, except for those states who used pirates as a 
policy vehicle, providing state harbour and creating the category of privateers. According to 
Kontorovich and Art, piracy concerns even the countries not directly involved in shipping, as 
pirate attacks raise the prices of commodities.1078 In this respect piracy is rather different to 
mercenarism, as there is always a state (or non-state) party that deliberately wishes to hire a 
private military force to further its own political conduct. Even though, as with mercenaries and 
private military contractors, pirates fall in the grey zone between military combatants and 
                                                 
1074 UN GA 64th Session, 2009, available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/64/UnivJur.shtml; UN GA 
67th Session, 2012, available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/gal3442.doc.htm; UN GA 71st 
Session, 2016, available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/gal3525.doc.htm  
1075 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Arts 3, 56(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 
400, 418; Legal Framework for the Repression of Piracy Under UNCLOS, updated 9 September 2010, 
available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_legal_framework.htm. 
1076 Neocleous, M.: “The Universal Adversary will attack: pigs, pirates, zombies, Satan and the Class War” 
2015, Vol. 8 (1), Critical Studies on Terrorism, p. 29; an alternative view, argued in the Harvard Research 
Draft Convention on Piracy, considers piracy a municipal offence that gave rise to an exception to 
exclusivity of territorial jurisdiction; see: Bingham, J. W.: “Part-IV Piracy” 1932, Vol. 26 (1, Supplement: 
Research in International Law), The American Journal of International Law, p. 757. 
1077 Kontorovich, E. and Art, S.: “An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy” 2010, 
Faculty Working Papers, Paper 38, Vol. 98 (1), California Law Review, p. 246. 
1078 Ibid., p. 252. 
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civilians,1079 the political drive behind the private security demand could be a serious obstacle 
to the criminalisation of mercenary activity.  
There is also a second pillar that supports the universality of the crime of piracy. According to 
Christopher Staker the purpose of UJ is to deliver justice against crimes that would otherwise go 
unpunished.1080 The issue of corporate impunity persists in cases of private military activity, and 
it has several roots. The problem is not only the lack of a universal definition of a mercenary, 
but also the situational and political context of existing definitions. In addition, while the AP I 
outlined a number of narrow scenarios that criminalises mercenaries, the act of mercenarism 
has not been criminalised. On that premise, PMCs were able to be incorporated as companies, 
and continue to operate under the legitimising shield of their legal personality. If mercenarism 
as an activity is criminalised, this could have two possible benefits. First of all, civilian 
participation in hostilities on behalf of a private company without a proper incorporation into a 
state’s army would be forbidden, which, as demonstrated throughout the thesis, has never been 
achieved through hard law, even if the general normative sentiment of the twentieth century 
claimed otherwise. Secondly, PMCs will no longer be able to form corporations that provide 
military services, as civilian participation in hostilities will be illegal. The criminalisation of 
mercenarism is discussed in more detail in the Recommendations section below.   
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
According to David Hirsh the notion of crimes against humanity marks a “recognition that there 
is no sovereign right to commit such crimes and that the claim made by cosmopolitan law, that 
it has jurisdiction within all sovereign states in relation to such crimes is legitimate.”1081 Falling 
under the UJ, these international crimes could potentially be extended to PMC misconduct. In 
                                                 
1079 Kontorovich and Art, supra, p. 245; pirates who were hired by states were not considered criminals, 
instead state practice legitimised privateering and distinguished it from piracy. 
1080 Staker, C.: “Jurisdiction” in Evans, supra, p. 322. 
1081 Hirsh, D.: Law Against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials, Glasshouse Press, London, 2003, p. 152. 
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May 1960 Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, captured Adolf Eichmann from his hiding place 
in Argentina and transported him to Jerusalem to be tried in an Israeli court.1082 After May 1960, 
only first degree murder could be prosecuted, while all other offences were reduced to twenty 
years of imprisonment under the statute of limitation.1083 Ironically described by Gerry Simpson 
as “a latter-day pirate” with his crimes “against all states”,1084 Eichmann was charged with crimes 
against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed under the Nazi 
regime during the Second World War.1085 The jurisdiction to try the accused in Eichmann’s case 
was the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710-1950,1086 which is equivalent to 
the “enforcement through universal jurisdiction of prohibitions under the rules of war against 
the commission of crimes against humanity.”1087 What undermines the universality of this case 
is the focus on the Jewish people, rendering it an experience of “particular groups at the hands 
of other groups” instead of a “universal experience subject to universal laws.”1088 While 
Eichmann had insisted that he was only “aiding and abetting” in the commission of the 
abovementioned crimes, the District Court of Jerusalem reached a decision that could set 
precedent to address the limitation currently posed by complicity in IL. The Court concluded 
that: 
in such an enormous and complicated crime as the one we are now considering, wherein 
many people participated at various levels and in various modes of activity – the 
planners, the organizers and those executing the acts, according to their various ranks 
– there is not much point in using the ordinary concepts of counselling and soliciting to 
commit a crime. [...] On the contrary, in general, the degree of responsibility increases 
                                                 
1082 Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann, available at: 
http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/192/Eichmann/. 
1083 Arendt, H.: Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, revised and enlarged edition, 
Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1994, p. 14. 
1084 Simpson, supra, p. 41. 
1085 Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann, Criminal Case No. 40/61, District Court of Jerusalem, Judgement 
1086 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1950-
1959/pages/nazis%20and%20nazi%20collaborators%20-punishment-%20law-%20571.aspx. 
1087 International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL, Practice Relating to Rule 157: Jurisdiction 
over War Crimes, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_il_rule157; 
the Israeli courts also cited passive personality jurisdiction and protective jurisdiction; see: Lasok, D.: 
“Eichmann Trial” 1962, Vol. 11 (2), International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 368. 
1088 Simpson, supra, p. 51. 
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as we draw further away from the man who uses the fatal instrument with his own 
hands.1089 
This judgement set a precedent for the comprehensiveness of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity or, more generally, international crimes. Therefore, it allows ICL to address the entire 
‘supply chain’ of crimes. Currently the parent company is protected by corporate law from any 
responsibility over the indiscretions of its subsidiaries. If ICL could be extended to corporations, 
it could address the challenges posed by the corporate veil and ensure the parent company’s 
liability is also invoked.  
Eichmann was a bureaucrat who, prior to his position as head of the Centre for Emigration of 
Austrian Jews in 1938, had had a rather insignificant career as a travelling sales person. A 
déclassé son of a solid middle-class family,1090 he was never truly interested in the Nazi ideology, 
nor had he read Hitler’s Mein Kampf.1091 The ‘banality of evil’, according to Hannah Arendt, lies 
in the way Eichmann’s lack of professional fulfilment and his natural talent for organisation and 
negotiation led him to setting in motion “forced emigration” and all subsequent stages of the 
Nazi Solution to the Jewish Question.1092 The bureaucratic background to a series of war crimes 
can be comparable with the banality of a company operating in politically sensitive and high risk 
regions. To quote Diane Amann, “corporations are being used as instrumentalities for great and 
unimaginable suffering.”1093 The corporate structure removes the element of aggression, 
intervention, and civilian participation in hostilities. It also obscures all those rules and norms 
that international humanitarian lawyers have worked so methodically to establish. Beyond the 
principle of the nature of crime1094 that characterised the UJ of the “Eichmann model”, the case 
also demonstrated a form of bureaucratic power on the part of an individual who worked for 
                                                 
1089 Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann, supra, para. 197. 
1090 Arendt, supra, p. 31. 
1091 Ibid., p. 33. 
1092 Ibid., see in particular chapters 2 and 3, pp. 21-55. 
1093 Amann, supra, p. 336. 
1094 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Princeton University, New Jersey, 2001, p. 28. 
235 
 
 
 
the government and executed the state’s policy through his role as a functionary. In the case of 
PMCs, we can trace the shift in governance from state to corporation, whereby PMCs in 
particular perform the bureaucratic functions of logistics, organising security operations, 
training, and, ultimately, killing. By drawing on the historical typology of mercenary activity, it 
becomes evident that states have shrunk; their functions have been limited or modified through 
privatisation and outsourcing to the private sector.  
The companies which have subsequently taken on the functions formerly owned by states have 
also inadvertently acquired a form of governance, making claims to legitimacy through self-
regulation. This newly acquired governance on the part of PMCs builds a strong case against an 
overarching criminal responsibility for corporations. In other words, companies make 
sovereignty claims by establishing international regulatory frameworks within the industry that 
promote human rights values on one hand, and do not have to answer to any judicial or state 
authority, on the other. It can be argued that the ‘responsibilisation’ approach of voluntary 
norms and industry standards falls in line with the neoliberal framework of the free market. 
However, to follow my claim for normative regulation, PMCs are different to other companies 
because they often preform inherently governmental functions and their activity takes place 
predominantly in zones of conflict or political tension. In other words, the ‘business of killing’ 
should not be self-regulated; instead PMCs’ increasing claims to sovereignty signal the need for 
criminal responsibility that ought to recognise corporations as independent actors, and tackle 
their misconduct directly.  
Part 3: Recommendations 
Having reviewed the existing regulatory landscape for corporations, and PMCs as a specific 
category, I conclude that there is a strong need for international criminal responsibility for 
corporations, in order to address the corporate impunity of PMCs and to ensure a more effective 
and responsible use of private security resources internationally. One of the many practical 
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advantages of this is that ICL and UJ allow for the trial of international crimes.1095 The need for 
corporate liability does not negate the value brought by the standard-setting regulatory 
mechanisms, such as ISO, for example. However, other industry-led self-regulatory processes, 
such as the ICoC and the Montreux Process, can act as a distraction from the legal vacuum of 
the PMC space. Ultimately, voluntary regulation can only be meaningful and beneficial in 
controlling private force if there is a strong criminalisation mechanism that could step in, should 
the soft law fail to govern.  
In order to tackle the challenge of prosecuting international crimes committed by corporations, 
I propose to explore the opportunities within international criminal law. ICL could offer a way of 
constructing a criminal corporate responsibility that is appropriate for the contemporary 
security landscape and which would be capable of adapting to changing governance structures. 
International crimes in ICL can address the entire ‘supply chain’ of crimes, thereby tackling the 
challenges posed by the corporate veil. As ruled in Eichmann, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are comprehensive enough to extend responsibility beyond the individual firing the 
gun.1096 If transferred to corporations, this could ensure the parent company is also held 
responsible.  
With that in mind, I propose four possible criminalisation options that explore different methods 
of employing ICL and exercising it in different fora, domestic, international, and transnational. 
Each method considers the advantages and possible challenges that may arise, bearing in mind 
the current critique of the international justice system, the existing deficiencies of PMC 
regulation, and associated state practice. The first option explores criminalisation of the act of 
mercenarism through universal jurisdiction. The following three options partially circumvent the 
need for state buy-in on criminalising mercenarism, adopting the framework of ICL to prosecute 
                                                 
1095 Philippe, supra, p. 377. 
1096 On different forms of criminal liability see Chapter 15 “General Principles of Liability” in Cryer, 
Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst, supra, pp. 353-397. 
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companies for already codified criminal acts under UJ and the Rome Statute. These 
recommendations should be treated as proposals that, while they could address the key 
loophole of the corporate impunity of PMCs, each require a deeper analysis to enable 
implementation.  
1. Criminalising Mercenarism  
One way of criminalising the act of mercenarism is for it to be added to the list of grave crimes 
covered by the UJ. By adopting the approach to UJ that justifies the principle based on the nature 
of crimes, then by analogy UJ can be claimed by states if the act is a crime under IL. This option 
could materialise either through customary IL, or via a treaty process such as the Geneva 
Conventions.1097 The limitations of treaty-based regulation have been discussed in depth in 
previous chapters, and the impotence of the UN Mercenary Convention is an indication as to 
how future efforts to criminalise mercenarism through treaty law will pan out. After the Arrest 
Warrant Case in 20001098 there has been a shift away from the “Eichmann model” which focuses 
on the nature of offence towards state behaviour, requiring a strong precedent to justify 
application of UJ.1099 Unlike the Princeton definition that solely emphasises the “nature of the 
crime, without regard to where the crime was committed”,1100 more recent attempts to define 
UJ outline three state-focused conditions, in which at least one should apply to meet the legal 
principle. The infraction must either be committed in the territory of the state, or by a national 
of the state, or the victim must be a citizen of the state in question.1101 Possible challenges that 
                                                 
1097 There is a debate in legal academic literature over whether treaty-based UJ is a separate principle of 
aut dedere aut judicare; see: Da Rocha Ferreira, A. et al.: “The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (aut 
dedere aut judicare)” 2013, Vol. 1, International Law Commission, UFRGS Model United Nations Journal, 
pp. 204-205. 
1098 Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium. 
1099 Reydams, 2004, supra; Reydams, L.: “The rise and fall of universal jurisdiction” in Schabas, W. and 
Bernaz, N. (eds): Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, Routledge, Abingdon, 2011, pp. 
337-354. 
1100 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Princeton University, New Jersey, 2001, p. 28. 
1101 Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2016, Make Way for Justice 2, p. 3. 
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would arise from this shift are related to the state-centric model of UJ, which, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, is unlikely to succeed under the current mode of global governance.  
Although both avenues are likely to face considerable challenges to state acceptance and 
implementation, I shall consider this option in more detail. As discussed earlier, UJ is aimed at 
delivering justice in respect of crimes that would otherwise go unpunished, as in the case of 
mercenary activity. It is important not only to criminalise a mercenary, but also to codify the 
crime of mercenarism, as originally attempted by the OAU Convention and now codified under 
the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, in order to establish 
responsibility under IL. Mercenaries are used, trained, and recruited by a contracting party, 
meaning they need financing and a direction in order to perform their function. It is not sufficient 
to criminalise the mercenary as they are simply a tool of aggression on behalf of a contracting 
party. The importance of codification lies in the blurred lines between mercenaries, PSCs, and 
PMCs. It is thus crucial to define the intended activity and not just the actor when approaching 
the question of regulation. Criminalisation of the act of mercenarism could restrict civilian, or 
more accurately non-combatant, participation in hostilities. This will mean that states will be 
forced to incorporate private military contractors into their own forces, therefore taking on the 
responsibility under the ILC Articles. In this way, criminalising mercenarism could also potentially 
increase state responsibility under IL.  
The criminalisation of mercenarism could not only prevent civilians from direct participation in 
hostilities, but could also help to regulate the companies themselves. It could address the issue 
of PMC regulation from the corporate perspective. According to the provisions of corporate and 
contract law, companies cannot be formed with a purpose of engaging in illegal activities. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the failure to criminalise mercenarism following the end of the Cold War 
gave rise to a multitude of private military companies. If mercenarism, or the provision of private 
armed forces for combat purposes, is deemed criminal, then private military companies will not 
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be incorporated to pursue belligerent goals. Of course, companies could fail to declare the 
provision of military services as part of their functions yet continue to supply these services 
covertly. However, this would then qualify as misconduct and create liability. 
Another advantage of criminalising mercenarism through UJ is the strength of national 
commitment to the international community, as a state would have to take necessary measures 
to ensure the UJ can be exercised in national courts.1102 At the same time, this could also pose a 
serious challenge. There are other doctrinal limitations to this solution. Currently there is no 
legally neutral, universal definition of the act of mercenarism, while the existing definitions can 
be conflicting and restricted by political context. The same is seen in the failure to codify 
terrorism as an international crime. Due to the lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism 
amongst states, customary IL does not currently provide for the prosecution of ‘terrorist’ acts 
under the universality principle.1103  
As to state exercised precedent, in 2015 alone the principle of UJ was applied to forty cases, 
with arrests, indictments, or convictions achieved in twenty-seven cases, significantly exceeding 
the 2014 results.1104 Moreover, as part of the UN GA’s seventy-first session on the scope and 
application of the principle of UJ,1105 Georgia advised that participation of mercenaries in armed 
conflicts or military actions is codified in Article 410 of chapter XLVII of the Criminal Code as part 
of specific legislation relating to UJ.1106 However, other recent examples of the exercise of UJ in 
Spain and Belgium have demonstrated the prevalence of sovereign interests over international 
justice.1107 In 2003, as a result of the US threat to move the NATO headquarters out of 
                                                 
1102 Philippe, supra, p. 387. 
1103 See: United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 97 (2nd Circuit, 2003); in the Spanish UJ case of Pinochet, 
one of the crimes he was charged with was terrorism, as defined in Spanish law; see: Wilson, R. J.: 
“Prosecuting Pinochet in Spain”, available at: 
https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v6i3/pinochet.htm. 
1104 Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2016, p. 7. 
1105 A/71/111, Item 85 of the preliminary list, 28 June 2016. 
1106 Ibid., Table 2. 
1107 Simpson, supra, p. 42. 
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Brussels,1108 the Belgian legislature revoked provisions of its extraterritorial 1993 UJ law.1109 
Meanwhile the Spanish Parliament “acted to limit the jurisdiction over human rights cases in 
2009.”1110 The amendment stipulated that, in order for UJ to apply, the victims must be of 
Spanish nationality, the alleged perpetrators must be in Spain, or there should be an important 
connecting link with Spain, and that another jurisdiction or an international criminal court 
should not have initiated investigation and prosecution of those offences.1111 More recently, in 
2014, a new amendment was issued, limiting the jurisdiction to cases initiated by public 
prosecutors and victims.1112  
Most importantly, the implementation of this option would be subject to the prevailing 
relationship between states and military actors. The clear privatisation trend, coupled with the 
practice of ‘small’ government, signals the desire of states to use PMCs and incorporate private 
security into government policy. The limitation of governmental functions results in the 
outsourcing of various tasks to private companies, including security. In other words, states are 
unlikely to accept mercenarism as an international crime under UJ because they are leading PMC 
clients and willingly use private military resources.  
2. Include Corporations (or at Least PMCs) in the Jurisdiction of the Rome Statute  
Another option for establishing criminal corporate responsibility for international crimes is 
through the international forum of the ICC. In other words, corporations should also be made 
                                                 
1108 Ratner, supra, pp. 890-891. 
1109 Human Rights Watch: Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, 1 August, 2003, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed; Reydams, L.: 
“Belgium reneges on Universality: The 5 August 2003 Act on Grave Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law” 2003, Vol. 1 (3), Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp. 679-689. 
1110 Kirshner, supra, p. 16. 
1111 See: Boletín Oficial Del Estado, No. 266, 4 November 2009; Kern, S.: “Spain Rethinks Universal 
Jurisdiction” 31 January 2014, Gatestone Institute International Policy Council, available at: 
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4149/spain-universal-jurisdiction. 
1112 Article 23 (4) of the 1985 Organic Law of the Judicial Power; Molto, J. E. E.: “The ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ to Impunity. Burying Universal Jurisdiction in Spain and Returning to the Paradigm of Human 
Rights as ‘domaine reserve’ of States” 2015, Vol. 13 (5), Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp. 
1121-1144. 
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liable under IL alongside individuals for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute. PMCs 
demand an even greater scrutiny due to the military nature of their business and the fact that 
their services are always delivered outside of their home state, so the international element is 
inevitable. If corporations acquire international legal personality, they can then be liable for war 
crimes in an international conflict, rather than only non-international; currently PMCs are 
treated as a civilian component of an operation, not military. This change in PMC status would 
expand the scope of potential violations and curtail corporate impunity.  
The first underlying principle of the Rome Statute, the principle of complementarity, stipulates 
that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction only when national legal systems are unable or unwilling 
to do so.1113 This means that domestic courts prevail in cases of simultaneous jurisdiction. “The 
court is not intended to replace national courts, but operates only when they do not.”1114 While 
it assumes that both domestic and international criminal justice systems ought to function in a 
subsidiary manner,1115 it does not negate the need for recognition of international criminal 
responsibility for corporations, for two reasons. First, corporate criminal liability is not 
consistently codified across all domestic legal systems, meaning that the ICC could be the sole 
avenue for such jurisdiction.1116 Second, the principle of complementarity does not apply 
uniformly across all international courts. The ICTY and the ICTR ad hoc Tribunals both prevail 
over national courts in cases of concurrent jurisdiction.1117 Alongside all the above-mentioned 
advantages of ICL application, the use of an international forum has the advantage of 
                                                 
1113 Rome Statute, Article 17(2). 
1114 Arsanjani, M. H.: “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” 1999, Vol. 93 (1), The 
American Journal of International Law, pp. 24-25. 
1115 Philippe, supra, p. 380. 
1116 However, the key rationale behind Art. 17 on complementarity is to urge states into getting their 
domestic legal order into shape.  
1117 Article 9 of the ICTY Statute: International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, p. 7; Article 8 of the ICTR Statute: Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for 
Genocide and Other such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 
January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. 
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extraterritoriality. While the ICC is only applicable to state parties, the nationals of non-parties 
who committed a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction can be subjected to it.1118 The UN Security 
Council can refer a case to the ICC involving non-party nationals, or the ICC can have jurisdiction 
if an act was committed on the territory of a state party by a non-party national.1119 
So, if the ICC’s jurisdiction extended to corporations, or even PMCs specifically, this could 
overcome the territorial barrier of national jurisdiction. Unfortunately, this extraterritoriality is 
highly conditional. Although the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, it does not 
exercise UJ as it was specifically rejected in the proceedings of the Rome Statute,1120 significantly 
limiting its extraterritorial reach. This means that the biggest PMC providers and clients, namely 
the US, China, and Russia, would not be subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction, having not ratified the 
Rome Statute.1121 Furthermore, different immunity mechanisms shield UK and the US military 
personnel from ICC investigations.1122 What complicates matters further is that the ICC was not 
set up to deal with isolated cases of international crimes; instead it is perceived as a forum where 
only the most heinous and systematic crimes ought to be tried, such as genocide, crimes of 
aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.1123 The need to prove that the offences 
were systematic could potentially obstruct the prosecution of one-off cases and continue to 
foster PMC impunity. Lacking the general requirement of being “widespread and systematic”, 
                                                 
1118 See Bassiouni, supra, p. 92: “in the territory of a state party or against citizens of a state party, and 
are found in the territory of a state party or in the territory of a non-party willing to cede jurisdiction to 
the ICC.”  
1119 Rome Statute, Article 13. 
1120 Simpson, G.: Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International Law, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 47. 
1121 In October 2016 Burundi, South Africa, and Gambia withdrew from the ICC. Experts believe that 
Kenya, Namibia, and Uganda could be among the next countries to leave the Court. Sieff, K.: “Gambia is 
the latest African country deciding to pull out of International Criminal Court” 26 October 2016, The 
Washington Post, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gambia-latest-african-country-
deciding-to-pull-out-of-international-criminal-court/2016/10/26/7f54d068-c4ca-440f-848f-
e211ba29dc34_story.html?utm_term=.d33089cea7d2. 
1122 Simpson, supra, p. 17. 
1123 Rome Statute, Art. 5, also reflected in the IMT Charter at Nuremberg. 
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the case of Baha Mousa,1124 an Iraqi civilian who was beaten to death while detained by British 
army soldiers in 2003, never made it to the ICC. The systematic element could pose an issue for 
PMC regulation, as single violations that do not form part of a large-scale action will not qualify 
as crimes against humanity and, therefore, will not be accepted by the Court. Equally, other 
serious crimes, such as human rights abuses, gross negligence, etc., are currently not covered 
by the Statute, signalling the potential need for a new category. Until codified by the 
international military tribunals at the end of the Second World War, the types of crimes 
committed by the Nazis, such as crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression, did not exist 
under IL.1125 Perhaps if corporations are recognised as actors under IL by the Rome Statute, a 
new type of crime, a corporate international crime, needs to be codified in order to reflect the 
gross misconduct of PMCs in military support operations abroad.  
Another hurdle that IL would have to overcome is the narrow responsibility of complicity for 
corporations,1126 as well as the narrow catalogue of crimes currently tried before the ICC. It is 
not sufficient for only the most important crimes to be tried before the ICC,1127 as it would leave 
less grave PMC misconduct unpunished. Without a doubt, not all PMC violations will require a 
criminal justice response, so there is still room for social corporate responsibility to regulate less 
heinous violations. Whether this should be done on the domestic level, or brought to the 
international forum, is a question of implementation and subject to further research, as the fact 
remains that PMCs operate internationally and differ from other corporations based on the 
nature of their business. 
                                                 
1124 Williams, A.: “Baha Mousa will never get justice while the army investigates itself” 12 September 
2013, The Guardian, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/12/baha-
mousa-justice-army-lawrence. 
1125 Schabas, supra, p. 6; Simpson, supra, p. 40. 
1126 See: Clapham, A. and Jerbi, S.: “Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights” 2000-2001, 
Vol. 24, Hastings International & Comparative Law Review, pp. 339-349; Clapham, A.: “Extending 
International Criminal Law beyond the Individual to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups” 2008, 
Vol. 6 (5), Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp. 899-926. 
1127 Philippe, X.: “The Principles of Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity: How Do the Two 
Principles Intermesh?” 2006, Vol. 88 (862), International Review of the Red Cross, p. 384. 
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Another limitation of IL as a forum for international criminal responsibility for corporations is 
the lack of widely recognised international criminal responsibility for corporations, outside of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, and the very narrow precedent set by the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon. Even if the jurisdiction of the international courts is extended to legal 
persons, the ICC and the Tribunals would have to develop or adopt legal procedures for the 
criminal trial of a corporation rather than a natural person. Here I refer to the existing procedural 
difficulties associated with corporations, addressed in detail in Chapter 5. International legal 
space remains highly politicised as the ICTY and ICTR have limited jurisdictional reach, while the 
principle of the complementarity of the ICC tasks domestic courts with prosecuting international 
crimes.1128 So before corporations can be tried at the international courts, first, it appears, the 
international criminal procedure would need to be significantly amended.  
3. ‘Downloading’ ICL to Domestic Legal Systems 
The solution could nevertheless be implemented through domestic legal systems.1129 If 
undertaken across a considerable number of states, this approach could arguably be more 
effective in terms of enforcement than that of the international courts, due to their tendency to 
take on only the most serious crimes. By adopting ICL in domestic legal systems, corporate 
responsibility could bypass the limitation of complicity posed by corporate criminal procedure, 
and potentially expose corporations to a greater level of criminal responsibility in the event of 
misconduct. Furthermore, a ‘domestic’ solution could overcome the resistance of international 
law practitioners to the recognition of corporate legal personality. Given the international 
nature of PMC activity, domestic case law would provide grounds for developing customary 
international law. In addition, choosing a national legal system as the criminal liability forum for 
                                                 
1128 Simpson, supra, p. 50. 
1129 An example of a purely domestic proposal is to replicate US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act) in Ganesan, A.: “One of the 
Missing Pieces in the Accountability Puzzle” 11 April 2015, Human Rights Watch, available at: 
http://jamesgstewart.com/one-of-the-missing-pieces-in-the-accountability-puzzle/. 
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corporate bodies gives domestic courts a relative freedom of interpretation, which would not 
be the case on the international level, where consensus would have to be reached on a number 
of provisions, including definitions and enforcement. Finally, this issue of extraterritoriality could 
be resolved under UJ for the most serious international crimes, as opposed to the first option 
which suggests codifying the crime of mercenarism as a new offence under UJ.1130 By applying 
UJ to PMCs as corporations who are found to have committed grave international crimes, such 
as war crimes, crimes against humanity, etc., companies could be tried at any national court 
without having to rely on the geographical coverage of domestic legal systems. On the other 
hand, it could mean continued disparity in the treatment of PMC violations and a lack of 
coherent regulation standards for corporate crimes. Divergence amongst states as to how they 
define the crime and what jurisdiction they assert over it poses difficulties for the emergence of 
a customary international law rule. The territorial limitation would leave room for impunity, as 
not all states would be willing to embrace international criminal responsibility for corporations. 
This could also exacerbate corporate impunity should PMCs shift their business to the states 
where corporate criminal liability is not recognised.  
4. Employing Transnational Law to Construct Corporate Criminal Responsibility  
Similar to the previous option, transnational criminal law suggests “the indirect suppression by 
international law through domestic penal law of criminal activities that have actual or potential 
trans-boundary effects.”1131 Forming part of ICL, transnational criminal law (TCL) still benefits 
from the international dimension in which the crimes are committed, but is not limited to the 
core international crimes1132 and reliance on customary international law.1133 Due to PMCs 
                                                 
1130 I use the interpretation that reads UJ as ‘any state’ can prosecute, as per the Eichmann case, 
practices in Belgium, Randall, K.C.: “Universal Jurisdiction under International Law” 1988, Vol. 66 (4), 
Texas Law Review 785-841. 
1131 Boister, N.: “‘Transnational Criminal Law’?” 2003, Vol. 14 (5), European Journal of International Law, 
pp. 955. 
1132 Articles 5 – 8 of the Rome Statute. 
1133 Boister, N.: An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law, OUP, Oxford, 2012, p. 18. 
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operating mostly in post-war environments, it may be problematic to argue for heinous 
systematic crimes in many cases of PMC offences. As part of broader misconduct, acts of 
murder, torture, rape, etc., all constitute a crime against humanity1134 and are on the ICC Rome 
Statute list of international crimes. TCL could, however, overcome this limitation as the 
catalogue of transnational crimes1135 covers of a wide variety of offences, including organised, 
white-collar and political crime.1136 
By employing transnational law, this solution could be seen as loosely replicating the ATS 
principle, only through criminal, not purely social corporate responsibility. In its current form, 
transnational criminal law is arguable more suitable to corporations than international law as it 
does not require the same extent of adjustments or recognition of international legal 
personality. According to Bassiouni, transnational crimes are those committed by private or non-
state actors.1137 Such classification is more tailored to PMC conduct as it removes the necessity 
of establishing the link to state bodies in order for PMC crimes to be recognised as international 
or as part of state conduct in a different state.  
However, a great extent of scholarly and practical development is necessary to realise this 
recommendation as private military activity does not fall organically within the realm of 
transnational criminal law. TCL predominantly targets the criminal market,1138 while the PMC 
activity is a priori legitimate and only becomes an unregulated issue when human rights abuses 
and other serious offences occur. TCL is limited to offences covered by a suppression 
                                                 
1134 Rome Statute, Art. 7; in Tadic, amongst other charges, the Appeals Chamber found Dusko Tadic 
guilty of one count of murder as a crime against humanity and one count of murder as a violation of the 
laws of war; IT-94-1-ES, Decision of the President, para. 7. 
1135 The term was first used at the Fifth UN Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of 
Offenders in 1975; see: Williams, P. and Vlassis, D. (eds.): Combatting Transnational Crime: Concept, 
Activities, Responses, Frank Class, London, 2001. 
1136 Boister, 2012, supra, p. 4. 
1137 Bassiouni, C. M.: “An Appraisal of the Growth and Developing Trends of International Criminal 
Law” 1974, Vol. 45, Revue Internationale de Droit Penal, p. 421. 
1138 Such as drug and human trafficking, cross border contraband, money laundering etc., see Boister, 
2012, supra, p. 15. 
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convention,1139 so state buy-in is necessary to willingly suppress a particular form of conduct. 
For PMC regulation it could either mean following the existing framework of transnational 
crimes,1140 or designing a new category of human rights violation by PMCs transnationally. While 
such convention requires governmental consent, it does not prevent the use of PMCs or demand 
the criminalisation of PMC activity as such. Instead, it would specifically target gross misconduct 
and offences that would call for criminal liability on the domestic level, or if committed by an 
individual. Therefore, criminalisation of serious PMC offences through transnational criminal 
law could offer the most tailored approach to regulation in the context of global governance.1141 
While the disparity in prosecuting legal persons exists on the national level and should, without 
a doubt, be recognized as a limitation, the private nature of transnational crimes makes the 
inclusion of corporate liability in the suppression conventions more likely. The United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) both oblige state parties “consistent with its legal 
principles, to establish the liability of legal persons”.1142 
This solution would naturally be enforced through a domestic forum. Alternatively, the 
precedent of the Extraordinary African Chambers1143 allows for the ad hoc establishment of a 
new special tribunal while national courts streamline the corporate prosecution procedures. 
This solution, coupled with the ‘domestic’ option described above, would produce 
comprehensive coverage while overcoming doctrinal difficulties. 
  
                                                 
1139 See Boister, N.: “Human Rights Protections in the Suppression Conventions” 2002, Vol. 2 (2), Human 
Rights Law Review, pp. 199-227. 
1140 E.g.: The International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting of Currency, 20 April 1929; 
UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 20 December 1988, 
the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, etc. 
1141 Drawing upon the relationship between the form of governance and the type of power, analysed in 
chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
1142 Article 26 of UNCAC and Article 10 of UNTOC. 
1143 See: http://www.chambresafricaines.org.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has surveyed an extensive terrain, from the feudal lords and fifteenth-century Italian 
condottieri who contracted their own troops in local wars, to the professional mercenary 
soldiers of the absolute monarchies of continental Europe, to the outsourced governance of the 
East India Company, to the modern-day PMC contractors working for legitimate private 
corporations. The historical analysis provided the necessary context, demonstrating the use of 
private military forces by different types of state both in the past and today. It afforded me the 
broader benefit of understanding the suitability and efficacy of existing and future legislation 
that administer this relationship between the state and military force. Tracing the patterns of 
state behaviour and their likely choice of security policy depending on the governmental model 
and the characteristics they exercise, allows me to draw conclusions addressing the use and 
regulation of private military actors today and into the future.  
The contemporary relationship between power and legitimacy demonstrates a number of 
conflicts between legitimate systems. As revealed in Chapter 5, the coexistence of domestic, 
international and industry-level regulatory systems is not complementary. Instead these 
conflicting legitimising systems claim authority over the private sources of power without a true 
effective and coherent enforcement. The conflict of emerging ‘responsibilisation’ and 
criminalisation approaches is also likely to create a dissonance and polarisation between the 
states in the two opposing regulatory camps.  
By utilising the concepts of power and legitimacy, this thesis traces the evolving nature of state 
power, authority, law, and economic power, and the way these shifts influence the relationships 
between the concepts from a socio-historical perspective. In the context of this research, 
legitimacy is best envisaged in terms of acceptance and validation of power, while power is 
understood as the military force that prevails in any given form of governance. Throughout this 
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thesis I have tried to analyse the manifestations of private violence in different forms of 
governance and the corresponding responses to this private force, in order to demonstrate a 
range of different normative standpoints concerning mercenaries, private armies, and PMCs.  
The socio-historical approach provides a wide scope for analysis of the seemingly contemporary 
issue of the use and regulation of private military companies. The concept of legitimacy predates 
that of the modern state and IL, and can serve as an indicator of the normative behaviour of a 
state. Legitimacy transforms into norms and has the ability to drive policy. Thinking critically 
about historical forms of state and military allows us to identify regulation in previously 
unsuspected places. For example, Machiavelli’s civilian militia was an ideological pushback 
against the overwhelming mercenary activity in sixteenth-century Italy, while the legitimacy of 
neoliberal ideas rationalised the outsourcing and privatisation of security in the US and the UK 
since the 1980s. 
Current regulation of private military space highlights the fact that power is out of 
synchronisation with the demands of legitimacy and cannot be adequately managed. There is, 
therefore, a need for legitimacy that responds to new and changing forms of power in the 
context of state-military relations. The regulation of killing and human rights violations needs to 
be taken seriously, whether these are committed by individuals, a state, or a corporation. Social 
corporate responsibility is insufficiently strong to single-handedly fulfil the function of creating 
responsibility. It lacks legally binding instruments to criminalise wrongful behaviour. Nor are the 
control mechanisms of state responsibility always reliable, due to the biased relationship and 
frequent reliance of states on PMCs. Referring to the historical analysis, it is unlikely that this 
reliance, at least for the biggest PMC client states, will diminish in the next few decades. In order 
to overcome the problem of corporate immunity, an international criminal response ought to 
be freed from the state responsibility limitation.  
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At the outset, this thesis sought to question the ability of existing PMC regulation to adequately 
control private force and its capacity for delivering justice in the event of infringement. In other 
words, it asked whether current IL can effectively regulate PMCs and if it is suitable for the 
system of global governance? The contemporary legal analysis of Chapter 5 answers the first 
part of the question, and the historical enquiry spanning chapters 2, 3, and 4 contributes to the 
latter.  
The legal analysis identified the gap between existing regulation and justice, while the historical 
patterns of relationships between states and military force provided insight into the 
effectiveness of existing and future regulatory responses. PMC regulation, current and 
developing, can be broadly divided into the ‘responsibilisation’ and criminalisation approaches. 
Although the soft norms of ‘responsibilisation’ are aimed at raising standards and PMC respect 
for human rights, they run a risk of creating a veneer of false legitimacy while lacking legal 
enforcement and any tangible mechanisms of delivering justice. The proposed criminalisation 
efforts, on the other hand, are state-centric and are likely to create a divergence between the 
states in the two opposing regulatory camps.  
By examining the questions of the use and regulation of PMCs, this thesis also highlighted the 
main source of impunity, namely the lack of a strong norm of corporate responsibility and, 
particularly, international criminal liability for corporations. The proposal to deploy international 
criminal law as an appropriate PMC criminalisation mechanism is based on a number of 
principles. International criminal responsibility for corporations shifts the focus from states to 
PMCs as companies. By taking on functions that are considered to be inherently governmental, 
PMCs have acquired a new, more significant role in their relationship with states, a role that 
needs to be appropriately governed. State reliance on outsourced, privatised security is unlikely 
to diminish in the foreseeable future, while the model of small, relatively decentralised 
government prevails.  
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Furthermore, PMC activity is international, making PMC regulation an international issue of a 
merged military-civilian realm. Due to the military nature of their activity, international criminal 
responsibility for PMCs is required to address gross human rights violations, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, and other international crimes. Finally, the formulation of 
international criminal liability for corporations would reinforce state responsibility and, coupled 
with selected industry standards, could bridge the legal gaps created by problems with contract 
law and the legal personality of PMCs.  
While the above recommendations could address key gaps in PMC regulation and improve 
accountability mechanisms, it is important to remember that the current form of governance 
poses an inherent limitation on the notion of the state monopoly of force. The rise of competing 
actors in international relations, as well as the conscious changes in government policy to limit 
the role of the state and outsource some of its functions, inevitably creates space for private 
military actors to exist. International law will struggle to fully criminalise and eliminate the risk 
of the unethical use of private force. However, by identifying the key sources of impunity across 
the supply chain of private military power, we can target the issues of corporate responsibility 
of PMCs. International criminal law offers a number of possible complementary avenues to 
implement a more robust mechanism to try and punish companies that to date have escaped 
liability for gross offences and violations by virtue of their corporate legal personhood.  
Although the implementation of the proposed options requires further scrutiny, the 
criminalisation of gross corporate misconduct could ensure a more efficient and controlled use 
of private military resources by states and international organisations, making PMCs a welcome, 
rather than a feared, addition to the security landscape. 
 
  
252 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
International Legal Bodies that Attempt to Regulate Private Military Space 
 
International Law 
 
Human Rights Law 
International 
Humanitarian Law 
Customary IL 
Int. Criminal 
Law 
Type of 
Responsibility 
UN WG on 
Mercenaries 
Draft 
convention 
on PMSC 
IWG-
proposed 
binding 
instrument 
on Business 
& HR 
Guiding 
Principles for 
Implementatio
n of the UN’s 
“Protect, 
Respect and 
Remedy” 
Framework 
Juridical 
Status of 
Irregular 
Combatants 
under IHLAC 
jus in 
bello 
jus ad 
bellum 
ILC 
Draft Code 
of Crimes 
against 
Peace and 
Security of 
Mankind 
1991 
ICC 
Individual (PMC 
Contractor) 
y     y       y y 
State 
responsibility 
y y y   y y y y   
Corporate 
(PMC) 
y y y              
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Appendix 2 
Industry and Domestic Legal Bodies that Attempt to Regulate Private Military Space 
 
Industry Domestic Law 
 Self-Regulatory Bodies Corporate Law Contract Law Criminal Law Tort Law 
Type of Responsibility 
ICoC for 
Private 
Security 
Providers 
Montreux 
Document 
OECD’s 
Guidelines for 
Multinational 
Enterprises  
Societas 
delibquere non 
potest 
Contracts 
between PMC 
and Client, and 
between PMC 
and Contractor 
Corporate 
Criminal 
Liability 
ATCA & TVPA 
UK Corporate 
Manslaughter 
Act 
Individual (PMC 
Contractor) 
y y     y y y 
State responsibility   y     y     
Corporate (PMC) y  y y y y y y 
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